Genesky v. Town of East Lyme, No. 17152.

• Decision Date: 30 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 17152.
• Citation: 881 A.2d 114,275 Conn. 246
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Edward GENESKY v. TOWN OF EAST LYME.

881 A.2d 114

275 Conn. 246

Edward GENESKY v. TOWN OF EAST LYME.

No. 17152.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 18, 2004.

Officially released August 30, 2005.

Nathan Julian Shafner, Groton, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Michael P. Carey, Norwich, with whom, on the brief, was Susan M. Phillips, New London, for the appellee (defendant).

SULLIVAN, C. J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.

ZARELLA, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff, Edward Genesky, is a regular member of a paid municipal police department for purposes of receiving benefits under the Heart and Hypertension Act, General Statutes § 7-433c.¹ The plaintiff, a constable employed by the defendant, the town of East Lyme (town), appeals from the decision of the compensation review board (board), which affirmed the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner for the eighth district² (commissioner) dismissing his claim for benefits under § 7-433c on the ground that he was not a regular member of a paid municipal police department. The plaintiff claims that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner's decision because: (1) the town has a paid municipal police department of which he is a part; (2) the state's interest in providing heart and hypertension benefits to municipal law enforcement officers preempts the town's interest in denying such benefits; and (3) the town concedes that members of its police force are entitled to benefits under § 7-433c. We reject the plaintiff's claim and, accordingly, affirm the decision of the board.

The following relevant facts, as found by the commissioner, are set forth in his decision of December 5, 2002. In 1989, the town hired the plaintiff as a full-time police officer. Thereafter, the plaintiff claimed that he had injured his knee in the course of his employment on January 21, 1992. On that date, Joseph Zeppieri, an orthopedic surgeon, treated the plaintiff for his injury, but counseled against going forward with surgery because of the plaintiff's elevated blood pressure.

Zeppieri referred the plaintiff to another physician, George Burton, who met with the plaintiff on January 28, 1992, and diagnosed him with hypertension.³ The plaintiff's blood pressure readings continued to be elevated between January 28, 1992, and November 20, 1997. Burton prescribed medication to treat the condition. The plaintiff also received treatment for hypertension from two other physicians, but failed to file a timely claim for hypertension benefits with the commissioner or his employer.⁴

In September, 1999, the plaintiff experienced what he initially believed were back spasms. Ultimately, it was determined that the spasms were caused by a myocardial infarction. The plaintiff filed a claim under § 7-433c for heart and hypertension benefits related to the myocardial infarction, with a claimed injury date of October 8, 1999. The commissioner determined, however, that the plaintiff's hypertension was a factor in the development of his coronary artery disease. He therefore found that, because the plaintiff had been receiving continuous treatment for his hypertension and heart condition since January 21, 1992, the October 8, 1999 injury was part of one continuous incident beginning in January, 1992.

The commissioner also found that the plaintiff was working as a constable for the town on the date of his alleged injuries in 1992 and 1999, and that the town did not have a municipal police department. As a result, the commissioner dismissed the plaintiff's claim because it was untimely and because the plaintiff was not a regular member of a paid municipal police department organized pursuant to General Statutes § 7-274⁵ and Zimmer v. Essex, 38 Conn.Supp. 419, 421, 449 A.2d 1053 (1982).⁶ The plaintiff thereafter appealed to the board.

In reviewing the plaintiff's claim, the board first addressed the threshold issue of whether the plaintiff fell within the class of employees to which § 7-433c benefits apply, namely, "a regular member of a paid municipal police department...." General Statutes § 7-433c (a). Following its examination of the commissioner's findings, the board noted that the town had established a constabulary and that it had contracted with the state department of public safety to participate in the resident state trooper program.⁷ The board thus concluded that the plaintiff was a constable. The board further noted that the facts of the present case were analogous to the facts of Zimmer v. Essex, supra, 38 Conn.Supp. 419-20, 449 A.2d 1053, in which the Superior Court determined that a municipal police force not organized in conformity with the provisions of § 7-274 is a police force to which § 7-433c does not apply. See id., at 421, 449 A.2d 1053. The board then observed that, according to testimony presented at formal hearings on the matter, law enforcement operations in the town differed from those of a municipal police force organized under § 7-274 because the town did not have a lockup, the town's first selectman served as the chief of police, an East Lyme police officer's powers of arrest were limited and the plaintiff's duties as a constable differed from those of "a regular member of a paid municipal police force." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The board added that § 7-433c has been characterized as "bonus" legislation and must be strictly construed. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The board concluded that the plaintiff was not a member of the class of persons to which § 7-433c applies and affirmed the commissioner's decision on that ground alone, finding it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the plaintiff's claim was time barred.⁸ This appeal followed.

We begin by setting forth the standard of review applicable to workers' compensation appeals.⁹ "It is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers' compensation statutes by the commissioner and [the] board.... A state agency is not entitled, however, to special deference when its determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny.... Whe[n] ... [a workers' compensation] appeal involves an issue of statutory construction that has not yet been subjected to judicial scrutiny, this court has plenary power to review the administrative decision." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bergeson v. New London, 269 Conn. 763, 769, 850 A.2d 184 (2004). The present appeal raises an issue of statutory construction that is of first impression for this court. Our review of the board's administrative decision is therefore plenary.

The plaintiff claims that, although he was employed as a full-time constable by the town at the time of his injury, he is entitled to heart and hypertension benefits under § 7-433c because he was "a regular member of a paid municipal police department.. . ." General Statutes § 7-433c. The town responds that the plaintiff does not qualify for § 7-433c benefits because there is a difference between a paid municipal police department and a constabulary, and the town has chosen to ensure public safety by establishing a constabulary. We agree with the town.

The plaintiff's claim that his status as a constable does not preclude him from being considered a regular member of a paid municipal police department under § 7-433c requires us to examine, first, whether the statutory provisions distinguish between a constable and "a regular member of a paid municipal police department," and, second, whether the town has a "paid municipal police department" under the statutory scheme. General Statutes § 7-433c. We consider each of these questions in turn.

I

The gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint is that, despite his status as a constable, he is a regular member of a paid municipal police department. We first consider whether there is a difference between a constable and a regular member of a paid municipal police department within the meaning of the relevant statutory provisions. We conclude that there is.

"The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wasko v. Manella, 269 Conn. 527, 534-35, 849 A.2d 777 (2004). When construing a statute, we first look to its text, as directed by General Statutes § 1-2z, which provides: "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extra-textual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered."¹⁰ In the present case, we conclude, following an examination of the language of the statute and its relationship to other statutes, that a constable is not "a regular member of a paid municipal police department," as that term is used in General Statutes § 7-433c.

General Statutes § 7-433c (a) provides in relevant part that heart and hypertension benefits shall be available to "a regular member of a paid municipal police department who successfully passed a physical examination on entry into such service, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease, [and who] suffers either off duty or on duty any condition or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in his death or his temporary or permanent, total or partial disability...."

Section 7-433c contains no functional definition of the term "paid municipal police department." Moreover, there is no provision in the statutory scheme that contains such a definition. We therefore turn for guidance, as directed by § 1-2z, to related statut...