Bergeson v. City of New London

• Decision Date: 22 June 2004
• Docket Number: (SC 17005).
• Citation: 269 Conn. 763,850 A.2d 184
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: JOYCE BERGESON v. CITY OF NEW LONDON ET AL.

269 Conn. 763

850 A.2d 184

JOYCE BERGESON v. CITY OF NEW LONDON ET AL.

(SC 17005).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 8, 2004.

Officially released June 22, 2004.

Borden, Norcott, Katz, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

Erik S. Bartlett, for the appellants (named defendant et al.).

Nathan Julian Shafner, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Yinxia Long, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and William J. McCullough and Michael Belzer, assistant attorneys general, for the appellee (defendant second injury fund).

Frank A. May and Marie Gallo-Hall filed a brief for the city of Bridgeport as amicus curiae.

Opinion

KATZ, J.

This appeal requires us to determine whether, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-306 (a) (2) (A)¹ of the Workers' Compensation Act, the second injury fund (fund)² is required to reimburse a municipal employer for cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) paid in connection with a claim for benefits under the Heart and Hypertension Act, General Statutes § 7-433c.³ The defendants, the city of New London (city) and CIRMA Claims and Risk Control Services (CIRMA),⁴ appeal⁵ from the decision of the workers' compensation review board (board) concluding that the fund was not required to reimburse the city for COLAs paid to the plaintiff, Joyce Bergeson, in connection with her claim arising under § 7-433c. Specifically, the city claims that the board improperly concluded that §§ 7-433c and 31-306 (a) (2) (A) do not require the fund to reimburse the city. The city further contends, in the alternative, that §§ 7-433c and 31-306 (a) (2) (A) violate the federal and state constitutions because they deprive municipal employers of a protected property interest without due process of law. We reject the city's claims and, accordingly, we affirm the decision of the board.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The plaintiff's husband, Axel Bergeson, while employed as a police officer by the city, suffered a fatal heart attack on June 17, 1995. On November 9, 1995, the plaintiff was awarded survivor's benefits under § 7-433c by the workers' compensation commissioner for the second district (commissioner). Since that time, the city has paid the plaintiff's benefits, including COLAs pursuant to § 31-306 (a) (2) (A), on a without-prejudice basis. On February 6, 2002, the commissioner ordered the fund to reimburse the city for the COLA payments. Specifically, the commissioner concluded that the plain language of § 31-306 (a) (2) (A) "is clear that the fund shall reimburse the city for any COLAs paid as a result of deaths occurring between July 1, 1993 and October 1, 1997."

The fund subsequently appealed to the board, which reversed the decision of the commissioner. Specifically, the board concluded that benefits under § 7-433c are not benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act and, therefore, are not subject to the reimbursement provision of § 31-306 (a) (2) (A). In so concluding, the board relied on McNulty v. Stamford, 37 Conn. App. 835, 845, 657 A.2d 1126 (1995), in which the Appellate Court concluded that an earlier revision of § 31-306 (a) (2) (A) did not require the fund to reimburse municipal employers for COLAs paid in connection with § 7-433c benefits. This appeal followed.

I

The city first claims that, under § 31-306 (a) (2) (A), it is entitled to reimbursement from the fund for COLA payments made in connection with a claim for benefits under § 7-433c. The fund claims, in response, that it is not required to reimburse municipal employers for COLAs paid in connection with § 7-433c benefits, which are intended as a "special bonus" to paid police officers and firefighters and, accordingly, are not workers' compensation benefits for the purposes of the reimbursement provision in § 31-306 (a) (2) (A). We agree with the fund.

