General Motors Corp. v. Dillon

• Decision Date: 03 November 1976
• Citation: 367 A.2d 1020
• Parties: GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, and Union Park Pontiac, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants below, Appellants, v. Joseph P. DILLON, Plaintiff below, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 1020

367 A.2d 1020

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, and Union Park Pontiac, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Defendants below, Appellants, v. Joseph P. DILLON, Plaintiff below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted May 25, 1976.

Decided Nov. 3, 1976.

Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.

Robert K. Payson, of Potter, Anderson & Corroon, Wilmington, for defendants below, appellants.

Edmund D. Lyons, of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellee.

Before CAREY, Justice Ad Litem, MARVEL, Chancellor, and BROWN, Vice Chancellor.

BROWN, Vice Chancellor.

This is an appeal by General Motors Corporation and Union Park Pontiac, Inc. (hereafter 'appellants') from a jury verdict against them and in favor of the appellee, Joseph P. Dillon (hereafter 'Dillon') in the amount of $65,000. The action sought recovery for personal injuries to Dillon based on charges of negligence and breach of warranty by the defendants in selling him an allegedly defective motor vehicle, which, in turn, caused the accident in which Dillon suffered his injuries. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a directed verdict in their favor on the issue of liability and also erred in refusing to grant either a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial.

Specifically, appellants argue that it was error to allow the matter to go to the jury based on an instruction as to the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. Secondly, it is contended that even if Res ipsa loquitur were applicable, it creates only an inference of negligence which was conclusively rebutted by the unrefuted expert testimony offered by appellants as to certain paysical facts, and that for this reason also the case should have been taken from the jury.

In summary, Dillon's testimony revealed that during March 1967, he ordered a new 1967 Pontiac Firebird convertible from the appellant Union Park Pontiac, Inc. Among other things the vehicle was equipped with an 'energy absorbing steering column,' which was so designed that in the event of a crash the column would shear away from the dashboard and compress in order to absorb the force and energy of the driver striking it and thus reduce the degree of injury to the driver. The new car was delivered to Dillon on April 12, 1967 and was driven about Wilmington on a few limited occasions through April 14. On Saturday, April 15, Dillon drove to Long Island, New York to visit his mother and brother. At no time through April 15 did he experience any difficulty with or notice any looseness or other abnormality in the steering mechanism.

On Sunday morning, April 16, Dillon left the home of his brother to drive a few blocks to his mother's house to have breakfast with her before going to church. As he turned a corner and headed up a residential street at a speed which he estimated to be at no more than 15 miles per hour, the accident suddenly occurred. In his testimony Dillon described it as follows:

'A. I went approximately past the first two houses, and I was at the third house when I thought I heard a sound that sounded like my cigarette lighter popping out, and the whole steering column seemed to shift and I went with it. I went to grab it and I didn't know what to do. I didn't know what was happening, and the next thing I knew the car made a 90-degree turn into these two parked cars. I woke up with my head in the window.

'Q. You say the column shifted. How did the column shift? In what direction did it shift?

'A. It seemed to like just pop back and then toward the left.

'Q. It came back towards you and then to the left?

'A. Popped up and then to the left. It made a movement toward me, and then shifted over to the left.

'Q. Did it get out of your hands when it did this?

'A. No, sir. I don't believe it did.'

Although repeated and embellished in varying degree on further examination, this basically constitutes Dillon's evidence as to the accident and its causation. There were no other witnesses to the event.

In opposition, appellants offered the expert testimony of Dr. Edward A. Moffatt, possessor of a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering and biomechanics, who at the time, was a Senior Analysis Engineer with General Motors charged with analyzing automobile accidents. While Dr. Moffatt had not personally inspected Dillon's vehicle, he did examine the steering column and offered an in-depth explanation of the operational characteristics of the energy absorbing steering column with which Dillon's car was equipped.

He explained that the steering column was designed to collapse upon impact only, which would require a pressure of 1400 pounds--far more than could be exerted by a human being. The column was held in place against the dash panel by plastic-filled 'shear capsules' designed so that the bracket holding the steering column could break away and slide free from its moorings when a driver struck the steering wheel with sufficient force. A mesh design at the bottom of the steering column would then compress so as to cause the steering column to give with the force exerted against it. After an impact the steering wheel and column, by design, would be free and lying in the lap of the driver. In short, Dr. Moffatt testified that after Dillon's accident the fact that the steering column was loose and lying upon Dillon indicated that it had performed exactly as designed. He further stated that there was no possible way that the steering column could 'pop back' or move in the direction of a driver as Dillon had testified. The condition of the bracket, bolts, shear-capsules, etc., on Dillon's vehicle after the accident were said to be consistent with the steering column having disengaged from the dash only as designed.

In addition, Dr. Moffatt offered his expert opinion that based on the force with which the two parked cars were struck by Dillon's vehicle (one wheel of each was forced up and over a curb of some six inches in height) and the damage which was done to them, Dillon was most likely going at a speed of some 30 miles per hour at the time of impact rather than the 15 miles per hour he estimated.

Appellants point to what they charge to be numerous inconsistencies in Dillon's testimony. For example, they refer to various instances in his testimony wherein Dillon stated that upon becoming aware of the 'pop' he 'grabbed' for the steering wheel, while other times he stated that he already had the wheel in his hands. He also referred to the steering column as 'shifting' or 'jumping out or up.' A doctor to whom Dillon went for treatment upon his return to Wilmington noted in his medical history that the accident occurred while Dillon was reaching for the vehicle's cigarette lighter in order to light a cigarette, a statement which, appellants urge, could only have been obtained by the doctor from Dillon himself. And the accident actually occurred six houses up the block rather than three.

By and large, however, the inconsistencies which appellants attribute to Dillon derive from the testimony of appellants' expert that it was impossible for the accident to have occurred in the manner which Dillon described and that of necessity his speed must have been greater than he admitted. Undoubtedly all of these arguments were ably presented to the jury--which obviously rejected them in favor of the testimony of Dillon which it found to be credible despite the alleged inconsistencies. Thus, the first question is whether, under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur, there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to allow the matter to go to the jury.

The view representing the clear weight of modern authority is that the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur, rather than creating a presumption of negligence, permits, but does not require, the trier of the facts to draw an inference of negligence from the proof of the injury and the surrounding circumstances. Speiser, Res Ipsa Loquitur (1972 Ed.) § 3:4. This is the view followed in Delaware. The application of the doctrine has flexibility which depends upon the court's evaluation of the particular situation, and a determination thereon is made at the close of the plaintiff's evidence. Delaware Coach Co. v. Reynolds, Del.Supr., 6 Terry 226, 71 A.2d 69 (1950).

While negligence is never presumed from the mere fact of an injury, if the particular manner in which the plaintiff shows the injury to have occurred is so unaccountable that the only fair inference of the cause was the negligence of the defendant, or, stated another way, if the manner in which the injury occurred would lead reasonable persons to conclude that it would not have happened in the absence of some negligence on the part of the defendant, then the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur is properly applicable to establish the negligence of the defendant. Skipper v. Royal Crown Bottling Company of Wilmington, Del.Supr., 192 A.2d 910 (1963); Ciociola v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Company,...