Gideon-Anderson Lumber Co. v. Hayes
| Citation | 156 S.W.2d 898,348 Mo. 1085 |
| Decision Date | 16 December 1941 |
| Docket Number | 37722 |
| Parties | Gideon-Anderson Lumber Company v. Earl Hayes, L. B. Fletcher, Jim Ackridge and Lonzo Ackridge, Appellants |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Appeal from New Madrid Circuit Court; Hon. Louis H. Schult Judge.
Affirmed.
Wallace Morgan and Edward F. Sharp for appellants.
(1) A parol agreement for the lease of land for the year in which made is enforceable. Sec. 3354, R. S. 1939. (2) The right to make contracts is both a liberty and a property right, and is within the protection of the guarantee against the taking of liberty or property without due process of law. Art. 2, Sec 30, Const. of Missouri; Angus v. Ins. Co., 283 Mo 442, 223 S.W. 70. (3) The prohibition of the contract clause of the Constitution is directed at legislative, not judicial, action. 12 C. J., p. 990, sec. 602; State ex rel. v. North, 304 Mo. 607, 264 S.W. 678; State ex rel. v. Atkinson, 271 Mo. 28, 195 S.W. 741; State ex rel. v. Hoppe, 71 Mo. 425; City of St. Joseph v. Farrell, 106 Mo. 437, 17 S.W. 497; New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U.S. 18, 8 S.Ct. 741, 31 L.Ed. 607. (4) The section of the statute 2970, R. S. Mo. 1939, now under consideration, violates the provisions of Article 4, Section 53, pars. 17 and 33, of the Constitution of the State of Missouri. (a) Because it attempts to change a general rule of evidence by special law. (b) Because this section attempts the partial repeal of a general law to-wit, the Statute of Frauds, by making the provisions of said statute inapplicable to certain persons under certain conditions. State ex rel. v. Revelle, 165 S.W. 1084; In re Flukes, 157 Mo. l. c. 132.
Ward & Reeves for respondent.
(1) (a) The constitutional question was, not timely or properly raised. Syz v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 323 Mo. 130; Lieber v. Heil, 325 Mo. 1148. (b) If the trial court erroneously construed or applied Section 2970, and by such ruling violated a constitutional right of appellants, this does not involve a construction of the Constitution, so as to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction. Stock v. Schloman, 322 Mo. 1209; Chilton v. Drainage District, 332 Mo. 1173; Hayes v. Hayes, 153 S.W.2d 1. (2) Section 2970 does not make any unreasonable classification of persons, things or conditions, and applies alike to all persons and things and conditions set forth in the statute. (3) (a) We concede that the liberty of contract is guaranteed by Article II, Section 30, Constitution of Missouri, which is known as the due process clause; but this provision of the Constitution does not deny to the Legislature the power to prescribe the manner in which contracts shall be made, nor does it impair the police power of the State to enact legislation regulating and curtailing the liberty of contract for the purpose, among other things, to prevent fraud and perjury by requiring certain classes of contracts to be in writing. 16 C. J. S., 618, sec. 210; Reigart v. Coal & Coke Co., 217 Mo. 142; Heller v. Lutz, 254 Mo. 704; State ex rel. Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cox, 306 Mo. 537; Hicks v. Simonsen, 307 Mo. 307. (b) A legislative requirement that designated classes of contracts, to be enforcible, must be in writing, does not render the oral contract void, but merely goes to the remedy and is a valid statutory rule of evidence. Huttig v. Brennan, 328 Mo. 471; Major v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 64 S.W.2d 296; Feldman v. Levinson, 93 S.W.2d 31; Hoshaw v. Fenton, 232 Mo.App. 137; 27 C. J., 309, sec. 398. (c) Section 3351, Revised Statutes of 1939, regarding limitation of actions, is likewise a limitation on the liberty of contract, but it has been specifically held to be constitutional under the police power of the State. Karnes v. Ins. Co., 144 Mo. 413; Richardson v. Railroad, 149 Mo. 311; Brucker v. Casualty Co., 326 Mo. 856. (4) Other statutes requiring written transactions have been held constitutional. Heller v. Lutz, 254 Mo. 704; State ex rel. Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cox, 306 Mo. 537.
