Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Muilenburg

• Decision Date: 29 February 2008
• Docket Number: 2060431.
• Parties: GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY v. James MUILENBURG.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

990 So.2d 434

GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY v. James MUILENBURG.

2060431.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

February 29, 2008.

Howard B. Warren of Turnbach, Warren, Roberts & Lloyd, P.C., Gadsden, for appellant.

Donald R. Rhea of Rhea, Boyd, Rhea & Coggin, Gadsden, for appellee.

BRYAN, Judge.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company appeals from a judgment awarding workers' compensation benefits to James Muilenburg and assessing a 15% penalty against Goodyear for unpaid compensation. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Muilenburg sued Goodyear, seeking to recover workers' compensation benefits for a left-leg injury allegedly caused by a work-related accident. Goodyear filed an answer denying the material allegations of Muilenburg's complaint. Following a trial, the trial court entered a judgment finding that Muilenburg's left-leg injury had been caused by a work-related accident. In its judgment, the trial court found: "The evidence ... establishes that [Muilenburg] was performing his job ... when his ankle rolled, snapping ... two bones in his left leg. It is obvious [Muilenburg] was performing his duties at the time of this traumatic injury and the injury arose out of his employment." The trial court's judgment awarded Muilenburg temporary-total-disability benefits for a period following his accident; permanent-partial-disability benefits, pursuant to the schedule established in § 25-5-57(a)(3)a., Ala.Code 1975; and a 15% penalty on accrued temporary-total-disability benefits, pursuant to § 25-5-59(b), Ala.Code 1975.

On appeal, Goodyear argues (1) that the trial court erred in awarding benefits to Muilenburg because, Goodyear says, Muilenburg's employment with Goodyear did not cause his accident; and (2) that the trial court erred in assessing a 15% penalty against Goodyear because, it says, there was a good-faith dispute regarding Goodyear's obligation to compensate Muilenburg.

At the time of his accident, Muilenburg operated a "wigwag," a machine that folds processed sheets of rubber onto a metal pallet or "skid." Muilenburg's work duties included transporting skids on an electric truck to and from the wigwag. When transporting a skid, Muilenburg controlled the electric truck by manually engaging buttons on the truck as he walked beside it. Muilenburg testified at trial that he was transporting an empty skid to the wigwag when he "tripped and fell," fracturing his left tibia and left fibula. Muilenburg testified that he believed that the floor was steel where he fell. Muilenburg further testified that he was "not certain" how the accident happened. Muilenburg attributed his inability to recall how the accident happened to the pain that he had experienced upon falling. The record on appeal indicates that no one observed the accident. Immediately after the accident, Muilenburg was transported to a hospital, where Dr. C. William Hartzog performed surgery on Muilenburg's left tibia. Muilenburg was 39 years old at the time of the accident.

A Goodyear-issued "Associate Report of Incident" stated that

"Mr. Muilenburg stated that he was walking around the [electric] truck back to the [wigwag] when his left ankle rolled over. Mr. Muilenburg stated that he heard a pop and then fell to the floor. He stated there was nothing in the floor and that he did not step over or walk on any skids, he was just walking `normally.'"

The associate report concluded that "the area was clean and free of debris, water and obstructions." However, the associate report seems to indicate that it was filled out more than 10 hours after the accident. That report listed Muilenburg and two coworkers, Stan Pollard and Brian C. Bowen, as "investigation team members." However, Muilenburg testified that he had not been involved in preparing the associate report. Similarly, Pollard testified that he did not sign the associate report and that he did not recall ever having seen it. Bowen, the other Goodyear employee listed as an "investigative team member," did not testify.

Muilenburg's "history and physical," completed at the hospital shortly after his accident, stated that Muilenburg had indicated that he was injured when he "tripped over his foot and twisted his left leg inward." Dr. Hartzog testified that fractures of the type that Muilenburg had incurred are usually associated with a twisting motion of the leg. Dr. Hartzog opined that Muilenburg's fractures could have been caused by tripping or slipping on a surface that is somewhat greasy or uneven due to built-up rubber.

