Golatt v. State
| Decision Date | 01 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 06-21-00029-CR |
| Parties | ROBERT CURRY GOLATT, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Do Not Publish
Date Submitted: January 25, 2022
On Appeal from the 5th District Court Bowie County, Texas Trial Court No. 18F0972-005
Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and Carter, [*] JJ.
A jury convicted Robert Curry Golatt of the third-degree-felony offense of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence[1] and assessed punishment at confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a period of eight years. On appeal, Golatt claims that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction. Because we disagree, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
As Officer Cliff Harris of the Texarkana, Texas, Police Department was patrolling the Rosehill neighborhood in July 2018, he spotted a vehicle parked in a section of woods off Peach Street. Knowing that a stolen vehicle had been recovered in that area, Harris sought to detain the vehicle. After Harris activated his emergency equipment to conduct a traffic stop, the vehicle drove several more blocks before it eventually turned into an apartment complex on Peach Street.
As Harris approached the vehicle, the driver had his registration and insurance card out as if he were prepared for a traffic stop. Harris and other officers who arrived to assist released the vehicle passenger from the scene and determined that Golatt was the driver. Because Golatt was arrested for evading arrest or detention with a motor vehicle, [2] Harris read him his Miranda[3]warnings. Golatt admitted that he was driving the car and that he was the person sitting in the car in the wooded area.[4] Officer Jeremy Sutton of the Texarkana Texas, Police Department searched Golatt before transporting him to jail.
Harris was present during Sutton's search and observed that Sutton found a red jewelry bag, like a small Ziploc bag, stuck in the back of Golatt's throat. Harris explained that these "jewelry bags" are commonly used to transport narcotics and that the bag in this case contained a residue on the inside. Sutton also testified that, based on his training and experience, the type of baggie found in Golatt's mouth was "a common method used to package and carry narcotics." Harris believed that, at one point, the baggie contained a controlled substance. According to Harris, a "very tiny amount [of what he believed to be] narcotics" was in the baggie, but that substance was not field tested. Harris explained that, if he tested for the wrong substance, there would be nothing left to test to determine if the residue was a different substance. Harris did not believe the laboratory would test the substance since Golatt was not arrested for possession of narcotics. Although Harris and Sutton[5] believed the baggie contained methamphetamine, it could have been cocaine or crushed up pills.
Harris did not see Golatt put the baggie into his mouth and did not find any drugs or drug paraphernalia in Golatt's vehicle. Golatt could not have put the baggie in his mouth after he exited his vehicle because he was immediately handcuffed.
After the baggie was discovered, Harris asked Golatt if he was "trying to eat the dope." Harris could not understand Golatt's response. Harris asked him if he "ever chewed any dope, " and Golatt responded, "'Not much,' or something along those lines." At a different point in the conversation, Golatt told Harris that he did not ingest any drugs. Sutton observed, though, that Golatt's tongue was lined with a white residue.
Golatt indicated that he fled from Harris "to get rid of it." Harris understood this to mean that Golatt fled in order to get rid of the narcotics in his mouth. In Harris's opinion, Golatt was actively trying to destroy the baggie, because it contained teeth marks and was located in the back of Golatt's throat. Before the baggie was discovered, Harris was confused about why Golatt fled since he did not have any outstanding warrants and was not driving a stolen car. To Harris, the discovery of the baggie explained Golatt's reluctance to stop.
Harris charged Golatt with tampering with physical evidence because he was actively trying to destroy a baggie that had residue inside, which led him to believe that the baggie contained narcotics.
"In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court considers all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Dean v. State, 449 S.W.3d 267, 268 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2014, no pet.); see Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2019, pet. ref'd) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). "Our rigorous [legal sufficiency] review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented." Williamson, 589 S.W.3d at 297 (citing Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917-18 (Cochran, J, concurring)). "We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury 'to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.'" Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007))).
"Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge." Id. at 298 (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). "The 'hypothetically correct' jury charge is 'one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.'" Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).
"In our review, we consider 'events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act.'" Id. at 297 (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (quoting Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985))). "It is not required that each fact 'point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.'" Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13).
A person commits the offense of tampering with evidence "if . . . knowing that an offense has been committed, [he] . . . alters, destroys, or conceals any record, document, or thing with intent to impair its verity, legibility, or availability as evidence in any subsequent investigation or official proceeding related to the offense." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 37.09(d)(1). Here, the State alleged that Golatt "did then and there, knowing that an offense had been committed, namely possession of a controlled substance, intentionally or knowingly alter, destroy or conceal an object, to wit: plastic baggie containing a white residue, with intent to impair its availability as evidence in any subsequent investigation or official proceeding related to the offense."
A generous reading of Golatt's brief leads us to conclude that his initial argument claims that insufficient evidence supports his tampering conviction because there is no proof that the baggie recovered from his person contained a controlled substance. Although Golatt was not charged with possession of a controlled substance, "[k]nowledge that an 'offense' was committed is an element under penal code subsection 37.09(d)(1)." Stahmann v. State, 548 S.W.3d 46, 67 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2018), aff'd, 602 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 37.09(d)(1). In this case, the indictment charged that Golatt knew that the offense committed was that of possession of a controlled substance.
"[W]hen the quantity of a substance possessed is so small that it cannot be measured, there must be evidence other than mere possession to prove that the defendant knew the substance in his possession was a controlled substance." King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (quoting Shults v. State, 575 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979)).
Here, there is ample evidence for the jury to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt, that Golatt knew that such offense had been committed. See Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 9) (circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of the actor and alone may be sufficient to establish guilt). Both Harris and Sutton testified that the "jewelry bag" found in Golatt's throat was of a type commonly used to package, carry, and transport narcotics. In addition, Sutton observed that Golatt's tongue was lined with a white residue, the baggie contained a tiny amount of what the officers believed was methamphetamine, the baggie contained teeth marks and was located in the back of Golatt's throat, and Golatt indicated that he fled from Harris "to get rid of it," which Harris understood to mean to get rid of the baggie. From this evidence, a rational jury could infer, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Golatt knew that he had committed an offense, i.e., possession of a controlled substance.[...
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