GOODSPEED AIRPORT v. EAST HADDAM INLAND WETLAND, 3:06CV930(MRK).

• Decision Date: 12 January 2010
• Docket Number: No. 3:06CV930(MRK).,3:06CV930(MRK).
• Citation: 681 F. Supp.2d 182
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: GOODSPEED AIRPORT, LLC, Plaintiff, v. EAST HADDAM INLAND WETLANDS AND WATERCOURSES COMMISSION and James Ventres, Defendants.

681 F. Supp.2d 182

GOODSPEED AIRPORT, LLC, Plaintiff, v. EAST HADDAM INLAND WETLANDS AND WATERCOURSES COMMISSION and James Ventres, Defendants.

No. 3:06CV930(MRK).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

January 12, 2010.

Dean M. Cordiano, John R. Bashaw, Rene Alejandro Ortega, Shannon D. Leger, Sharon M. Seligman, Day Pitney LLP, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.

Eric D. Knapp, Branse Willis & Knapp LLC, Glastonbury, CT, Kenneth J. McDonnell, Gould, Larson, Bennet, Wells & McDonnell, Essex, CT, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

MARK R. KRAVITZ, District Judge.

This case raises important questions regarding the extent to which Congress intended federal regulation of aviation safety to preempt generally applicable state and local environmental laws. Plaintiff Goodspeed Airport, LLC, the owner and operator of Goodspeed Airport (hereinafter "Goodspeed" or "the Airport") in East Haddam, Connecticut, seeks a declaration that two Connecticut environmental laws— the Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Act (the "Wetlands Act"), Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 22a-36 through 22a-45, and the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act (the "CEPA"), Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 22a-14 through 22a-20—are preempted by federal aviation law insofar as the state statutes require Goodspeed to obtain a permit before removing certain trees located at the Airport. Goodspeed claims that the trees are "obstructions to air navigation" under Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, making them potential hazards to aeronautical safety that the Airport is obligated to remediate. However, because the trees are located in wetlands protected by the Wetlands Act and the CEPA, Goodspeed is required to obtain permission of the Town of East Haddam's Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Commission (the "Wetlands Commission") before trimming or removing the trees. If Goodspeed undertakes the trimming or removal of these trees without the required permit, the Airport could be subjected to civil liability and substantial fines under the Wetlands Act and the CEPA.

After considering evidence presented at a bench trial, and as explained below, the Court concludes that in the particular circumstances of this case, federal regulation of airport safety does not preempt state and local environmental laws in the manner in which Goodspeed asserts. The Court emphasizes that it does not take the Airport's safety concerns lightly, and it does not mean to suggest that the obstructing trees ought to be ignored—there do appear to be a number of trees that pose legitimate safety concerns. But if Goodspeed wishes to remove the trees that it believes are obstructions, it will need to seek a permit to do so from the Wetlands Commission, which may, consistent with state law, impose conditions designed to mitigate degradation of the wetlands.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Goodspeed filed this action on June 6, 2006 against the East Haddam Wetlands Commission; its enforcement officer, James Ventres; and Gina McCarthy, in her official capacity as the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). See Compl. doc. # 1; Am. Compl. doc. # 30-2. Goodspeed sought a declaratory judgment that once trees at the Airport constitute "obstructions to air navigation," local and state agencies are prohibited from interfering with whatever action Goodspeed wishes to take to remediate those obstructions. It asked further that the Defendants be enjoined from bringing any future action related to the removal of any tree that would qualify as an "obstruction to air navigation" under FAA regulations. See Am. Compl. doc. # 30-2 at 8.

In October 2008, all Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, arguing that it failed to alleged a "case or controversy" ripe for adjudication, as required by Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. See Mots. to Dismiss docs. # 61-62. The DEP also asserted that Goodspeed's claims against Ms. McCarthy in her official capacity were barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Mot. to Dismiss of Def. DEP doc. # 61; see also Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953 (2003) ("The Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States."). The Court held oral argument on the motions to dismiss, after which it denied the motion of the Wetlands Commission and Mr. Ventres, because it was apparent that there was a real and live controversy between Goodspeed and local officials, and obtaining a declaratory ruling before the trees were actually removed seemed the preferable course of action for all concerned, including the trees. See Order doc. # 88. During oral argument, and in light of the very important issues of state law and policy at stake, the Court urged the State of Connecticut to reconsider its assertion of an Eleventh Amendment defense so that it could participate fully in this action. Nonetheless— and much to the Court's chagrin—the State notified the Court that it was "disinclined" to waive its Eleventh Amendment defense. See Notice doc. # 90. In effect, the State voluntarily absented itself from this case even though it raised important issues regarding state law, leaving the Town on its own to defend state laws. In view of the State's position, the Court granted its motion to dismiss on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment. See Goodspeed Airport, LLC v. East Haddam Wetlands Comm'n, et al., 632 F.Supp.2d 185, 189-90 (D.Conn.2009).

