Giles v. Gibson
Decision Date | 12 March 1952 |
Docket Number | No. 17776,17776 |
Citation | 69 S.E.2d 774,208 Ga. 850 |
Parties | GILES v. GIBSON. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
The sentence imposed in this case was based upon a void ordinance, and the prisoner should have been released upon his writ of habeas corpus.
Charles Henry Giles filed a petition for habeas corpus against H. H. Gibson, as Superintendent of the City Prison of the City of Atlanta. It was alleged that the illegal detention of the petitioner by the respondent was under a purported sentence by the Deputy Recorder of the city on purported charges of being 'drunk under the steering wheel.' A duly certified copy of the ordinance under which the sentence was imposed was attached to the petition as an exhibit. It was alleged that the ordinance of the city was unconstitutional, null, and void because at the time of its enactment there was a general law in force, Code, § 68-307, and the ordinance violated the Constitution, art. 1, sec. 4 par. 1, Code Ann. § 2-401, providing that laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the State, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law. The petitioner further attacked the ordinance as being violative of other stated provisions of the Constitution.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the petitioner was remanded to the custody of the respondent, and the exception is to that judgment.
Frank Grizzard, Frank A. Bowers, and Norman H. Fudge, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
J. C. Savage, J. C. Murphy, J. M. B. Bloodworth, John E. Feagin and Henry L. Bowden, Atlanta, for defendant in error.
The ordinance under attack provides in part as follows:
It is contended by counsel for the petitioner that the ordinance of the city is in conflict with the general law of this State, to wit, Code, § 68-307 as amended by the act of 1947, Ga.L.1947, p. 230, which reads in part as follows: 'No person shall operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle upon any public street or highway, or any private way, private street, or private property in this State, whether as owner or operator of such vehicle, if under 16 years of age, or while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, or drugs'.
Counsel for the respondent cite Loach v. City of LaFayette, 19 Ga.App. 639, 91 S.E. 1057, 1058, and the cases there cited, and emphasize the following language: 'An act penalized by a law of the state may be penalized also by a municipal ordinance, if there is in the municipal offense some essential ingredient not essential to the state offense, or if the municipal offense lacks some ingredient essential to the state offense.' The quotation from Loach v. City of LaFayette, supra, is not in accord with the correct rule for testing the validity of a municipal ordinance. A municipal ordinance is nothing more than a special law limited in its application to the territory embraced within the municipality.
In City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, 193 Ga. 618, 623, 19 S.E.2d 508, 511, Mr. Chief Justice Duckworth, in speaking for this court, stated in part as follows: See also: Mayor, etc., of Savannah v. Hussey, 21 Ga. 80; Jenkins v. Mayor, etc., of Thomasville, 35 Ga. 145; Vason v. City of Augusta, 38 Ga. 542; Reich v. State, 53 Ga. 73; Rothschild v. City of Darien, 69 Ga. 503; Turner v. Mayor, etc., of Forsyth, 78 Ga. 683, 3 S.E. 649. Hood v. Von Glahn, 88 Ga. 405, 14 S.E. 564; Kahn v. City of Macon, 95 Ga. 419, 22 S.E. 641; Strauss v. Mayor, etc., of Waycross, 97 Ga. 475, 25 S.E. 329; Moran v. City of Atlanta, 102 Ga. 840, 30...
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Jenkins v. Jones
...with matters covered by a general law is a special law within the meaning of the uniformity clause of the Constitution. Giles v. Gibson, 208 Ga. 850, 69 S.E.2d 774, and The ordinance under attack in this case is violative of art. 1, sec. 4, par. 1 of the Constitution of Georgia, Code Ann. §......
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Meeks v. Lunsford
...I, Sec. IV, Par. I, of the Constitution of the State of Georgia (Code § 2-401). And we think this is the clear import of Giles v. Gibson, 208 Ga. 850, 69 S.E.2d 774. While the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance (Shirley v. City of C......
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City of Atlanta v. McKinney
...rights or status of private persons...." (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(c); Giles v. Gibson, 208 Ga. 850, 851-852, 69 S.E.2d 774 (1952) (a municipal ordinance is a special law). See also Att'y Gen.Op. 93-26. And, as a special law, the registry ordinance ......
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Hannah v. State, 37052
...punishment of such act.' To the same effect see Hood v. Von Glahn, 88 Ga. 405, 14 S.E. 564. On the other hand the cases of Giles v. Gibson, 208 Ga. 850, 69 S.E.2d 774; Jenkins v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758, 75 S.E.2d 815, and Beard v. City of Atlanta, 91 Ga.App. 584, 86 S.E.2d 672, have held or ind......