State v. RMH

• Decision Date: 24 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. C0-99-559.,C0-99-559.
• Citation: 617 N.W.2d 55
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, petitioner, Appellant, v. R.M.H., Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

617 N.W.2d 55

STATE of Minnesota, petitioner, Appellant, v. R.M.H., Respondent.

No. C0-99-559.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

August 24, 2000.

Rehearing Denied October 3, 2000.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice.

The issue before us is whether the State of Minnesota has jurisdiction to enforce its speeding and driver's license laws against an Indian who commits these offenses on a state highway located on the reservation of a tribe of which the Indian is not an enrolled member. The district court concluded that Minnesota does have jurisdiction over an Indian who is not an enrolled member of the tribe on whose reservation the offenses occurred. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that federal law does not distinguish between tribes and reservations in granting a state jurisdiction over offenses committed on an Indian reservation. We reverse the court of appeals.

On October 29, 1998, R.M.H., then 15 years old, drove a motor vehicle on a state highway within the boundaries of the reservation of the White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians. A Becker County police officer stopped R.M.H. for driving 14 miles per hour in excess of the posted 50 mile-per-hour speed limit. After the stop, the officer gave R.M.H. a citation for violating Minn.Stat. § 169.14 (1998) (speeding) and Minn.Stat. § 171.02 (1998) (driving without a license).¹

R.M.H. appeared in Becker County District Court on February 24, 1999, for both offenses. During that appearance, R.M.H. stipulated that he was driving 14 miles per hour in excess of the speed limit and was driving without a valid driver's license.² R.M.H. and the state then stipulated that R.M.H. was not an enrolled member of the White Earth Band, although his mother is a member of the band.³ Finally, they stipulated that R.M.H. is an enrolled member of the Forest County Potawatomi Community in Crandon, Wisconsin and that the offenses occurred within the boundaries of the White Earth Reservation.

Following the district court's acceptance of this stipulation, R.M.H. moved the court to dismiss the charges against him on jurisdictional grounds. R.M.H. argued that under Pub.L. 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1998), and this court's decision in State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725 (Minn.1997), Minnesota did not have jurisdiction over these traffic offenses. More specifically, R.M.H. argued that the state lacked jurisdiction because he is an Indian for the purposes of federal law, the offenses occurred in "Indian country," and the offenses were civil/regulatory. The state disagreed, arguing that neither Pub.L. 280 nor Stone applies here because R.M.H. is not an enrolled member of the White Earth Band. The district court agreed with the state, concluding that R.M.H. was subject to state jurisdiction. The court then denied R.M.H.'s motion to dismiss, found him guilty of the cited offenses, and ordered him to pay fines and surcharges totaling $167.50.

The court of appeals reversed the district court, concluding that Pub.L. 280, which grants Minnesota jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country, does not differentiate between tribes or reservations. See State v. R.M.H., 602 N.W.2d 411, 412 (Minn.App.1999). In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals cited our decision in Topash v. Commissioner of Revenue, 291 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn.1980). More specifically, the court of appeals stated that, in Topash, this court "recognized, in a different context, that Public Law 280 makes no distinctions among Indians of various tribes." R.M.H., 602 N.W.2d at 412 (citing Topash, 291 N.W.2d at 682). The court of appeals then held that, under Stone, the state lacked subject matter jurisdiction over R.M.H.'s traffic offenses. See R.M.H., 602 N.W.2d at 413. On appeal to this court, the state challenges the court of appeals' holding that Minnesota lacked subject matter jurisdiction over R.M.H.'s offenses.

I.

We review issues of jurisdiction de novo. See Minnesota Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Metropolitan Council, 587 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Minn.1999). State jurisdiction over Indians is governed by federal statutes or case law. See Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 728; see also National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855-56, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985). The United States Supreme Court has approved an analytical framework for determining whether state law applies to an Indian in Indian country. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207, 210, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987) ("public policy test" superceded by Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988) with respect to Class III gaming, see generally United States v. E.C. Invs., Inc., 77 F.3d 327 (9th Cir.1996)). Under this framework, state law does not generally apply to tribal Indians on their reservation absent express consent from Congress. See id. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1083. However, even absent such express consent, a state may exercise its authority if the operation of federal law does not preempt it from doing so. See id. at 215, 107 S.Ct. 1083.

