Gleaton & Assocs. v. Cornelius
| Decision Date | 08 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | A22A1403 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | GLEATON & ASSOCIATES, INC. v. CORNELIUS. |
BARNES, P. J., DOYLE, P. J., and SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE PHIPPS
PHIPPS, SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE
Defendant Gleaton & Associates, Inc. appeals from a trial court order granting in part and denying in part its motion for summary judgment in this suit involving, among other things negligence per se. Gleaton & Associates claims that the court erred by failing to grant it summary judgment on plaintiff LaQuita Cornelius's claim that it knowingly and willingly made a false statement in a dispossessory warrant in violation of OCGA § 44-7-58. For the reasons that follow, we agree and reverse.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Strength v. Lovett, 311 Ga.App. 35 39 (2) (714 S.E.2d 723) (2011). We review an award of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 624 (1) (a) (697 S.E.2d 779) (2010). "In so doing, we owe no deference to the trial court's legal analysis or legal conclusions." Atlanta Dev. v. Emerald Capital Investments, 258 Ga.App. 472, 477 (1) (574 S.E.2d 585) (2002).
So viewed, the evidence shows that Cornelius leased a house (the "property") from its owner for a term of March 4, 2017, to March 30, 2018, and subsequently renewed the lease for a second term from April 1, 2018, to March 31, 2019. Gleaton & Associates, also operating under the name Elite Realty Group, managed the property. Under a heading entitled "Due Date for Rent," provision (A) (3) (b) of the applicable lease stated that "[r]ent shall be paid no later than by 6 m.[sic] on the 5th day of the month ('Due Date')" or the tenant would be assessed a late fee (hereinafter "provision 3"). However, the lease also contained "Special Stipulations," the second of which stated:
All parties acknowledge that rent is due on the first day of each month. All parties acknowledge that if rent is not paid by 6:00 pm on the 5th day of the month tenant shall be assessed late fees in the amount of $125.00 plus $10.00 per day for each day thereafter until all fees assessed to bring [the] account current are paid in full.
(Hereinafter "special stipulation 2".) According to the special stipulations page, if the special stipulations conflict with any preceding paragraph of the lease, the special stipulations "shall control."
The lease further indicated that rent was due "on or before the Due Date" and that the landlord had no obligation to accept rent paid after the due date. In addition, the landlord was authorized by the lease to "file a dispossessory action against Tenant if any rent or other fees and charges owed by Tenant [were] not paid in full by the Due Date." According to the lease, the landlord could terminate the lease early by giving 60 days' notice or terminate immediately if default occurred. Default occurred if, for example, the tenant failed to abide by the terms and conditions of the lease or failed to timely pay rent.
It is undisputed that the owner knew Cornelius was interested in purchasing the property and, in December 2018, mentioned to her that he would be selling the property. Both parties recount a number of disputed facts occurring between that time and February 4, 2019, but those facts are irrelevant to the issues in this appeal and therefore are not included here. On February 4, 2019, Gleaton & Associates filed a dispossessory action in magistrate court, averring that Cornelius "fail[ed] to pay rent now due [f]rom 2/1/2019 [t]o 2/28/2019." Gleaton & Associates voluntarily dismissed the dispossessory action on March 4, 2019, and Cornelius left the property the next day.
On April 8, 2019, Cornelius filed a complaint, which she subsequently amended, against Gleaton & Associates, Elite Realty Group, Calvin Gleaton individually, and the property owner, alleging claims for the negligent filing of a dispossessory affidavit, violation of the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, and defamation. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment.[1] The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on Cornelius's Georgia Fair Business Practices Acts and defamation claims, but denied summary judgment on her negligence claim and request for punitive damages and attorney fees. Gleaton & Associates appeals from this order.[2] 1. Gleaton & Associates argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant it summary judgment on Cornelius's negligence per se claim based on OCGA § 44-7-58.[3] We agree.
