Gillespie v. Cypher

• Decision Date: 28 June 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action 20-cv-30050-MGM
• Parties: VINCENT GILLESPIE, on behalf of the ESTATE OF GREGORY GILLESPIE, and VINCENT GILLESPIE, individually, Plaintiff, v. ELSPETH CYPHER, individually and in her previous capacity as a Judge of the Mass. Court of Appeals; JOSEPH TRAINOR, individually, and in his previous capacity as a Judge of the Mass. Court of Appeals; GREGORY MASSING, individually, and in his capacity as a Judge of the Mass. Court of Appeals; KENNETH DESMOND, JR., individually, and in his capacity as a Judge of the Mass. Court of Appeals; and the HAMPSHIRE SUPERIOR COURT, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

VINCENT GILLESPIE, on behalf of the ESTATE OF GREGORY GILLESPIE, and VINCENT GILLESPIE, individually, Plaintiff, v. ELSPETH CYPHER, individually and in her previous capacity as a Judge of the Mass. Court of Appeals; JOSEPH TRAINOR, individually, and in his previous capacity as a Judge of the Mass. Court of Appeals; GREGORY MASSING, individually, and in his capacity as a Judge of the Mass. Court of Appeals; KENNETH DESMOND, JR., individually, and in his capacity as a Judge of the Mass. Court of Appeals; and the HAMPSHIRE SUPERIOR COURT, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-cv-30050-MGM

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

June 28, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (DKT. NO. 18)

KATHERINE A. ROBERTSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Introduction

On August 27, 2020, Vincent Gillespie (“Plaintiff”) ^[1] a self-represented party, filed his Second Amended Complaint (hereinafter “Complaint”) in this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), stating claims against Elspeth Cypher, Joseph Trainor, Gregory Massing, and Kenneth Desmond, Jr., individually and in their official capacity for actions they took as Associate Justices of the Massachusetts Appeals Court (hereinafter, “Justices”), and against the Hampshire County Superior Court (collectively, “Defendants”). In summary, the Complaint seeks a declaration that the Justices violated Plaintiff's due process rights when they assessed attorney's fees and double costs against Plaintiff in an appeal from a judgment entered by the Superior Court Department of the Massachusetts Trial Court and an injunction against the Hampshire County Superior Court to preclude a proceeding in that forum to collect the award of fees and costs. Before the court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, which was referred to me for Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 32). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants.

II. Relevant background

The factual background provided here is derived from the Complaint and incorporated documents. On or around April 25, 2003, Plaintiff filed a state court complaint against Peggy Gillespie, his stepmother and the widow of his father (Compl. ¶ 9). Attorneys Sandra Staub and David Angier represented Ms. Gillespie (Compl. ¶ 10). Ms. Staub and Mr. Angier obtained summary judgment in Ms. Gillespie's favor. According to Plaintiff, this outcome was the result of misconduct by Ms. Staub and Mr. Angier. The Massachusetts Appeals Court (“MAP”) affirmed the trial court judgment on February 7, 2011 and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) denied further appellate review on April 27, 2011 (Compl. ¶ 12).

On April 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed a state court action against Ms. Staub, Mr. Angier, and Ms. Gillespie, alleging - in an amended complaint - denial of access to the courts, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy (Compl. ¶ 13). On April 29, 2015, a Superior Court judge dismissed this second case on statute of limitations grounds (Compl. ¶ 15). Plaintiff appealed from the judgment, raising a variety of arguments (Compl. ¶ 17). On March 23, 2017, the MAP affirmed the trial court's dismissal in a summary decision (Compl. ¶ 19 & Exh. 1), further concluding that the defendants were “entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and double costs under Mass. R.A.P. 25, as appearing in 376 Mass. 949 (1979).” The MAP directed that the defendants file statements of their appellate attorney's fees and costs with appropriate supporting material (Compl. Exh. 1).^[2] On May 3, 2017, having reviewed the defendants' fee and costs petition and Plaintiff's response thereto, the MAP awarded Ms. Staub “attorney's fees in the amount of $4, 920.00 and double costs of $40.38 for a total of $4, 960.38” (Compl. Exh. 2).^[3] The MAP's May 3, 2017 order - captioned Notice of Docket Entry - directed that any proceedings to enforce the order awarding fees and costs should be “commenced in the Trial Court” (Compl. Exh. 2). The MAP denied Plaintiff's subsequent petition for rehearing and his motion for clarification (Compl. Exhs. 3 & 4). Plaintiff “has not paid the sanctions at this time, and he so far has received almost no pressure from anyone to pay them, ” but he anticipates that this situation will change (Compl. ¶ 26).

