Still v. Commissioner of Employment and Training

• Decision Date: 20 November 1996
• Citation: 423 Mass. 805,672 N.E.2d 105
• Parties: Annie K. STILL v. COMMISSIONER OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 105

672 N.E.2d 105

423 Mass. 805

Annie K. STILL v. COMMISSIONER OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Hampden.

Argued Oct. 8, 1996.

Decided Nov. 20, 1996.

Macy Lee, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.

Peter R. Benjamin, Springfield, for plaintiff.

Cynthia L. Amara and Stephen S. Ostrach, Boston, for Associated Industries of Massachusetts and another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Donald J. Siegel, Allan G. Rodgers and Monica Halas, Boston, for Massachusetts AFL-CIO & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and ABRAMS, GREANEY and FRIED, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

The plaintiff, Annie K. Still, was employed as a senior nurse's aide at a nursing home. On January 12, 1993, she was discharged by her employer for swearing at a patient, in violation of the employer's patient care policies and rules for employee conduct. Still filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Department of Employment and Training (department), and a department claims service representative determined that she was disqualified from receiving such benefits. She requested a hearing before a department review examiner, who concluded that Still had knowingly violated a reasonable and uniformly enforced company rule or policy, and was therefore disqualified from receiving benefits under the provisions of G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(2) (1994 ed.). ¹ Still applied for further consideration by the department's board of review (board), which also denied her application. She then sought judicial review of the decision. ² A District Court judge upheld the board's decision. Still appealed, and the Appeals Court vacated the District Court's judgment and held that Still's conduct did not, as matter of law, disqualify her from receiving benefits. 39 Mass.App.Ct. 502, 657 N.E.2d 1288 (1995). We granted the application of the commissioner of the department (commissioner) for further appellate review. We conclude that Still is not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits and reverse the judgment of the District Court.

The facts concerning Still's employment and discharge, as contained in the examiner's findings, and in testimony which he found to be credible, are not in dispute. Still is an African-American woman who had been employed for four years at the nursing home, and was a senior nurse's aide at the time of her discharge. Her employer had a written policy, contained in an employee handbook, that patients were to be free from mental and physical abuse, and that employees could be discharged for inconsiderate treatment of patients and for rude, discourteous, or uncivil behavior. Still was aware of these policies; she had received a copy of the handbook, and had attended training sessions on dealing with combative and demanding patients. She was aware that other employees had been discharged for patient abuse. Before the incident, Still herself had never been accused of, or disciplined for, any abusive behavior.

On Saturday, January 9, 1993, Still worked a double shift, beginning at 7 A.M. During the morning, she went to provide care to a male patient who was known by staff and administrators for being angry and argumentative, and for often uttering racial slurs. The patient called Still names and ordered her to leave the room; she did so, and reported the situation to her supervisor. For the rest of the day, the patient made abusive remarks to Still and to other employees who entered or passed by his room. In order to avoid contact with the patient, Still changed assignments so that another aide would provide the patient's scheduled afternoon care. About 4 P.M., Still entered the patient's room to care for his roommate; the curtain between the patients was partially closed. The patient called Still a "fat, lazy, black bitch." Still responded by calling the patient a "mother fucker."

Two days later, Still's outburst was reported to the employer by another employee. When Still arrived for work the next day (January 12, 1993), she was discharged for "swearing at a [patient]."

At issue is whether the conduct for which Still was discharged disqualifies her from receiving unemployment benefits, in accordance with c. 151A, § 25(e)(2). That statute provides that an employee is disqualified if substantial and credible evidence shows that the discharge was attributable either to "deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employing unit's interest," or to "a knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule or policy of the employer, provided that such violation is not shown to be as a result of the employee's incompetence." The examiner concluded that Still's action, although constituting misconduct, had not been "deliberate," because "it was not done with forethought," and that the conduct had been "provoked" by the patient. Nonetheless, the examiner concluded that Still had "knowingly violated a reasonable and uniformly enforced company rule or policy," and was disqualified from receiving benefits. In support of this conclusion, the examiner stated that Still "knew of the rule or policy by having been issued a copy of [such rules] and having been instructed regarding them and avoidance of violations thereof."