In State v. Stone, we resolved an issue similar to the one we face here. 572 N.W.2d 725 (Minn.1997). Therefore, the same analytical framework that we applied in Stone is appropriate here. In Stone, the state charged enrolled members of the White Earth Band with violating state traffic laws while on their reservation and the band members contested state jurisdiction over their offenses. Id. at 728. In order to determine whether Congress had expressly consented to state jurisdiction, we first examined Pub.L. 280, which expressly grants Minnesota broad criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over specified areas of Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a); see also Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1083. We held that Pub.L. 280 did not expressly grant Minnesota jurisdiction because we determined that the charged offenses were civil/regulatory rather than criminal in nature. See Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 731. Recognizing that "[t]he Supreme Court has not established a per se rule prohibiting the exercise of state jurisdiction * * * in the absence of an express congressional grant of jurisdiction," we then addressed whether exceptional circumstances existed so that Minnesota could nonetheless exercise jurisdiction. See id. at 731-32. We ultimately concluded that the state lacked jurisdiction over the offenses committed by these enrolled members of the White Earth Band. See id. In this case, we are presented with the question of whether the same legal principles that barred state jurisdiction in Stone apply where the offender is an Indian, but is not an enrolled member of the governing tribe. Here, as in Stone, we first must look to Pub.L. 280 to determine whether Congress has expressly consented to Minnesota's jurisdiction over R.M.H.'s traffic offenses. In the absence of such express consent, we then would have to determine whether federal law preempts state jurisdiction.

Public Law 280 grants Minnesota jurisdiction over offenses "committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country" within Minnesota, except on the Red Lake Indian Reservation. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a).⁴ This grant of jurisdiction was intended to combat the problem of lawlessness on reservations and a lack of tribal law enforcement. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976). The Supreme Court defined the parameters of Pub.L. 280 in Cabazon when it held that Pub.L. 280 grants states "broad criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians within all Indian country within the State." Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1083. The Court then approved the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that a state statute is "criminal/prohibitory," and therefore within Pub.L. 280's grant of jurisdiction, if the statute is generally intended to prohibit certain conduct. Id. at 209, 107 S.Ct. 1083 (citing Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir.1982)). Conversely, the Court held that a statute does not fall within Pub.L. 280's grant of jurisdiction if it generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to regulation. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209, 107 S.Ct. 1083. In the latter case, the statute is properly classified as "civil/regulatory" and Pub.L. 280 does not expressly grant the state jurisdiction to enforce the statute on an Indian reservation. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209, 107 S.Ct. 1083 (quoting Barona, 694 F.2d at 1185).

We specifically addressed Pub.L. 280's scope with respect to certain traffic laws in Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 725. There, we characterized the laws at issue, which included driving without a valid driver's license and speeding, as civil/regulatory. See id. at 728, 731. Accordingly, we concluded that, under Pub.L. 280, Minnesota did not have authority to enforce its civil/regulatory traffic laws that occurred on the White Earth Reservation against enrolled members of the White Earth Band. See Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 732. Further, we concluded that exceptional circumstances did not exist to warrant state jurisdiction over a tribal member absent an express federal grant. See id. Therefore, we held that the state lacked jurisdiction over the offenses. See id.

Citing Stone, R.M.H. argues that Minnesota does not have jurisdiction over his traffic offenses because they are civil/regulatory. The state argues that R.M.H.'s offenses do not fit within the ambit of Pub.L. 280. Rather than focusing on the nature of R.M.H.'s offenses, the state argues that Pub.L. 280 does not apply to R.M.H. because he is not an "Indian" for the purposes of federal law. Consequently, while R.M.H. and the state focus on different aspects of Pub.L. 280, they both argue that this federal statute does not expressly grant Minnesota jurisdiction over R.M.H.'s offenses. We agree with this conclusion, which is consistent with our decision in Stone. Therefore, we hold...