Glynn v. State

• Citation: 252 P.3d 742,2011 -NMCA- 031,149 N.M. 518
• Decision Date: 08 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. 29,453.,29,453.
• Parties: Tyler GLYNN, Petitioner–Appellant,v.STATE of New Mexico, TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

149 N.M. 518

252 P.3d 742

2011 -NMCA- 031

Tyler GLYNN, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.STATE of New Mexico, TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 29,453.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Jan. 20, 2011.Certiorari Denied, No. 32,862, March 8, 2011.

Titus & Murphy, P.C., Victor A. Titus, Farmington, NM, for Appellant.Gary K. King, Attorney General, Julia Belles, Special Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

FRY, Judge.

{1} Petitioner Tyler Glynn (Driver) appeals the district court's ruling affirming the Motor Vehicle Division's (MVD) revocation of his driver's license. Driver contends that the district court and the MVD erred in concluding that at the license revocation hearing the MVD could consider the constitutionality of the traffic stop that resulted in his arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI). Driver also contends that the MVD and the district court were collaterally estopped from considering the constitutionality of the stop by a prior municipal court ruling that there was no probable cause to stop Driver. For the following reasons, we affirm and conclude that the validity of the traffic stop is irrelevant to the issues to be decided by the MVD in a license revocation proceeding and, further, that the exclusionary rule does not apply in such a proceeding. Because of our disposition, we need not consider Driver's collateral estoppel argument.

BACKGROUND

{2} Driver was arrested in March 2008 for DWI. A Farmington police officer observed Driver's vehicle strike a curb and fail to maintain its lane. After making contact with Driver, the officer observed that Driver had an odor of alcohol, and Driver admitted to drinking alcohol. Driver failed field sobriety tests, and his breath alcohol test resulted in readings of .09 and .08. Driver was then served with a notice of license revocation pursuant to the Implied Consent Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, Sections 66–8–105 to –112 (1978, as amended through 2010). Following his arrest, a criminal charge of DWI was filed in the Farmington, New Mexico, municipal court. Driver filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, which the municipal court granted, finding that there was “insufficient probable cause for [the] stop.” As a result of the suppression, the charge against Driver in municipal court was dismissed with prejudice.

{3} Meanwhile, Driver had requested a license revocation hearing before the MVD pursuant to Section 66–8–112. After the municipal court dismissed the DWI charge against him, Driver filed a motion with the MVD to dismiss the revocation proceedings, arguing that the MVD was now collaterally estopped from reconsidering whether there was reasonable suspicion to justify his stop because the issue had already been decided by the municipal court. Driver also filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained after his stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Driver's vehicle.

{4} At the revocation hearing, the MVD hearing officer concluded that collateral estoppel was inapplicable because the municipal court had employed the wrong standard in analyzing the legality of the traffic stop; the municipal court had decided that there was no probable cause to stop Driver and not that there was no reasonable suspicion. In addition, the hearing officer concluded that even if the elements of collateral estoppel had been met, it was inapplicable because MVD, as an administrative agency, was unable to grant equitable remedies such as collateral estoppel. The hearing officer then determined that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Driver and that all of the evidence obtained after the stop was admissible. After finding that all elements necessary for revocation had been established, the hearing officer revoked Driver's license for six months.

{5} Following the hearing, Driver appealed the MVD's revocation of his license to the district court. On appeal, Driver argued that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him, that collateral estoppel applied, and that the breath alcohol tests were invalid. In addition to requesting that the district court exercise its appellate jurisdiction to review the MVD's decision, Driver asked the district court to invoke its original jurisdiction to decide the constitutional question of whether there was reasonable suspicion for the stop. Driver contended that the MVD was not permitted to decide constitutional questions and that the issue of reasonable suspicion could only be considered in the district court. The district court affirmed the revocation of Driver's license, concluding that the MVD's decision was supported by substantial evidence, that there was sufficient evidence of reasonable suspicion, that collateral estoppel did not apply, and that the results of the breath alcohol tests were admissible. However, the district court did not make any ruling on whether the MVD had the authority to decide the constitutional question raised by Driver.

