Giles v. Kearney

• Decision Date: 15 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-4140.,07-4140.
• Citation: 571 F.3d 318
• Parties: Wardell Leroy GILES, Appellant v. Warden Rick KEARNEY, et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

571 F.3d 318

Wardell Leroy GILES, Appellant v. Warden Rick KEARNEY, et al.

No. 07-4140.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued March 10, 2009.

Filed July 15, 2009.

Kathryn J. Gainey (Argued), Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Washington, DC, Counsel for Appellant.

Judy Oken Hodas (Argued), Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, DE, Counsel for Appellees.

Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.

This appeal arises from a pro se action brought by Appellant Wardell Leroy Giles, who suffered injuries including a broken rib and punctured lung after being forcibly subdued and kicked or "kneed" in the side by correctional officers while he was incarcerated at Sussex Correctional Institution ("SCI"). Giles filed claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers and other parties, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Giles appeals from the District Court's order granting summary judgment based on qualified immunity for three officers in their individual capacities, and from the District Court's judgment in favor of the remaining Appellees.

Because Giles testified that he was kicked and punched while fully restrained on the ground, after he ceased to resist, Giles alleges conduct in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights that a reasonable officer would have known was a violation under the circumstances, and we will reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment for the three correctional officers in their individual capacities. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court with regard to the other Appellees.¹

I.

Giles contends that the District Court did not accept his factual allegations as true or adequately address the defendants' use of force in its summary judgment analysis. Giles also contends that the District Court did not properly consider the five factors established in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986), in its conclusion that the force used against him was not excessive, and that the District Court erred in finding that the correctional officers were not deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and did not adequately address conflicting testimony as to whether Giles had requested medical treatment.

On an appeal from a grant or denial of summary judgment, our review is plenary and we apply the same test the district court should have utilized initially. See Alexander v. Nat'l Fire Ins., 454 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir.2006); Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 105 n. 5 (3d Cir.2000). A court may grant summary judgment only when the record "shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In this analysis, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor" in determining whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The mere existence of some evidence in support of the nonmovant is insufficient to deny a motion for summary judgment; enough evidence must exist to enable a jury to reasonably find for the nonmovant on the issue. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Where the plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the court has an obligation to construe the complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83, 86 n. 6 (3d Cir.1997).

A district court's findings of fact under Rule 52(a) are reviewed for clear error. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). Rule 52(a) requires that the district court's ultimate decision be supported by subordinate factual findings. O'Neill v. United States, 411 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir.1969). However,

In reviewing the decision of the District Court, our responsibility is not to substitute findings we could have made had we been the fact-finding tribunal; our sole function is to review the record to determine whether the findings of the District Court were clearly erroneous, i.e., whether we are "left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." It is the responsibility of an appellate court to accept the ultimate factual determination of the fact-finder unless that determination either (1) is completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.

Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3d Cir.1972) (internal citation omitted). In bench trials, a district court's application of the deliberate indifference and excessive force legal standards to a set of facts is also guided by the clear error standard. See Goffman v. Gross, 59 F.3d 668, 671-672 (7th Cir.1995) (deliberate indifference); Quezada v. County of Bernalillo, 944 F.2d 710, 715 (10th Cir.1991) (excessive force); Jacobs v. City of New Orleans, 484 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1973) (excessive force).

Clear error review is deferential: "If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently." Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). When a district court's findings are based on credibility determinations, Rule 52(a) demands even greater deference. Id. Nevertheless, a court may not insulate its findings from review by "denominating them credibility determinations, [because] factors other than demeanor ... go into the decision whether or not to believe a witness." Id. at 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504.

II.

The relevant evidence concerns two related use-of-force incidents at SCI after Giles had been transferred there, as well as the medical aftermath of those incidents. One incident occurred in a prison shower during Giles' intake process; the second occurred several hours later in a cell in the prison infirmary.

A.

Giles was transferred to SCI from another facility on November 27, 2001. On that day, he was brought to the receiving and processing area for new inmate intake procedures including a strip search and shower. Present in the intake area were Corporal Dean Blades, Sergeant Charles Steele and Sergeant Bob Cassase.

Giles was wearing a red religious cap called a kufi, which Blades asked him to remove and informed him was in violation of a new SCI policy that permitted only white kufis. Giles became angry and refused to hand over his kufi, cursing at Blades and arguing that he did not believe there was such a policy. After repeated orders, Giles eventually relinquished his kufi. Cassase then ordered Giles to strip down to be searched. Giles initially refused to remove his boxer shorts or expose himself for inspection, but complied after the orders were repeated.

Giles was then ordered to take a shower. He cursed at the guards and argued that he had already taken a shower that day, but ultimately complied. After he entered the shower, Giles had trouble turning on the water, and Blades entered to show Giles how to operate the shower. A verbal altercation ensued, with Giles resisting Blades' assistance and cursing him. When Giles cursed Blades in the shower, Blades pulled out his cannister of capstun—a potent form of pepper spray—and sprayed Giles, temporarily blinding him. After being capstunned, Giles swung his arm and struck Blades in the mouth. For hitting Blades, Giles later was found guilty of assault on a staff member, in an administrative hearing on December 7, 2001. On July 29, 2002, Giles also pled no contest to misdemeanor assault in the third degree for the same conduct, in the Superior Court of Delaware in Sussex County, pursuant to Del.Code Ann., tit. 11 § 611. State of Delaware v. Wardell L. Giles, Crim. No. 02-06-0330 (Del.Super.Ct. July 29, 2002).

Blades called for reinforcement to subdue Giles, and Steele, Cassase and Sergeant Gary Campbell responded to the scene. The officers tackled Giles, Blades and Campbell wrestled Giles to the floor of the shower, and Blades sat on Giles' middle back and held his legs. The record reflects that Giles is 5 feet 7 inches tall and weighed 195 pounds, and Blades weighed 275 pounds. The officers testified that Giles continued struggling and pushing against Blades and did not comply with orders to put his hands behind his back to be handcuffed, shaking his head "no" in response to requests to do so. Giles testified that he stopped resisting once on the ground but was unable to put his hands behind him because Blades was sitting on his back. Giles explained that he was shaking his head to indicate that he was unable to present his hands. Giles stated that the officers kicked him in the ribs and punched him in the head after he had stopped resisting, while he was prostrate on the ground with Blades sitting on him. Campbell's incident report stated that Campbell "hit [inmate] Giles in his side with my knee to try to make him give up his arms to be cuffed." App. 108.

After the officers finally had him cuffed, Giles had a bloody nose and complained of other injuries. He was assessed by nurse Amy Whittle, who reported that Giles complained of pain in his left side and told her that he had heard one of his ribs snap. Giles also insisted that he could not breathe and complained of shortness of breath. Nurse Whittle observed a large red area under Giles' left nipple and a slightly elevated respiratory rate. She concluded that Giles did not have a punctured lung, and spoke with a doctor by phone who arranged an order for X-rays the following day and instructed that Giles' condition should be monitored. Giles was then transferred to a...