Gilbert v. Canyon County

• Decision Date: 03 March 1908
• Citation: 14 Idaho 429,94 P. 1027
• Parties: FRANK G. GILBERT et al., Appellants, v. CANYON COUNTY et al., Respondents
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

94 P. 1027

14 Idaho 429

FRANK G. GILBERT et al., Appellants, v. CANYON COUNTY et al., Respondents

Supreme Court of Idaho

March 3, 1908

BOARDS OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS-SESSIONS OF-REGULAR, ADJOURNED SPECIAL-NOTICE OF-BUSINESS TO BE TRANSACTED AT-WHAT MUST BE SPECIFIED.

1. Under secs. 1755, 1756 and 1757, Rev. Stat., regular adjourned and special meetings of the boards of county commissioners are provided for.

2. The time for holding the regular meetings is fixed by the provisions of sec. 1755, Rev. Stat.

3. Adjourned meetings of the board may be provided for and fixed by the board when in session by an order of the board duly entered on the record, in which must be specified the character of the business to be transacted at such meeting and none other than that specified can be legally transacted.

4. A special meeting of the board may be ordered by a majority of the board. Such order must be entered of record and five days' notice thereof must be given to the member not joining in the order. Such order must specify the business to be transacted at such special meeting, and none other than that specified can be legally transacted.

5. Under the provisions of sec. 1758, the clerk is required to give five days' public notice of all special or adjourned meetings, stating the business to be transacted, by posting three notices in conspicuous places, one of which shall be at the courthouse door.

6. The following order held to be an order for an adjourned meeting to wit: "On motion the board adjourned until November 1st, 1906, for the purpose of allowing claims for county courthouse construction, and any other regular business which the board may choose to take up."

7. Held, that five days' public notice of said adjourned meeting was not given, and for that reason no business could legally be transacted thereat by the board.

8. Held, that an adjournment of the board at said pretended meeting on the 1st of November, 1906, to the 21st of November, 1906, would not transform or change said pretended adjourned meeting to a regular meeting of the board.

9. Held, that the board had no jurisdiction to hold meetings on November 1st and 21st.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from the District Court of Seventh Judicial District for Canyon County. Hon. Ed. L. Bryan, Judge.

Action to restrain the board of county commissioners from issuing and selling negotiable bonds for the purpose of building a bridge. Judgment for the respondent. Reversed.

Judgment reversed and costs awarded to appellants.

W. A. Stone, and John F. McLane, for Appellants.

"A board of commissioners is a tribunal created by statute, with limited jurisdiction and only quasi-judicial powers, and cannot proceed except in strict accordance with the mode provided by statute. It has no right or authority to adopt any other mode than that required and provided by statute." (Dunbar v. Commrs., 5 Idaho 407, 49 P. 409; Gorman v. Commrs., 1 Idaho 553; 11 Cyc. 398; 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 2d ed., 983; Johnson v. Eureka Co., 12 Nev. 28.)

County boards can speak only through their records. The validity of their proceedings must appear from their records, and can be shown in no other way. (Riley v. Pettis Co., 96 Mo. 318, 9 S.W. 906; Phelan v. San Francisco, 6 Cal. 531; Conger v. Commrs., 5 Idaho 347, 48 P. 1064; Polly v. Hopkins, 74 Tex. 145, 11 S.W. 1084.)

The action of the board in ordering the issuance and sale of bonds is void because made without proof of jurisdictional facts. (Johnson v. Eureka Co., 12 Nev. 28; Rhode v. David, 2 Ind. 53; State v. Ormsby County Commrs., 6 Nev. 95.)

The bond proceedings were all, subsequent to the approval of the petition, taken at adjourned meetings of which no notice was posted as required by law. (Secs. 1755, 1756, 1757, and 1758, Rev. Stat.; 2 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 2d ed., 979-981; People v. Dunn, 89 Cal. 228, 26 P. 761; Tierney v. Brown, 67 Miss. 109, 6 So. 737; El Dorado County v. Reed, 11 Cal. 130; Goedgen v. Manitowac Co., 10 F. Cas. 5501, 2 Biss. 328.)

