Gautier v. Town of Jupiter Island, 2586

• Decision Date: 15 June 1962
• Docket Number: No. 2586,2586
• Citation: 142 So.2d 321
• Parties: R. B. GAUTIER, Jr., and William R. Dawes, as Trustees, Appellants, v. TOWN OF JUPITER ISLAND, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 321

142 So.2d 321

R. B. GAUTIER, Jr., and William R. Dawes, as Trustees, Appellants, v. TOWN OF JUPITER ISLAND, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee.

No. 2586.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 15, 1962.

Lee M. Worley, of Worley, Gautier & Dawes, Miami, for appellants.

Alley, Maass, Rogers & Lindsay, Palm Beach, and Anderson & Nadeau, Miami, for appellee.

SHANNON, Chief Judge.

The appellants, as plaintiffs in the court below, brought this suit in equity against the Town of Jupiter Island, a municipal corporation, for the purpose of attacking a zoning ordinance which restricted the property involved to single family dwellings. The chancellor dismissed their complaint and hence, this appeal.

In setting out the facts we shall quote from the chancellor's opinion:

'The Plaintiffs' land is 4,400 feet in length and constitutes all the land, for this distance, between the Atlantic Ocean and Hobe Sound. Only the north 630 feet lying east of highway number 707, upon which Plaintiffs wish to erect a multiple family apartment house or hotel, is involved in the litigation.

'The community has existed for over fifty years, but it was not until 1953 that it received a municipal charter. The Town is isolated geographically, being located entirely upon an island and it is not a suburban area of any city. Its boundaries extend for nine and one-half miles, north to south, and the width of the island (Town) varies from 425 feet to 2,575 feet. The Atlantic Ocean is on the east and it is separated from the mainland by Hobe Sound and the Intracoastal Waterway. Only one bridge connects the Town with the mainland and it is located somewhat north of the center of the Town; but another bridge, a mile or so south of the Town boundary, affords access to and from the mainland.

'The population is small compared with the land encompassed by the municipal boundaries with approximately two hundred homes having been constructed; some being very old.

* * *

* * *

'* * * It is a tropical paradise, and in this area the community is fairly well developed and built up,--giving full consideration to the seclusive tendencises [sic] and desires of the inhabitants.

'The settlement originated over fifty years ago as a retreat for individuals who could afford to seek the quiet peaceful solitude and tranquility to be found on the island. Its character was thus impressed, and it remains so to this day.

'To strike down the ordinance would be tantamount to destroying the character of the Town.

'The community is unique--it is the one and only, different from all others, having no like or equal. It is unusual, extraordinary and rare. It was cut from one mold and its counterpart cannot be found elsewhere. Many people would consider it dead--but it is very much alive with gentell living, friendship and compatability. The Town doesn't want what many others have, but many others would be better off if they had more of what this Town has and wants to keep--seclusion, solitude and tranquility.

* * *

* * * 'Under the existing zoning regulations a comparatively small area is allowed for business and related purposes, and at present a large part of the business is occupied by a golf course.

* * *

* * *

'The community was originally created with a singleness of purpose; the County zoning (when it was effective) followed through to preserve that purpose; and in turn, the Town Council has now added its strength. The Legislature, the County Commission and the Town Council have seen fit to extend the preservative features of the zoning regulations to include the Plaintiffs' land and the judicial role is tightly surrounded by these legislative enactments. The wisdom and judgment of the Court cannot be substituted therefor without a clear showing that the zoning restriction is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, and this, the Court feels, has not been done to the extent required here.'

The appellants urge that the regulation under attack here amounted to an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power by the governing body of the Town of Jupiter Island because the object sought to be accomplished by the zoning ordinance bears no relationship to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community as a whole. Before striking down a zoning ordinance for these reasons it must be shown that its provisions when applied to the property in question are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and have no substantial relation to public health, safety, morals or general welfare. See, e. g., City of Miami Beach v. Silver, Fla.1953, 67 So.2d 646. This is the protection necessary to secure to the owner of property his right of enjoyment thereof. Tollius v. City of Miami, Fla.1957, 96 So.2d 122.

In the instant case, as in any litigation wherein such an attack is made on a zoning code enacted by a city council upon authorization by legislative grant, the burden of alleging and proving its invalidity rests upon the assailant thereof. This burden is a heavy one. City of Miami v. Wiesen, Fla.1956, 86 So.2d 442. We are of the opinion that the burden was not sufficiently carried by the plaintiffs in the case at bar.

While we have been presented with excellent briefs on both sides of the question now before us, neither party has cited a Florida case involving a like fact situation and our research has failed to disclose such a case. However, in the case of Fox Meadow Estates v. Culley, 1931, 233 App.Div. 250, 252 N.Y.S. 178, the New York court had before it a nine year old zoning ordinance of the village of Scarsdale, the primary purpose of which was to preserve the residential character of the village. It was pointed out that the zoning plan carried out the desires of the citizenry and provided for foreseeable future development. In holding that the ordinance was neither unreasonable nor discriminatory, the appellate court noted that generally in cases such as this there is resulting loss to individuals where there is public benefit. This case was affirmed in 261 N.Y. 506, 185 N.E. 714.

Subsequently, in the case of Gignoux v. Village of Kings Point, 1950, 199 Misc. 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory decree as to the validity of a zoning ordinance limiting the village to single family residences, with the exception of a very small area zoned for business. In upholding the validity of the municipal ordinace, the court set out the two-fold purpose of zoning, namely, that it should protect districts already established and also that it 'should control future development in a manner that is reasonable and in the best interests of the municipality in a comprehensive manner which would aid in the development of new areas.' The New York court further stated that if it is the desire of the inhabitants of a village to make the realty therein available for residential purposes only, 'so that its beauty and rustic character may be preserved and increased and such zoning may be accomplished without arbitrary and confiscatory action, such a village should be sustained in its attempt to secure to village from noise and traffic, the danger from fire, a better opportunity for rest and...