Goff v. Town of Randolph
| Decision Date | 12 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15–P–1144.,15–P–1144. |
| Citation | 56 N.E.3d 893 (Table),90 Mass.App.Ct. 1101 |
| Parties | Benjamin F. GOFF, trustee, v. TOWN OF RANDOLPH. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
The plaintiff, trustee Benjamin Goff (Goff), owns property in the Town of Randolph (town) at the end of Powers Farm Road, a private way. As an abutter to the way, Goff owns the fee to the center line of the portion of the way adjacent to his property, and has easement rights (in common with others) to use the way. In 2009, the town obtained title to an 11.6–acre parcel that abuts the plaintiff's property. The town opened this land to the public and made it accessible by a path that connects to the end of Powers Farm Road, next to the plaintiff's property. The entrance to the path from the road is marked by a stone marker, which bears the town seal and reads “Powers Farm: A Community Park.” The plaintiff brought a complaint in the Superior Court against the town, alleging, among other things, that the creation of this path has facilitated and encouraged public use of Powers Farm Road and a cul-de-sac that is located partially on his property. The court allowed the defendant's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff now appeals.
Background. We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as the nonmoving party, see LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Joint Venture, 463 Mass. 316, 318 (2012)
, and “draw[ ] inferences in favor of the plaintiff where they may reasonably be drawn from the facts,” see Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 474 Mass. 382, 385 (2016), quoting from Young v. Boston Univ., 64 Mass.App.Ct. 586, 587 (2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 832 (2006). We base this recitation on a de novo examination of the evidence in the summary judgment record. This record includes the affidavits of the parties and the verified complaint, see Pupecki v. James Madison Corp., 376 Mass. 212, 217 (1978), as well as “the documents relied on by the parties” and “concessions made by them on the record,” see Cannata v. Berkshire Natural Resources Council, Inc., 73 Mass.App.Ct. 789, 793 (2009).
The plaintiff acquired his property, 18 Powers Farm Road, in October, 2007, from a previous owner.3 It is designated “Lot 4” on a subdivision plan recorded in the Norfolk Registry of Deeds on April 9, 1987 (the subdivision plan). This subdivision plan depicts a large lot labeled “Dana R. Powers Residence” (the Powers lot4 ) that abuts the plaintiff's property to the north. The plan also depicts Powers Farm Road, a forty-foot wide way that runs north-south, begins at Grove Street (a public way) to the south, borders lot 4 on the east, and dead-ends where it meets the Powers lot. A circular area labeled “Prop. Temporary Turnaround” appears on the subdivision plan at the northern end of Powers Farm Road, directly in front of the plaintiff's lot. It appears to protrude equally into lot 4 and lot 5, located across the way. The border of the Powers lot appears to lie tangent to the top of this circular area.
Under the plaintiff's deed, his property is subject to an easement of passage granted to Dana Powers. The easement includes “the right to pass and re-pass to and from the adjoining land of Dana R. Powers ... and Grove Street” by way of Powers Farm Road, which it describes as a “forty foot (40') right[ ] of way.” The easement is a right appurtenant to the Powers lot.
Lot 4 is also “[s]ubject to a Proposed Temporary Turnaround as shown on [a] plan [entitled, ‘Plan of Land—Randolph, Mass., Lots 1, 2, 3, & 4 Powers Farm Road’ dated September 21, 1990].” This September 21, 1990, plan was not included in the record on appeal. We infer that the “Proposed Temporary Turnaround” shown on that plan is the same as the “Prop. Temporary Turnaround” depicted on the 1987 subdivision plan (hereinafter, “temporary turnaround”). Since 1990, there has been a large paved cul-de-sac at the end of Powers Farm Road, which corresponds roughly with the temporary turnaround shown on the subdivision plan. This cul-de-sac extends beyond the width of the way and covers about ten percent of the plaintiff's property. The motion judge correctly found that “nothing in the easement [appurtenant to the Powers lot] authorized the layout of a cul-de-sac at the end of Powers Farm Road, or the encroachment of any roadway pavement onto the property of the owner of the parcel at 18 Powers Farm Road.” In his amended complaint, Goff alleged that, as long as it has existed, the town has “facilitated” and “permitted” the public use of the cul-de-sac, including the portion that is located on the plaintiff's property. He alleged that the town issued him tickets for parking his automobile on the section of the cul-de-sac that lies entirely on his property. He further alleged that, “since 1990,” the town or its officials “knew or should have known that the Powers Farm Road temporary turnaround was on private property.”
