Georgia Mental Health Institute v. Brady

• Decision Date: 08 November 1993
• Docket Number: Nos. S93A0976,S93A0977,s. S93A0976
• Citation: 263 Ga. 591,436 S.E.2d 219
• Parties: GEORGIA MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTE et al. v. BRADY (Two Cases).
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 219

436 S.E.2d 219

263 Ga. 591

GEORGIA MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTE et al. v. BRADY (Two Cases).

Nos. S93A0976, S93A0977.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 8, 1993.

Reconsideration Denied Dec. 2, 1993.

Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., William C. Joy, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Patricia Downing, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Jefferson James Davis, Davis & Davis, Decatur, for Georgia Mental Health Institute et al.

Karen S. Byers, Tucker, for Brady.

SEARS-COLLINS, Justice.

The appellants in both these appeals are the Georgia Mental Health Institute (hereinafter "GMHI") and the Georgia Department of Human Resources (hereinafter "DHR"). GMHI sought to have the appellee, Lorraine Brady, involuntarily committed for inpatient treatment at its facility. OCGA § 37-3-22. The probate court heard GMHI's petition, determined that Brady did not meet the requirements for involuntary commitment, and accordingly ordered GMHI to discharge Brady immediately. See § 37-3-81.1(a)(1). GMHI appealed to superior court under OCGA §§ 5-3-2 and 5-3-3, which generally govern appeals from probate court to superior court. Moreover, GMHI refused to release Brady pending the appeal to superior court, contending that its notice of appeal stayed the probate court's order of immediate discharge and permitted GMHI to hold Brady until GMHI exhausted the appellate process. Brady then filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus and injunctive relief in superior court. She relied on OCGA § 37-3-150 to contend that GMHI did not have the right to appeal. That code section specifies that the patient shall have the right to appeal from any decision of a probate court under Title 37, Chap. 3; it does not specify that a mental health facility has a right to appeal, but neither does it specify that the facility does not have such a right. ¹ Brady contended that the exclusion of mental health facilities from the persons entitled to appeal under § 37-3-150 precludes those facilities from appealing. Brady also contended that, even if GMHI had the right to appeal, it did not have the right to restrain her pending the appeal. The superior court held that GMHI did not have the right to appeal, granted Brady's writ of habeas corpus, and ordered GMHI to release Brady. The court subsequently granted Brady $600 in attorney fees. In Case No. S93A0976, GMHI appeals from the order granting Brady habeas corpus and injunctive relief. In Case No. S93A0977, GMHI appeals from the award of attorney fees. We affirm the superior court in Case No. S93A0976 and reverse in Case No. S93A0977.

1. In Case No. S93A0976, GMHI contends that Brady was not entitled to habeas corpus and injunctive relief, first, because, contrary to the superior court's ruling, GMHI did have the right to appeal under §§ 5-3-2 and 5-3-3, and, second, because GMHI's notice of appeal entitled it to detain Brady pending the appeal pursuant to supersedeas under OCGA § 5-6-7.

2. We first address the issue of the right to appeal and begin with the proposition that a specific statute governs over a more general statute where they are in conflict. First Nat. Bank v. Sinkler, 170 Ga.App. 668, 670(1), 317 S.E.2d 897 (1984). Section 37-3-150 is the more specific statute, as it focuses on appeals of probate court rulings under Chapter 3 of Title 37. Moreover, we conclude that it conflicts with the general appeal provisions of §§ 5-3-2 and 5-3-3, and therefore controls.

a. In reaching this conclusion, we find several rules of statutory construction useful. The first is that, in ascertaining the purpose of legislation, courts may look to the history of the legislation on the subject matter of the particular statute. International Minerals, etc., Corp. v. Bledsoe, 126 Ga.App. 243, 244, 190 S.E.2d 572 (1972). We conclude that the relevant statutory history provides firm support for the conclusion that the General Assembly made a decision in 1969, to which it has since adhered, to deny persons who seek the involuntary hospitalization of an allegedly mentally ill individual ("applicants for commitment") the right to appeal an adverse decision of the probate court.