J. J. Guheen, Atty. Gen., O. M. Van Duyn, Pros. Atty., and Smith & Scatterday, for Respondents.

If it can be gathered from the records, either by express statements therein or by expression of subsequent acts of the commissioners, that they had relied upon and acted upon a matter as having been done, even though the minutes do not show that they had made an express finding of fact that the same had been done, then such is sufficient to show jurisdiction. (County of Canyon v. Toole, 8 Idaho 508, 69 P. 320; Humboldt Co. v. Dinsmore, 75 Cal. 604, 17 P. 710; State v. Crawford County Supervisors, 39 Wis. 596; Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 64, 6 L.Ed. 552.)

It is the duty of the courts to so construe statutes as to make them effect their evident purpose, and harmonize their various provisions with one another, and when the application of these rules still leaves a question of doubt, the principles of justice and reason must determine the doubt. (Lamkin v. Sterling, 1 Idaho 92; Oregon Street Line Ry. Co. v. Yeates etc., 2 Idaho 397, 17 P. 457.)

All laws relating to the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia. (Rankin v. Jauman, 4 Idaho 394, 39 P. 1111; Dunlap v. Pattison, 4 Idaho 473, 95 Am. St. Rep. 140, 42 P. 504.)

A regular meeting of the board may be continued until all the business is disposed of, and until the opening day of the subsequent term. (State v. Board of Commrs., 22 Nev. 15, 34 P. 1057.) That the board can adjourn from week to week, or from month to month, is clearly the meaning of our statute. (Sec. 1755, Rev. Stat.; Ex parte Mirande, 73 Cal. 365, 14 P. 888.)

The records show that the board had been in session from time to time and continuously since the opening day of the October term, 1906. Perhaps the record does not show for what purpose, but it is implied in the order made October 17, 1906.

There are two constructions which can be placed on the language used in the order referred to, but the construction which will most nearly carry out the intention of the board and the will of the people of the county should be adopted.

SULLIVAN, J. Ailshie, C. J., concurs, Stewart, J., concurs in the conclusion.

OPINION

SULLIVAN, J.

This action was commenced by the appellant, a citizen and taxpayer of Canyon county, to restrain the defendants, who comprise the board of commissioners of said county, from issuing and selling negotiable coupon bonds of that county for the purpose of raising funds with which to build a bridge across the Boise river at Notus in said county.

The general ground of the complaint is that the commissioners have not followed the provisions of the statute which should govern their actions in such matters, and that, consequently, they are without jurisdiction to issue and sell such bonds. The action was tried on the complaint and answer and judgment was entered in favor of the defendants, denying the relief prayed for. This appeal is from the judgment.

It appears from the record that on July 18, 1906, a petition in proper form was presented to the board praying for the construction of a wagon bridge by the county over Boise river near the town of Notus in said county. The commissioners considered the petition and made the proper order declaring that such bridge was a public necessity and that the cost thereof would be $ 12,000, and fixed October 11, 1906, as the date of hearing the petition. Proper notice thereof was ordered to be published and was published in the "Caldwell Tribune," a newspaper published in said county, for more than thirty days prior to the date of hearing. However, proof of such publication was not made and filed until April 27, 1907. On October 11, 1906, the board convened in regular session and the matter of said bridge came on for hearing. No objection was made thereto and the board ordered that the prayer of the petition be granted and that proceedings be had for the construction of the bridge as prayed for. The board further found that the cost of said bridge would not exceed $ 12,000, and accepted plans and specifications for the construction of the same which had been prepared by the county surveyor. Notice calling for bids for the construction of said bridge was ordered published and was published. Said notice stated that the bids would be opened on November 21, 1906. The board continued in regular session, adjourned from day to day until October 17th, on which day an order was made and entered that the board adjourn until November 1, 1906. Said order is as follows: "On motion the board adjourned until November 1st, 1906, for the purpose of allowing claims for courthouse construction and any other regular business which the board may choose to take up." On the 1st day of November the board met and the following order was made and entered of record: "On motion the board adjourned until November 21st, 1906, at 10 o'clock A. M." For neither of these two last-mentioned adjournments was any notice posted as required by sec. 1758, Rev. Stat. On November 21st, the board met and opened the bids received for the construction of said bridge pursuant to the notice above referred to. The board proceeded to consider the bids submitted and let the contract for the construction of said bridge for the sum of $ 17,832, that being the lowest and best bid therefor. Thereupon the board made an order calling for a bond election, submitting the question to the electors whether a bond issue should be made to the amount of $ 18,000 for the construction of said bridge. No...