Glencoe Lime & Cement Co. v. City of St. Louis

• Decision Date: 30 July 1937
• Parties: Glencoe Lime & Cement Company, a Corporation, v. City of St. Louis et al., Defendants-Appellants. Glencoe Lime & Cement Company a Corporation, v. City of St. Louis et al., Defendants, Wesley A. Milby et al., Interveners-Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

108 S.W.2d 143

341 Mo. 689

Glencoe Lime & Cement Company, a Corporation, v. City of St. Louis et al., Defendants-Appellants. Glencoe Lime & Cement Company a Corporation, v. City of St. Louis et al., Defendants, Wesley A. Milby et al., Interveners-Appellants

Supreme Court of Missouri

July 30, 1937

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Charles B Williams, Judge.

Reversed and remanded (with directions).

Edgar H. Wayman, Louis A. McKeown and Francis J Sullivan for City of St. Louis et al.; John E Corvey for Wesley A. Milby et al.

(1) The objection that plaintiff's petition does not state a cause of action because it shows on its face that plaintiff has a complete and adequate remedy at law, and, therefore, the court was without jurisdiction, may be raised for the first time on appeal. Schloss v. Dattillo, 197 Mo.App. 656, 198 S.W. 1137; Palmer v. Marshall, 24 S.W.2d 229; In re McMenamy's Guardianship v. McMenamy, 270 S.W. 662, 307 Mo. 98; Congregation B'Nai Abraham v. Arky, 20 S.W.2d 899, 323 Mo. 776. (2) Petition failing to show affirmatively that plaintiff has exhausted its remedies under the zoning ordinance and enabling act, states no cause of action in equity to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance. Palmer v. Marshall, 24 S.W.2d 233; Congregation B'Nai Abraham v. Arky, 323 Mo. 776, 20 S.W.2d 904. (3) Where the zoning ordinance and the enabling act provide for a Board of Adjustment, with jurisdiction to remedy the matters complained of in the petition, such remedy is exclusive. Plaintiff's petition, the evidence, and admissions of its counsel, show that the only objection to the zoning ordinance is that Lot 25 should have been classified as industrial instead of residential property. Sec. 7265, R. S. 1929; Call Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Sioux City, 259 N.W. 33; Park Ridge Fuel & Material Co. v. Park Ridge, etc., 335 Ill. 509, 167 N.E. 119; People ex rel. Sondern v. Walsh, 178 N.Y.S. 192; People ex rel. Broadway Realty Co. v. Walsh, 196 N.Y.S. 672, 203 A.D. 468; Rice v. Jefferson, 50 Mo.App. 464; Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 323 Mo. 180, 19 S.W.2d 746. (4) The provisions of a zoning ordinance, limiting the subsequent addition, extension or substitution of business buildings, or the use thereof, existing in a residence district at the time of the enactment of such ordinance, where it does not appear that such restrictions have no real or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, is a valid exercise of the police power, and is not violative of either the State or Federal Constitutions. State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 317 Mo. 1179, 298 S.W. 720; Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 54 A. L. R. 1016; Zahn v. Los Angeles Bd. of Public Works, 195 Cal. 497, 234 P. 388; Lowell Bldg. Insp. v. Stoklosa, 250 Mass. 52, 145 N.E. 262. (a) If, through its universality, an individual, because of special circumstances, suffers hardship because of a zoning ordinance, such fact does not render it void as to him. State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co., v. Christopher, 317 Mo. 1179, 298 S.W. 720. (5) If the question is fairly debatable as to whether zoning ordinance is reasonable or arbitrary, or has any substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, the courts will not interfere. Women's Kansas City St. Andrews Soc. v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593; Marblehead Land Co. v. Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528, certiorari denied, 284 U.S. 634; Tucson v. Arizona Mortuary, 34 Ariz. 495, 272 P. 923; People v. Hawley, 207 Cal. 395, 279 P. 136; State v. Hillman, 110 Conn. 92, 147 A. 294; Michigan Lake Bldg. Corp. v. Hamilton, 340 Ill. 284, 172 N.E. 710; Anderson v. Jester, 206 Iowa 452, 221 N.W. 354; Jackson v. McPherson, 108 Miss. 152, 130 So. 287, 162 Miss. 164, 138 So. 604; State ex rel. Nigro v. Kansas City, 325 Mo. 95, 27 S.W.2d 1030; 86 A. L. R. 668. (6) A provision permitting continuance of existing nonconforming uses saves only such nonconforming uses as were in existence at the time the ordinance was adopted, and a new and different use cannot be substituted, neither can a different or temporary nonconforming use, abandoned before the ordinance is adopted, give a vested right to continuance thereof. Eaton v. Sweeney, 232 A.D. 459, 251 N.Y.S. 246; Lexington v. Bean, 272 Mass. 547, 172 N.E. 867; State ex rel. Hochfelder v. New Orleans, 171 La. 1053, 132 So. 786; Yuba City v. Cherneavsky, 117 Cal.App. 568, 4 P.2d 299. (7) The decree must conform to the case made out by the pleadings and proofs. Congregation B'Nai Abraham v. Arky, 323 Mo. 776, 20 S.W.2d 899.