"Under Georgia law, the violation of a statute, ordinance, or mandatory regulation may constitute negligence per se." Combs v. Atlanta Auto Auction, 287 Ga.App. 9, 12 (2) (650 S.E.2d 709) (2007). In analyzing whether negligence per se occurred, the trial court first must determine that there has been a violation of a statute, ordinance, or mandatory regulation by the defendant. See Norman v. Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, 277 Ga.App. 621, 628 (2) (b) (627 S.E.2d 382) (2006). If so, then the court must (i) consider whether the harm complained of was the harm the statute was meant to protect against and whether the person harmed fell into the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, and (ii) determine whether a causal connection exists between the negligence per se and the injury. See id.
The statute at issue in this case, OCGA § 44-7-58, provides as follows: "Anyone who, under oath or affirmation, knowingly and willingly makes a false statement in an affidavit signed pursuant to Code Section 44-7-50 . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."[4] Thus, the ultimate question on this issue here is whether Gleaton & Associates' statement in the dispossessory affidavit that Cornelius "fail[ed] to pay rent now due," was a false statement knowingly and willingly made by Gleaton & Associates.[5]
Gleaton & Associates contends it did not violate OCGA § 44-7-58 because the lease agreement required payment on the first day of the month and it filed the dispossessory affidavit stating that Cornelius had "fail[ed] to pay rent now due" on the fourth day of the month. In support of this argument, Gleaton & Associates relies on special stipulation 2 attached to the lease, noting that (i) the stipulations page indicated that the special stipulations, if conflicting with any preceding paragraph, "shall control," and (ii) special stipulation 2 read, "[a]ll parties acknowledge that rent is due on the first day of each month."
Cornelius, on the other hand, contends that Gleaton & Associates' sworn statement that she "fail[ed] to pay rent now due" was knowingly and willingly false because (i) the "Due Date" was defined in provision 3 of the lease as "the 5th day of the month," (ii) the actual date for the Due Date (the "5th") in provision 3 was specifically typed on an assigned line of the lease, and (iii) both provision 3 and special stipulation 2 of the lease allowed acceptance of rental payments through the fifth of the month. Accordingly, Cornelius asserts that Gleaton & Associates, knowing rent could be paid through the fifth of the month, falsely swore out the dispossessory affidavit on the fourth of the month.
The trial court found that Gleaton & Associates violated the statute when it filed the dispossessory affidavit on February 4, 2019, because "rent was not yet past due." This conclusion is erroneous.
"[T]he construction of the provisions of a lease is generally a question for the court to determine as a matter of law." Stern's Gallery of Gifts v. Corporate Property Investors, 176 Ga.App. 586, 593 (4) (337 S.E.2d 29) (1985) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also OCGA § 13-2-1. Such construction involves a three-step process.
First, the court decides if the contract language is unambiguous, and if so the court enforces the contract's clear terms. Second, if the contract is ambiguous, the court must apply the rules of contract construction to resolve the ambiguity. And third, if the ambiguity remains after use of the construction rules, the meaning of the contract must be decided by a jury. The first rule that courts must apply when construing contracts is to look to the plain meaning of the words of the contract[.]
NW Parkway v. Lemser, 309 Ga.App. 172, 175 (2) (709 S.E.2d 858) (2011) (citations and punctuation omitted). "A word or phrase is ambiguous when its meaning is uncertain and may fairly be understood in more ways than one." Atlanta Dev., 258 Ga.App. at 477-478 (1). "The existence or non-existence of an ambiguity is itself a question of law for the court[,]" and "[l]anguage which is unambiguous will not be construed as ambiguous based on extrinsic circumstances." Kusuma v. Metametrix, 191 Ga.App. 255, 256 (2) (381 S.E.2d 322) (1989) (citation and punctuation omitted). "Where the language of a contract is clear, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation, no construction is necessary or even permissible." Stern's Gallery of Gifts, 176 Ga.App. at 593 (4). While provision 3 and special stipulation 2 in the applicable lease here conflict, there is no ambiguity in the plain meaning of the words used in the provision or stipulation.
Provision 3 of the lease stated that the due date for rent was no later than 6:00 p.m. "on the 5th day of the month[,]" whereas special stipulation 2 provided that "[a]ll parties acknowledge that rent is due on the first day of each month." This special stipulation is "clear unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation," Stern's Gallery of Gifts, 176 Ga.App. at 593 (4), and the preface to the special stipulations...
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