Still contends that this decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of the statutory term "knowing violation." She argues that the statute requires a finding of intent on the part of the employee to violate the employer's rule, and argues further that the examiner's decision that she had "knowingly violated" company policy is contradicted by his conclusion that her action had not been "deliberate" or "done with forethought." The commissioner contends that Still's admission (that she had prior knowledge of the employer's policy and understood the consequences of violating it) is sufficient to establish that she "knowingly violated the policy," and that the commissioner may disqualify an employee on this basis without a showing that the employee intended to violate the rule or policy (as contrasted with the "deliberate misconduct" test, which does require a finding of intent). The statutory meaning of "knowing violation" is, thus, the sole legal issue which we must address. ³

We have not, until now, considered the meaning of the term "knowing violation" in § 25(e)(2). ⁴ The "knowing violation" test was added to the statute by St.1992, c. 26, § 19; prior to that amendment, the "deliberate misconduct" test had been the only basis on which a discharged employee could be disqualified from receiving benefits. The meaning of "knowing violation" must be examined in the context of established principles underlying the unemployment insurance system, as well as our prior decisions interpreting the "deliberate misconduct" test.

The unemployment compensation statute itself directs that G.L. c. 151A "shall be construed liberally in aid of its purpose, which purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls on the unemployed worker and his family." G.L. c. 151A, § 74 (1994 ed.). Benefits are to be paid to "persons who are out of work and unable to secure work through no fault of their own." Howard Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 333 Mass. 244, 248, 130 N.E.2d 108 (1955). If an employer contests the eligibility of a discharged employee to receive unemployment benefits, the issue is not whether the employee had been discharged for good cause, but whether the Legislature intended to deny benefits in the circumstances presented by the case. See Goodridge v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 375 Mass. 434, 436, 377 N.E.2d 927 (1978). Even if an employee leaves a position on his own initiative, he is still not disqualified if he can show "good cause for leaving attributable to the employing unit or its agent," G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1), or can establish that "his reasons for leaving were for such an urgent, compelling and necessitous nature as to make his separation involuntary." G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e), second par. In accordance with the directives of § 74, the grounds for disqualification in § 25(e)(2) are considered to be exceptions or defenses to an eligible employee's right to benefits, and the burdens of production and persuasion rest with the employer. See Cantres v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 396 Mass. 226, 229-232, 484 N.E.2d 1336 (1985). See also Emerson v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 393 Mass. 351, 352, 471 N.E.2d 97 1984) (Any "statutory opaqueness" should be construed favorably to the unemployed worker).

Prior to the 1992 amendment to § 25(e)(2), "deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard" of an employer's interest was the only basis for disqualifying a discharged employee from receiving benefits. The phrase denotes "intentional conduct or inaction which the employee knew was contrary to the employer's interest." Goodridge, supra at 436, 377 N.E.2d 927. In decisions interpreting this provision, we have concluded that the Legislature's purpose was "to deny benefits to a claimant who has brought about his own unemployment through intentional disregard of standards of behavior which his employer has a right to expect. When a worker is ill-equipped for his job or has a good faith lapse in judgment or attention, any resulting conduct contrary to the employer's interest is unintentional; a related discharge is not the worker's intentional fault, and there is no basis under § 25(e)(2) for denying benefits." Garfield v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 377 Mass. 94, 97, 384 N.E.2d 642 (1979). The denial of benefits therefore requires evidence as to "the claimant's state of mind in performing the acts that cause his discharge." Id. The provision requires a two-part analysis: both "deliberate misconduct" and "wilful disregard" of the employer's interest must be shown in order to disqualify the employee, and the employee's state of mind at the time of the misconduct is an issue for both...