Several considerations support this conclusion. Most persuasive is that for many years before 1969 the General Assembly had specifically provided a right to appeal to applicants for commitment, as in the comprehensive and exhaustive mental health reforms of 1964, see 1964 Ga.Laws 499, 536-537; former Code Ann. § 88-506, ² yet entirely deleted that specific right in the equally comprehensive and exhaustive mental health reforms of 1969 while continuing to provide a right of appeal to the patient, 1969 Ga.Laws 505, 516; former Code Ann. § 88-502.16. ³ Moreover, the fact that the appeal code section in the 1969 Act appeared, for the first time, under a new heading entitled "Rights of Patients," is significant in two respects. First, it demonstrates that the General Assembly intended the right to appeal to be a right special to patients only and not one to be afforded to facilities. This conclusion is borne out by the fact that the other rights listed under the "Rights of Patients" heading are rights unique to patients. E.g., the right to education of a patient who is a child, former Code Ann. § 88-502.9, 1969 Ga.Laws at 512; patient's right to vote, former Code Ann. § 88-502.7, 1969 Ga.Laws at 511. Second, it demonstrates that the exclusion of applicants for commitment was not inadvertent; the General Assembly consciously had to delete them from the list of persons having a right of appeal under that code section, as the rights of applicants for commitment have no place in a "patients rights" code section. That the General Assembly did not shift the previously provided right of appeal for applicants for commitment to any other section of the mental health code is further evidence that the General Assembly did not intend for applicants to have that right, as this omission occurred in a comprehensive and exhaustive reform of the rules governing the parties entitled to participate in proceedings concerning the hospitalization and treatment of the mentally ill and their rights and duties therein. It would be unreasonable to conclude that the General Assembly, as part of those comprehensive and exhaustive reforms, did not intend for the appeal rights of applicants for commitment to be governed by those comprehensive provisions but by the general appeal statutes, especially considering that for so long before 1969 the General Assembly had specified that applicants had the right to appeal.

These considerations lead inescapably to the conclusion that the legislature has expressed its will that § 37-3-150 exclusively govern the right to appeal commitment decisions of a probate court and that only patients have the right to appeal such decisions.

b. Further cementing this conclusion is the rule of statutory construction that any proposed construction of a statute must not result in unreasonable consequences and must square with common sense and sound reasoning. State v. Mulkey, 252 Ga. 201, 204, 312 S.E.2d 601 (1984). We find that an unreasonable result will obtain if GMHI has the right to appeal under § 5-3-2. Under § 37-3-150, a patient's appeal must be heard in superior court within 30 days, and, to facilitate this expedited review, the patient is denied the valuable right to a jury trial. In contrast, in a facility's appeal under § 5-3-2, there would be no requirement for expedited review, subjecting the patient to the strain, stigma, and expense of the mental health proceeding for an extended period of time, and the facility would be entitled to a valuable right denied to patients under § 37-3-150--the right to a trial by jury. This contrasting treatment on appeal is unreasonable and illogical.

c. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the General Assembly must have intended § 37-3-150 to exclusively control the parties who have a right to appeal from a commitment decision and for mental health facilities not to have that right. ⁴ We acknowledge that if a patient appealed an adverse probate court ruling to superior court and the superior court ruled the patient was not committable, a facility could appeal the superior court decision to this Court or the Court of Appeals. We do not, however, agree with the dissent's assertion that this result is inconsistent with our present holding. Significantly, in a facility's appeal to this Court or the Court of Appeals neither court may try the issue of the patient's commitment; we may only reverse the appeal based on an error appearing on the record. On the other hand, if a facility were permitted to appeal a probate court decision that a patient is not committable, the facility would be obtaining two bites at the commitment apple, as the appeal to superior court would be de novo. Because of the conflicting nature of the appeal rights, the legislature may reasonably have decided to deny a facility an appeal in the former case but to permit an appeal in the latter case.

3. Although our holding in Division 2 precludes a facility such as GMHI from appealing an adverse probate court decision on commitment and thus leads to an affirmance of the trial court's grant of habeas corpus and injunctive relief to Brady, we nevertheless address GMHI's contention that it had the right to restrain Brady pending the appeal because its notice of appeal stayed the probate court's order of immediate discharge pursuant to OCGA § 5-3-7. We do so because the parties to the appeal have briefed the issue and because the issue presents a significant question of individual liberty. For several reasons, we conclude that GMHI did not have the right to involuntarily confine Brady a. First, because GMHI's petition for involuntary commitment only authorized it to detain Brady "pending completion of a full and fair hearing," OCGA § 37-3-81(a), in probate court, and because the probate court did not order some form of treatment for Brady, e.g., §...