Plaintiff alleges that the Justices' decisions and orders awarding fees and costs against him, an award which he characterizes as a sanction, violated his Fifth Amendment right against deprivation of property without due process of law when “they issued sanctions against him without notice and an opportunity to be heard” (Compl. ¶ 31). He contends that the award of fees and costs was so outside the norm that the Justices might be found to have acted in their individual rather than their official capacities and so they might not “have judicial immunity for their misconduct here” (Compl. ¶ 32). If, however, they are found to be acting in their official capacities, then, he contends, “declaratory relief would still be an available remedy” (Compl. ¶ 33). The declaratory relief he requests is a declaration “stating that the 5/3/2017 decision is unconstitutional and therefore void and unenforceable” (Compl. at 14).

Plaintiff claims he is entitled to an injunction against the Hampshire County Superior Court to prevent that court from adjudicating a proceeding to enforce the award for fees and costs because the Hampshire County Superior Court would likely consider itself bound by the decisions of the MAP and the SJC's denial of further appellate review (Compl. ¶¶ 27-29).

III. Discussion

A. Standard of review

The defendants move for dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The standards of review for such motions are essentially the same:

“A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) is appropriate when the plaintiff lacks standing to bring the claim.” Oum v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 842 F.Supp.2d 407, 411 (D. Mass. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., 708 F.3d 282 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Edelkind v. Fairmont Funding, Ltd., 539 F.Supp.2d 449, 453 (D. Mass. 2008)). Courts assess such motions using the familiar standard applicable to motions filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6): a complaint's well-pleaded facts must be credited as true, and all reasonable inferences from the complaint must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., Kerin v. Titeflex Corp., 770 F.3d 978, 981 (1st Cir. 2014); Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir. 2006)); Igartua v. United States, 86 F.Supp.3d 50, 53 ((D.P.R. 2015) (citing Negron-Gaztambide v. Hernandez-Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1994)). However, a party's “bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like” merit no assumption of truth. Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996)); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

Oyola v. Cavalry SPV I, LLC, CIVIL ACTION NO 4:17-cv-40083-TSH, 2018 WL 1940313, at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 1, 2018). When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion that asserts a lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a basis for dismissal, a court may look beyond the four corners of the complaint by which it is generally constrained under Rule 12(b)(6) and rely on “whatever evidence has been submitted.” Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1210 (1st Cir. 1996). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Osediacz v. City of Cranston, 414 F.3d 136, 139 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)); Marcello v. Maine, 464 F.Supp.2d 38, 41 (D. Me. 2006).

B. Analysis

In seeking dismissal of the Complaint, Defendants argue, inter alia, that: (1) the court lacks jurisdiction over the claims in the Complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) judicial immunity bars Plaintiff's claims against the Justices because the award of attorney's fees and costs was an adjudicatory function the exercise of which is protected by judicial immunity; and (3) the Hampshire County Superior Court is not a person subject to suit for purposes of § 1983. Further, Plaintiff is not entitled to the declaratory relief he seeks. Because this court finds that each of these grounds or a combination of these grounds so clearly requires dismissal of this action and makes its recommendations in accordance with these findings, the court need not reach the additional arguments for dismissal raised by the defendants. See, e.g., Watson v. Ordonez, 318 F.Supp. 456, 460 (D. Mass. 2018) (“Because the court finds that the case must be dismissed under Younger, it need not consider alternative arguments for dismissal raised by defendants.”); Werner v. Wall, No. Civ.A 06-3IT, 2006 WL 2559484, at *3 (D.R.I. Aug. 31, 2006) (declining to address the defendants' second ground for dismissal after recommending dismissal on the first ground).

1. Plaintiff's Claims Against the Justices are Subject to Dismissal.

a. The case is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claims in this case are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which states that a federal trial court cannot exercise jurisdiction to review a final judgment entered by a state court. Plaintiff responds that he is not challenging the merits of the MAP decision (although he disagrees with it) but has filed suit claiming a violation of his right to due process because the court allegedly granted Ms. Staub attorney's fees and...