Gold v. McDermott

• Decision Date: 26 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 18,18
• Citation: 32 Conn.Supp. 583,347 A.2d 643
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Andrew GOLD et al. v. John McDERMOTT.

Page 643

347 A.2d 643

32 Conn.Supp. 583

Andrew GOLD et al. v. John McDERMOTT.

No. 18.

Superior Court of Connecticut, Appellate Session.

June 26, 1975.

Richard M. Cosgrove, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

William R. Breetz, Jr., Hartford, for appellees (plaintiffs).

ANTHONY J. ARMENTANO, Judge.

This action was submitted to the trial court on a stipulation of facts. By agreement of counsel, Alexander Standish, acting city assessor, became the sole defendant. At the time of hearing, a motion to substitute John McDermott, city assessor, for Alexander Standish was granted. All plaintiffs are Hartford taxpayers and residents of the state of Connecticut. They reside in single-family homes owned by them and by their spouses in the city of Hartford. The present assessed value of the property owned by the plaintiffs and of all taxable property on the current grand list of Hartford, other than property altered or constructed between 1961 and the present time, was established in a 1961 revaluation of all taxable property in Hartford. The current grand list of Hartford, as well as grand lists of prior years, are available for inspection by the general public. The property record cards (or 'field cards') are available to property owners for inspection on request. These cards contain valuations which serve as a basis for assessment found in the current grand list.

During 1971 the city of Hartford decided to make a complete revaluation of all taxable property in the city. Subsequently, it entered into a contract with Appraisal Surveys, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Appraisal Surveys, whereby the firm agreed to perform a complete revaluation of all taxable property in Hartford for local real estate taxation purposes. Pursuant to the contract, Appraisal Surveys has been paid the sum of $297,401.70 by Hartford. The firm is no longer performing work under the contract. Certain documents, records, computer tapes and printouts, and other material were prepared by either Appraisal Surveys or employees of Hartford, or both of them under the contract between the firm and the city. The documents include property record cards with raw valuation data collected by Appraisal Surveys, computer printouts and tapes with the assessment valuation of properties provided by Appraisal Surveys, and manuals and printouts with standards and formulae developed by Appraisal Surveys and Hartford to convert the valuation data on the property record cards into assessment valuations.

Between November 10, 1972, and December 20, 1972, Appraisal Surveys and employees of the city of Hartford sent notices of assessment to the owners of 75 to 85 percent of all taxable properties in the city. The assessed value shown on each notice of assessment was based on the valuation data principally supplied by Appraisal Surveys and was reviewed and revised in part by employees of Hartford. Subsequent to the mailing of the notices of assessment, a computer printout which contained information based on the revaluation data was available for public inspection at the assessor's office. The underlying property record cards were also made available for public inspection by individual property owners on request.

The assessment valuations and valuation data produced pursuant to the contract between Hartford and Appriasal Surveys have never been accepted by the city for use in establishing the grand lists. Since October 1, 1973, the materials produced under the contract have not been available for public inspection. On January 29, 1974, the plaintiffs, pursuant to General Statutes § 1-19, ¹ filed with the defendant a written request for inspection and copying of records and documents produced under the contract between Hartford and Appraisal Surveys. That request was denied on January 31, 1974. The plaintiffs thereafter appealed to the Circuit Court seeking an order of disclosure as authorized by General Statutes § 1-20. ² The court ordered the defendant to make available for inspection and copying all records and documents requested by the plaintiffs, and the defendant has appealed that order.

Before addressing ourselves to the defendant's assignment of errors, an explanation of the legislative history and purposes of General Statutes §§ 1-19 and 1-20, Connecticut's 'right to know' law, is pertinent. When construing statutes to ascertain legislative intent, courts must look to the legislative history as well as the purpose which the statutes are to serve and the circumstances surrounding their enactment. Rizzo v. Price, 162 Conn. 504, 507, 294 A.2d 541. Sections 1-19 and 1-20 became effective on January 1, 1958. Prior to that date Connecticut recognized the common-law doctrine of public inspection. Under that doctrine every person, either individually or through his agent, had a right to inspect public records if he could demonstrate an interest sufficient to justify the inspection. At common law the interest requirement was strictly interpreted to mean such interests 'as would enable him to maintain or defend an action for while the document or record sought can furnish evidence or necessary information.' 66 Am.Jur.2d, Records and Recording Law, § 15. The strict interest requirement is generally not enforced in the United States. An interest as a citizen and a taxpayer is regarded as sufficient to give rise to the right of inspection, particularly to allow a citizen to ascertain whether public money is being properly expended. McCoy v. Providence Journal Co., 1 Cir., 190 F.2d 760, 764.

Connecticut's right to know law was enacted to expand the common-law right. Under our law, if a document is made, maintained, or kept on file by a governmental body and if it does not fall within certain exceptions, then it must be made available for public inspection, and no showing of interest or special purpose is required. The purpose of the law was ably summarized by Representative Robert B. August, the sponsor of the bills in the House, during the proceeding immediately prior to passage of one of the bills: '(R)ecords of governmental bodies should in general be public unless there was some specific exclusion or unless there were a question of the impairment of the reputation or character of an individual or financial loss to the State.' 7 H.R.Proc., Pt. 5, 1957 Sess., p. 2651. Senator John H. Filer, the sponsor of the bills in the Senate, clearly indicated in his testimony that the right to know law was designed 'to establish the principle that the government serves best when the people know what appears in its records and that all of its actions are open to the public.' 7 S. Proc., Pt. 4, 1957 Sess., p. 2492. In light of the intent of the law to provide for disclosure and accountability, §§ 1-19 and 1-20 of the General Statutes, allowing inspection, have been broadly construed. Meriden Record Co. v. Browning, 6 Conn.Cir.Ct. 633, 637, 294 A.2d 646; State v. Mayo, 4 Conn.Cir.Ct. 511, 515, 236 A.2d 342.

The defendant's first assignment of error is that the court erred in concluding that all of the documents and records to which the plaintiffs seek access constitute public records within the meaning of General Statutes § 1-19. The relevant portion of § 1-19 provides that 'all records made, maintained or kept on file by any executive, administrative, legislative or judicial body, agency, commission or official of the state, or any political subdivision thereof, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records.' That definition is extremely broad. The issue for our determination is whether the documents and materials that the plaintiffs seek, which contain raw valuation data and assessment data complied by the city of Hartford and a private firm under a contract for revaluation of taxable properties in the city for purposes of real estate taxation, fall within the definition above. That is a matter of first impression for this court. A similar question, however, was recently considered by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire under a right to know statute parallel to out own in that it contains no specific definition on 'public record.' Menge v. Manchester, 113 N.H. 533, 311 A.2d 116. In Menge the court concluded that field record cards used to determine real estate assessments were public records and should be open to inspection under the New Hampshire right to know law. We find that conclusion persuasive.

The defendant also contends that the documents and other material which the plaintiffs seek to inspect cannot constitute public...