{6} Driver appeals the judgment of the district court, arguing that the MVD does not have the statutory authority to consider whether a stop is supported by reasonable suspicion and that only the district court has jurisdiction to consider the issue. In addition, Driver maintains that collateral estoppel barred the district court from reconsidering whether the stop was lawful. For the following reasons, we affirm the revocation of Driver's license.

DISCUSSIONDriver's Appeal Was Timely Filed

{7} As an initial matter, the MVD argues that Driver's appeal was untimely because he filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 12–201 NMRA, not a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 12–505 NMRA (2006). The district court entered an order affirming the judgment of the MVD on March 18, 2009. Driver filed a notice of appeal on March 30, 2009, twelve days after the entry of the district court's order. On April 21, 2009, thirty-four days after the entry of the district court's order, Driver filed a docketing statement. Driver's docketing statement requested, for the first time, a writ of certiorari to review the district court's decision. The MVD contends that because the district court exercised only its appellate jurisdiction, Driver was required to file a petition for a writ of certiorari within twenty days of the district court's decision and that Driver's notice of appeal was insufficient to meet this requirement.

{8} When a party appeals from a judgment reflecting the district court's exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, Rule 12–505 requires the party to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals. At the time Driver filed his notice of appeal, Rule 12–505(C) provided that a “petition for writ of certiorari shall be filed with the clerk of the Court of Appeals within twenty (20) days after entry of the final action by the district court.” However, when a party appeals the district court's exercise of its original jurisdiction, the party must file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the district court's final order. Rule 12–201(A)(2).

{9} The MVD argues that because the district court exercised only its appellate jurisdiction, Driver was required to file a petition for certiorari within twenty days of the district court's final order. Because Driver filed a notice of appeal within twenty days, but not a petition for a writ of certiorari, the MVD contends that Driver's appeal was untimely. In response, Driver argues that the district court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction, despite Driver's request that it do so in order to determine whether the traffic stop was constitutionally sound. Consequently, Driver maintains the proper procedure for appealing from the district court's refusal to exercise its original jurisdiction is a direct appeal, not a petition for writ of certiorari. Driver further contends that it is unclear what mechanism should be used by a party seeking review if the district court concurrently exercises both its appellate and original jurisdiction.

{10} We first observe that the district court's order does not unambiguously state that the court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction. Rather, the order is conflicting regarding what type of jurisdiction the court exercised. On the one hand, the order states the findings necessary to uphold the MVD's statutory determinations “[i]n accordance with [Section] 66–8–12, and Rule 1–074 NMRA,” which suggests that the district court was acting in its appellate capacity. However, the order also goes on to state that “there was sufficient evidence of reasonable suspicion to stop [Driver's] vehicle.” This conclusion suggests that the district court was acting in accordance with its original jurisdiction.

{11} We have previously noted that “this Court may, at its discretion, elect to treat a notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari if the notice of appeal was filed within twenty days after the district court's final action.” Dixon v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2004–NMCA–044, ¶ 10, 135 N.M. 431, 89 P.3d 680. Because of the uncertainty regarding the district court's order and the uncertainty regarding the correct procedure for appealing a district court's decision involving both its appellate and original jurisdiction, we elect to treat Driver's notice of appeal as a timely petition for writ of certiorari since it was filed within twenty days of the district court's order. See Maso v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2004–NMCA–025, ¶ 17 n. 1, 135 N.M. 152, 85 P.3d 276 (declining to decide whether an appeal from a decision in which the district court exercises both appellate and original jurisdiction would be made by filing a notice of appeal, a petition for certiorari, or both). We therefore address the merits of Driver's appeal.

The Legality of the Traffic Stop Is Not an Issue to Be Decided by the MVD

{12} Driver...