The appellants suffered an adverse judgment in unlawful detainer below. They had been tenants of a farm in New Madrid County during the calendar year 1940 under a written lease with the owner. He declined to renew the lease for 1941, and rented the land to respondent. Appellants refused to surrender possession and respondent brought this suit. At the circuit court trial appellants offered to prove that in August, 1940, the landowner orally agreed to let them continue as tenants during 1941; and during the first week of the latter year the landowner's authorized agent gave them the same assurance. The trial court excluded the testimony because Sec. 2970, R. S. 1939, Sec. 2583a, Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 4832, pocket part, enacted by Laws Mo. 1935, p. 288, prohibits the admission of such evidence in the circumstances detailed. Appellants contended then, as they do now, that the statute violates Sec. 30, Art. II, Constitution of Missouri. This is the only question on this appeal. They concede that if the statute is constitutional their case must fail.
At the trial they further maintained the statute violated Subsections 17 and 33, Sec. 53, Art. IV of the State Constitution but that assignment was not preserved in their motion for new trial. Also, in the motion for new trial they affirmed the statute contravenes certain cited sections of the Constitution of the United States. But those assignments were not presented during the trial. The statute appears in the chapter on Landlords and Tenants. So far as pertinent here it provides (italics ours):
"In all cases where a tenant holds over after the termination of the time for which the premises were let or leased, under a written contract between the lessor or his agent and the tenant or his agent, in any suit for possession by the party entitled to possession of said premises against such tenant, after the termination of the time for which said premises were let or leased under written contract, oral evidence shall not be admissible that said lease or letting was renewed or extended, or that a new contract was entered into or substituted for the written contract, but the tenant's right to continued possession or the landlord's right to collect rent on said premises after the termination thereof, shall be established by contract in writing; . . ."
The substance of the enactment is that where a tenant holds over after the termination of his written lease and is sued for possession by the party entitled thereto, oral evidence of any renewal, extension, substituted or new lease to the tenant shall be inadmissible, and the tenant's right to continued possession must be evidenced by a written contract. In other words, where the original lease was in writing the extending agreement also must be.
Without inquiring into the legal effect of the landlord's alleged oral agreement with appellants in August, 1940, to let them continue as tenants during the year 1941, in view of Sec. 3352, R. S. 1939, Sec. 2695, Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 688, and Sec. 3354, R. S. 1939, Sec. 2967, Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 1835, it is at least true that the alleged oral agreement to the same effect made by the landlord's authorized agent during the first week in January, 1941, was a valid, enforceable contract so far as those statutes are concerned. It was to be performed within less than one year from its date and was not a lease for a longer time than one year. (In this discussion we are assuming the agreement was a lease and not a mere indefinite agreement to make a lease.) This latter agreement being valid under Secs. 3352 and 3354, supra, though oral, appellants say Sec. 2970, supra, is unconstitutional in declaring it inadmissible in evidence because it was oral. In other words, appellants contend the statute denied them the right to make and prove a legal contract, as guaranteed by the due process section, Sec. 30, Art. II, Constitution of Missouri. The fact should be borne in mind that Sec. 2970, supra, was enacted in 1935, and had been in force over five years when the alleged oral agreements on which appellants rely were made in 1940 and 1941.
It is fundamental that liberty to contract is one of the rights protected by the due process clause. [State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 172-3, 31 S.W. 781, 782.] But it is equally well established that the right is not absolute and universal. As stated broadly in the texts cited below, the State may restrict the right under the police power for the general welfare, and prescribe the manner in which contracts shall be made. However such restrictions must not be arbitrary or unreasonable and can be justified only by conditions calling for their imposition. [12 C. J., sec. 460, p. 948, sec. 966, p. 1200; 16 C. J. S., sec. 210, p. 615; 11 Am. Jur., sec. 341, p. 1161, sec. 342, p. 1165.]
Supporting the texts are such leading cases as Atlantic Coast Line Rd. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.S. 186, 202, 55 L.Ed 167, 31 S.Ct. 164, where it was...
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Marshall v. Kansas City
...rights to contract with whom they choose in regard to their restaurant services, the plaintiffs cite Gideon-Anderson Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 348 Mo. 1085, 156 S.W.2d 898, which holds at p. 899[2, 3]: 'It is fundamental that liberty to contract is one of the rights protected by the due process ......