Goodridge v. Director of Division of Employment Sec.
| Citation | 377 N.E.2d 927,375 Mass. 434 |
| Parties | Robert E. GOODRIDGE v. DIRECTOR OF the DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY. |
| Decision Date | 19 June 1978 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
Philip K. Hamilton, Cambridge, for Robert E. Goodridge.
Frank J. Scharaffa, Asst. Atty. Gen, for the Director of the Division of Employment Security.
Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and BRAUCHER, KAPLAN, WILKINS and LIACOS, JJ.
The board of review of the Division of Employment Security determined that the appellant, Robert E. Goodridge, was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because his discharge from employment was shown "to be attributable solely to deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employing unit's interest." G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e )(2), as amended through St.1973, c. 899, § 2.
The review examiner, whose decision is to be treated as that of the board of review (G.L. c. 151A, § 41), found that Goodridge had been warned against leaving his work area, without permission, to attend to personal business. He further found that on June 24, 1974, Goodridge left his employer's premises on personal business after having sought and been denied permission to leave. The review examiner ordered a denial of certain benefits and a reduction of Goodridge's benefit credit.
A District Court judge affirmed the decision of the board of review. We reverse that judgment because there was no substantial evidence to warrant the finding that Goodridge left his work area after being expressly denied permission to do so and because of the improper exclusion of evidence.
Goodridge worked for the Massachusetts General Hospital (hospital) as an accounts payable clerk. He was discharged on June 25, 1974. A personnel assistant of the hospital testified that Goodridge was discharged because on June 24, 1974, he asked permission to leave his work area, was told he could not, but left anyway. Goodridge testified that he left the hospital to register a complaint against the hospital with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. He testified that he pursued his grievance in the manner he did in reliance on statements in the hospital's handbook for employees. The review examiner, however, excluded material in the handbook from evidence.
The issue here is not whether Goodridge was discharged for good cause or whether he was discriminated against. It is whether the Legislature intended that certain unemployment benefits should be denied in the circumstances of a case such as this. Deliberate misconduct alone is not enough. Such misconduct must also be in "wilful disregard" of the employer's interest. Deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employer's interest suggests intentional conduct or inaction which the employee knew was contrary to the employer's interest. See Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 674, 685 (1974).
There was no substantial evidence (G.L. c. 30A, § 1(6)) to support the finding that Goodridge was expressly refused permission to leave the hospital on June 24. Therefore, that finding of the review examiner cannot be sustained. Goodridge testified that his supervisor granted him permission to leave. His supervisor testified that Goodridge just left without asking. Although a personnel assistant of the hospital testified that Goodridge sought and was denied permission to leave the hospital, that witness had no personal contact with Goodridge on that day. Neither Goodridge nor his supervisor, the only persons shown to have been directly involved, testified that Goodridge was expressly denied permission to leave the hospital.
The personnel assistant's testimony was hearsay of a character which would have been inadmissible under traditional rules of evidence. Those rules of evidence, of course, do not apply in proceedings under the State Administrative Procedure Act. 1 However, an agency finding must be supported by substantial evidence, that is, "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." G.L. c. 30A, § 1(6), inserted by St.1954, c. 681, § 1.
The personnel assistant's unexplained and unsupported testimony, contradicted by the only two persons directly involved, that Goodridge left the hospital after permission was expressly denied is not substantial evidence. We reach this conclusion, not because that evidence is hearsay or because in no circumstances could such evidence be given probative effect, but because on this record it was not reasonable to accept it...
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Still v. Commissioner of Dept. of Employment and Training
...394 Mass. 817, 820, 477 N.E.2d 592 (1985), which findings are supported by substantial evidence, Goodridge v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 375 Mass. 434, 436, 377 N.E.2d 927 (1978), an agency decision disqualifying the claimant "cannot stand." Torres v. Director of the Div. of E......
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Labor Relations Commission v. Blue Hill Spring Water Co.
...Corp., 331 F.2d 511, 515 (5th Cir. 1964). Cf. Goodridge v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 375 Mass . 434, --- - ---, 377 N.E.2d 927 (1978) (Mass.Adv.Sh. (1978) 1591, 1595-1596); NLRB v. Joseph Antell, Inc., 358 F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir. 1966).20 Even in criminal cases failure of......
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...for objection. G.L. c. 30A, § 11(2). 310 Code Mass. Regs. 1.01(10)(g) par. 2 (1979). See Goodridge v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 375 Mass. 434, 436-437 & n. 2, 377 N.E.2d 927 (1978). We have carefully reviewed the November 24, 1980, final decision which excluded the two areas ......
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Still v. Commissioner of Employment and Training
...the Legislature intended to deny benefits in the circumstances presented by the case. See Goodridge v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 375 Mass. 434, 436, 377 N.E.2d 927 (1978). Even if an employee leaves a position on his own initiative, he is still not disqualified if he can show......