At the annual town meeting on June 9, 2009, a warrant was approved to accept Powers Farm Road (and numerous other “roads”) as a public way. However, according to the uncontroverted affidavit of the town clerk, neither the board of selectmen nor its successors ever took any action under the warrant passed on June 9, 2009, and thus the town never “laid out” any “way” on Powers Farm Road within the meaning of G.L. c. 82, §§ 21
& 23. Accordingly, the town concedes (and the judge ruled) that the road remains private.
On June 30, 2009, Dana Powers sold the property that abuts the plaintiff's property to the north to the town.5 The town accepted this property as conservation land.6 The town now refers to the site as “Powers Farm.”
The town subsequently made improvements to Powers Farm. As part of this work, existing structures and paths were improved and new structures and paths were constructed. The record does not indicate when this work began or was completed, but an order of conditions was issued on December 5, 2013,7 and an “Existing Conditions plan” of Powers Farm was created in 2014. The work relevant to this case was completed by December, 2014.
The town constructed a five-foot wide stone dust path, which connected the park to the cul-de-sac at the end of Powers Farm Road, and placed a stone post at the end of that path. The post bears an engraving of the town seal above the words “Powers Farm: A Community Park.”8 The new path and stone post were in place by December, 2014, and they extend beyond a fence near the edge of the plaintiff's lot. There is a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether some of the work extended a few feet beyond the boundary of the town-owned land onto the plaintiff's land.
The record does not indicate whether this fence was preexisting but, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, we infer that it was. The residents of Powers Farm Road sent a letter to the town manager in October, 2014, objecting to the creation of the path and to any other project that would “facilitate a connecting way between Powers Farm Park and Powers Farm Road.”
The town also renovated a pavilion next to a lake located on the new path, a little over 100 feet from the cul-de-sac. A gangway leads from the pavilion to a floating dock. The pavilion, gangway, and dock are all visible from the cul-de-sac. The park entrance on Powers Farm Road is the closest entrance to this pavilion by several hundred feet.
Analysis. The plaintiff's pro se complaint includes both factual allegations and several explicit legal theories based on statutes as to how those facts violate the law. Our jurisdiction, however, has a system of notice pleading. See Mass.R.Civ.P. 8
, 365 Mass. 749 (1974), and Reporter's Notes to Rule 8, 46 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. at 101 (West 2016) (describing the “notice-pleading theory” as “behind the Rules generally and Rule 8(a) in particular”). Thus, “[t]he question of a pleading's sufficiency pursuant to the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure turns on whether the complaint provides enough information to give the defendant notice of what the dispute is about and asserts a right to recovery cognizable on some acceptable legal theory.” Commonwealth v. One 2004 Audi Sedan Auto., 73 Mass.App.Ct. 311, 320 (2008), S.C., 456 Mass. 34 (2010). “[T]his language does not require the claimant to state the specific legal theory on which the claim for recovery is based.” Windross v. Village Automotive Group, Inc., 71 Mass.App.Ct. 861, 866 (2008). See Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 89 (1979). Any legal theory the plaintiff does state is not required to be correct. Gallant v. Worcester, 383 Mass. 707, 709 (1981). Giovanella v. Conservation Commn. of Ashland, 447 Mass. 720, 724 (2006).
In addition, when a party is acting pro se, “we ‘liberally construe[ ]’ his submissions, see Lamoureux v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Walpole, 390 Mass. 409, 410 n. 4 (1983)
. While judges must apply the law without regard to a litigant's status as a self-represented party, see Mmoe v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 617, 620 (1985) (), our courts have recognized that self-represented litigants must be provided the opportunity meaningfully to present claims and defenses. See Carter v. Lynn Hous. Authy., 450 Mass. 626, 637 n. 17 (2008) ; Loebel v. Loebel, 77 Mass.App.Ct. 740, 743 n. 4 (2010).” I.S.H. v. M.D.B ., 83 Mass.App.Ct. 553, 560–561 (2013).
Fairly read, Goff's complaint alleges first, a taking of the portion of the cul-de-sac on plaintiff's private property, and of the portion of his property on which the new path and stone post were built, for public use without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and art. 10 of the Declaration of Rights, for which it seeks compensation for past use and an injunction for the future. Indeed, after describing the situation with the cul-de-sac, the complaint...
To continue reading
Request your trial