Salkey & Jones and Sam Elson for respondent.

(1) Where the classification imposed upon particular property by a zoning ordinance is palpably unreasonable and arbitrary, and has no real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or welfare, such classification is void and unconstitutional, in that it takes property without due process of law. (a) A zoning ordinance may be valid in its general aspects, yet arbitrary, unreasonable and void with respect to its classification of specific property. Where the classification under a zoning ordinance, as applied to specific property, is designed solely for aesthetic purposes or to increase or stabilize the value of surrounding property, and has no other justification within the police power, it is void and unconstitutional with respect to the classification of such property. U.S. Const., Fourteenth Amendment; Mo. Const., Art. II, Secs. 20, 21, 30; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365; Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393; State of Washington ex rel. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116; Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183; State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 298 S.W. 720; State ex rel. Penrose Inv. Co. v. McKelvey, 256 S.W. 474; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217, 147 S.W. 998; Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 319 Mo. 337, 4 S.W.2d 776; Women's Kansas City St. Andrews Society v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593; Village of University Heights v. Cleveland Jewish Orphans Home, 20 F.2d 743; Village of Terrace Park v. Errett, 12 F.2d 240; Tucson v. Arizona Mortuary, 34 Ariz. 495, 272 P. 923; Hurst v. Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308; People v. Hawley, 207 Cal. 295, 279 P. 136; Del Fanta v. Sherman, 107 Cal.App. 746, 290 P. 1087; Wilmington v. Turk, 129 A. 512; State ex rel. Helseth v. Du Bose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4; State ex rel. Skillman v. Miami, 101 Fla. 585, 134 So. 541; Smith v. Atlanta, 161 Ga. 769, 132 S.E. 66; Morrow v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 228, 133 S.E. 345; People ex rel. Dietenbeck v. Oak Park, 331 Ill. 406, 163 N.E. 445; Phipps v. Chicago, 339 Ill. 315, 171 N.E. 289; Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166, 180 N.E. 767; Spies v. Board of Appeals, 337 Ill. 507, 169 N.E. 220; Anderson v. Jester, 206 Iowa 452, 221 N.W. 354; Standard Oil Co. v. Bowling Green, 244 Ky. 362, 50 S.W.2d 960; Goldman v. Crowther, 128 A. 50; North Muskegon v. Miller, 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743; State ex rel. Roerig v. Minnesota, 136 Minn. 479, 162 N.W. 477; Eaton v. Sweeny, 257 N.Y. 176, 177 N.E. 412; Dowsey v. Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427; Cordts v. Hutton Co., 146 Misc. 10, 262 N.Y.S. 539; City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842; State ex rel. Srigley v. Woodworth, 33 Ohio App. 406, 169 N.E. 713; Mehl v. Stenger, 38 Ohio App. 416, 175 N.E. 712; In re Gilfillan, 291 Pa. 358, 140 A. 136; Sundlun v. Zoning Board of Review, 50 R. I. 108, 145 A. 451; State ex rel. Tingley v. Gurda, 243 N.W. 317; 86 A. L. R. 659; 54 A. L. R. 1030; 43 A. L. R. 668; 38 A. L. R. 1496. (b) Respondent had no adequate remedy at law in the police courts or the Board of Adjustment. State ex rel. Nigro v. Kansas City, 27 S.W.2d 1030; Lewis v. Mayor of Baltimore, 164 A. 220. (2) The evidence clearly supported the finding of the decree that respondent's property, Lot 25, had been used as a building material storage yard long prior to and upon the date of the enactment of the St. Louis General Zoning Ordinance of 1926. The continuation of such use, or any industrial use of the property must be, and is recognized by the ordinance; and any interference with such use is in itself a deprivation of respondent's property without due process of law. R. S. 1929, sec. 7259; Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14; Biscay v. Burlingame, 15 P.2d 784; Town of Darien v. Webb, 162 A. 690; Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co., 245 Mich. 261, 222 N.W. 86; Sandenburgh v. Michigamme Oil Co., 249 Mich. 372, 228 N.W. 707; Lamb v. McKee, 10 Misc. 649, 160 A. 563; People ex rel. Ortenberg v. Bales, 224 A.D. 87, 229 N.Y.S. 550; Appeal of Haller Baking Co., 295 Pa. 257, 145 A. 77; Lombardo v. Dallas, 47 S.W.2d 495; State ex rel. Schaetz v. Manders, 206 Wis. 121, 238 N.W. 835.

Gantt, J. All concur, except Douglas, J., not sitting.

OPINION

GANTT

Action to enjoin the city of St. Louis and its officers from enforcing a zoning classification of Lot 25, Block 5406, as "residential." Under the pleadings the issues are: (1) The constitutionality of the classification; (2) the question of immunity under the "non-conforming use" provision (Sec. 8) of the general zoning ordinance. It was alleged that the lot had been used as a storage yard for building materials long prior to the enactment of the ordinance, and for that reason was immune under said provision. The issues are not inconsistent. Plaintiff did not seek relief under the ordinance. It sought relief from the enforcement of the classification.

The court found for plaintiff on both issues and permanently enjoined defendants and the successors in office of the individual defendants from enforcing the classification against the lot and from interfering with its use for industrial purposes. Defenda...