Also during oral argument, the Court suggested that it would seek the opinion of the FAA on Goodspeed's preemption claims. The Airport and the remaining defendants, the Wetlands Commission and James Ventres (hereinafter referred to collectively as simply "Defendants" or "the Wetlands Commission"), agreed that the FAA's views could be useful. The parties were therefore asked to collaborate on producing a set of stipulated facts and proposed questions that the Court could submit. See Order doc. # 88; see also Parties' Proposed Questions doc. # 92.

Accordingly, on August 4, 2009, the Court sent a letter to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Connecticut requesting that the FAA and/or the U.S. Government answer a series of questions related to Goodspeed's claims. See Letter doc. # 95. Those questions were:

1. Does 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) of the Federal Aviation Act completely preempt Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 22a-42a(a) and (c)(1) and the regulations promulgated thereunder regulating wetlands in the State of Connecticut?

2. Does 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a) of the Federal Aviation Act completely preempt Connecticut's Environmental Protection Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 22a-16?

3. Does 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) of the Airline Deregulation Act completely preempt Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 22a-42a(a) and (c)(1) and the regulations promulgated thereunder regulating wetlands in the State of Connecticut?

4. Does 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) of the Airline Deregulation Act completely preempt Connecticut's Environmental Protection Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 22a16?

5. Does 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) of the Airline Deregulation Act apply to Goodspeed Airport?

6. To what extent is a licensed, privately-owned and operated commercial airport that receives no federal funds or aid bound by or subject to the FAA regulations set forth in 14 C.F.R. Part 77?

7. To what extent is the FAA interested in issues concerning terrain growth into navigable airspace at a licensed, privately-owned and operated commercial airport that receives no federal funds or aid?

Id.

A few days before a bench trial, on November 30, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517,¹ the United States submitted a Statement of Interest that addressed the Court's questions. See Statement of Interest of the United States ("Statement of Interest") doc. # 112. The Statement of Interest is discussed in more detail below, but in brief, it stated that while "the FAA has a strong interest in monitoring terrain growth on airport property as it relates to air safety," the Federal Aviation Act "does not facially preempt generally applicable state environmental laws," including the Wetlands Act and the CEPA. Id. App. A at 1-2. The United States also confirmed that Part 77 of the FAA regulations does apply to Goodspeed Airport, but that those regulations do not authorize the FAA to order the removal of an obstruction. See id. at 2 ("The regulations do not amount to a federal directive to an airport proprietor to remove the obstruction or hazard in question, nor to a grant of power to an airport proprietor to do so."). Finally, the Statement of Interest opined that the Airline Deregulation Act does not expressly preempt the state laws at issue because they "do not have a significant effect on the operations of air carriers at Goodspeed Airport." Id. at 1-2.

The State of Connecticut also sought permission to file an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Defendants. See Mot. for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Br. doc. # 98. The Court granted the State's request, see Order doc. # 101, and the State filed its brief, though the majority of the brief focused on conflict preemption, see Amicus Curiae Br. of the State of Connecticut doc. # 108—a claim that Goodspeed has explicitly not pursued in this case. See Pl.'s Pre-Trial Br. doc. # 107 at 12 n. 6.

On December 4, 2009, the Court held a one-day bench trial. At trial, Goodspeed submitted some thirty exhibits and the live testimony of five witnesses. See Ex. Lists docs. # 114, 115; Witness List doc. # 115.

First to testify was Timothy Mellon, the sole member of Plaintiff Goodspeed Airport, LLC, which purchased the Airport in 1999. Mr. Mellon is also a pilot licensed by the FAA, the owner of two aircraft, and the former owner and operator of an air carrier. Mr. Mellon testified that at least since he has owned the Airport, it has not received any federal funding, and that while Goodspeed does not have any regularly-scheduled passenger service, the Airport is...