We note, at the outset, that our resolution of this issue revolves around the interrelationship of the Workers' Compensation Act,⁶ which is codified in chapter 568 of title 31 of the General Statutes, and § 7-433c, which commonly is known as the Heart and Hypertension Act. Therefore, we begin our analysis with a brief overview of that statutory framework. "The Workers' Compensation Act was enacted to provide compensation for any injury arising out of and in the course of employment, without regard to fault, by imposing a form of strict liability on the employer.... Heart disease and hypertension are just some of the many ailments compensable under the act. . . . In order to recover under chapter 568, however, the employee has the burden of proving that the injury claimed arose out of the employment and occurred in the course of the employment.. . . Section 7-433c, on the other hand, was enacted to provide special compensation to qualifying police officers and fire fighters who die or become disabled as a result of hypertension or heart disease.. . . It requires the employer to pay compensation to those officers who have successfully passed a physical examination which failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease and who subsequently die or are disabled as a result of such conditions whether or not the disease resulted from the employee's occupation or . . . occurred in the line and scope of his employment. . . . An employee may, if the facts so warrant, elect to proceed under either chapter 568 or § 7-433c." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Collins v. West Haven, 210 Conn. 423, 425-27, 555 A.2d 981 (1989).

"As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard of review applicable to workers' compensation appeals.. . . It is well established that although not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers' compensation statutes by the commissioner and the board. . . . A state agency is not entitled, however, to special deference when its determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny. . . . When . . . a workers' compensation appeal involves an issue of statutory construction that has not yet been subjected to judicial scrutiny, this court has plenary power to review the administrative decision." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kuehl v. Z-Loda Systems Engineering, Inc., 265 Conn. 525, 532, 829 A.2d 818 (2003). Because this appeal raises an issue of statutory construction that is of first impression for this court, our review is plenary.

We begin with our well established principles of statutory interpretation in analyzing the city's claim. Our legislature recently has enacted No. 03-154, § 1, of the 2003 Public Acts, which provides: "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." In the present case, the relevant statutory text and the relationship of that text to other statutes do not reveal a meaning that is plain and unambiguous. Accordingly, our analysis is not limited and we look to other factors relevant to the inquiry into the meaning of § 31-306 (a) (2) (A), including its legislative history and the circumstances surrounding its enactment and its purpose.

Of particular relevance in the present case is the principle that "payment of an award from a special fund such as the second injury . . . fund, which was established, inter alia, to assist in the payment of compensation awarded to handicapped and disadvantaged workers . . . should be made only in accordance with express statutory authority . . . in order to protect that special fund and prevent unwarranted diversions of it from the specific purpose for which it was created." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Civardi v. Norwich, 231 Conn. 287, 294, 649 A.2d 523 (1994); see also Badolato v. New Britain, 250 Conn. 753, 762, 738 A.2d 618 (1999). With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of the city's claim.

As with any issue of statutory construction, we begin with the pertinent statutory language. Section 31-306 (a) (2) (A) provides in relevant part: "The employer or its insurer shall be reimbursed by the Second Injury Fund, as provided in section 31-354, for adjustments, including lump-sum payments, payable under this subparagraph for deaths from compensable injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1993, and before October 1, 1997, upon presentation of any vouchers and information that the Treasurer shall require." (Emphasis added.)

We previously have stated that "benefits awarded to an employee pursuant to § 7-433c are payable . . . under the Workers' Compensation Act . . . ." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) King v. Sultar, 253 Conn. 429, 439, 754 A.2d 782 (2000); see Carriero v. Naugatuck, 243 Conn. 747, 759, 707 A.2d 706 (1998). This observation does not end our inquiry, however, because the Workers' Compensation Act expressly authorizes reimbursement from the fund for COLAs that are "payable ... for deaths from compensable injuries . . . ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 31-306 (a) (2) (A). Accordingly, before we can apply § 31-306 (a) (2) (A) as written, we must determine what is meant by the phrase "compensable injuries."

General Statutes § 31-275 (4), which defines the term "compensation" for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act, provides in relevant part: "`Compensation' means benefits or payments mandated by the provisions of this chapter . . . ." (Emphasis added.) The term "injury" is defined by § 31-275 (16) (A), which provides: "`Personal injury' or `injury' includes, in addition to accidental injury which may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred,...