Three days after his accident, Muilenburg talked on the telephone with a representative from the third-party administrator responsible for handling workers' compensation claims submitted by Goodyear employees. A transcript of that conversation indicates that Muilenburg stated: "I [had placed] an empty skid in[to] position [when I] walked around [the empty skid] and my left ankle gave way and buckled underneath me, and I fell to the ground." Muilenburg further stated that he did not remember much after falling because of the pain he had experienced. Muilenburg also stated that he did not know if he had tripped on anything or if the floor was wet when he fell.

When the accident occurred, the treads of Muilenburg's work shoes were caked with built-up rubber. Muilenburg testified that he wore those shoes only at work. According to Muilenburg, rubber accumulates in the shoe treads of Goodyear employees because stray pieces of rubber sometimes gather on the workplace floor. Muilenburg testified that he did not remember any stray pieces of rubber lying on the floor at the time of his accident. The surface of Muilenburg's shoes also contained dried slurry residue. The record indicates that slurry is a very slick liquid used in the manufacturing of rubber products. Both Muilenburg and Pollard testified that slurry will sometimes spill onto the floor in the area where Muilenburg worked. However, Muilenburg stated that he did not remember whether slurry was on the floor of his work area when he fell.

Muilenburg testified that the floor in his work area sometimes contained stray rubber pellets, which he described as being roughly the size of "bubble gum." Muilenburg did not, however, testify that he had tripped or slipped on any pellets. Pollard testified that Muilenburg's accident could have been caused by stepping on a pellet or by tripping on a skid.

Section 25-5-81(e), Ala.Code 1975, provides the standard of review in a workers' compensation case:

"(1) In reviewing the standard of proof set forth herein and other legal issues, review by the Court of Civil Appeals shall be without a presumption of correctness.

"(2) In reviewing pure findings of fact, the finding of the circuit court shall not be reversed if that finding is supported by substantial evidence."

Substantial evidence is "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). In a workers' compensation case, "the appellate court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the findings of the trial court." Ex parte Professional Bus. Owners Ass'n Workers' Comp. Fund, 867 So.2d 1099, 1102 (Ala.2003). "[C]ircumstantial evidence is a recognized form of proof in compensation cases as in others." W.T. Smith Lumber Co. v. Raines, 271 Ala. 671, 673, 127 So.2d 619, 622 (1961).

On appeal, Goodyear first argues that the trial court erred in awarding workers' compensation benefits to Muilenburg because, Goodyear says, Muilenburg's employment with Goodyear did not cause his accident. More specifically, Goodyear argues that Muilenburg's accident did not "arise out of" his employment. An employer must pay compensation for its employee's injury or death "caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his or her employment." § 25-5-51, Ala. Code 1975. Goodyear concedes that Muilenburg's accident arose "in the course of" his employment. See Massey v. United States Steel Corp., 264 Ala. 227, 230, 86 So.2d 375, 378 (1955) ("An injury to an employee arises in the course of his employment when it occurs within the period of his employment, at a place where he may reasonably be and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or engaged in doing something incident to it."). Goodyear argues, however, that Muilenburg's accident did not "arise out of" his employment.

The Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, does not define the phrase "arising out of ... employment." Our supreme court has stated:

"The phrase `arising out of ... employment' refers to the employment as being the source and cause of the accident. This Court has held that the rational mind must be able to causally connect the resulting injury to the employment. Massey v. United States Steel Corp., [264 Ala. 227, 86 So.2d 375 (1955)]. The claimant bears the burden of proving that his injury arose out of his employment. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Wynn, 266 Ala. 327, 96 So.2d 159 (1957)."

Ex parte Patterson, 561 So.2d 236, 238 (Ala.1990). Moreover, "`[c]ourts must liberally construe the workers' compensation law "to effectuate its beneficent purposes," although such a construction must be one that the language of the statute "fairly and reasonably" supports.'" Ex parte Weaver, 871 So.2d 820, 824 (Ala.2003) (quoting Ex parte Dunlop Tire Corp., 706 So.2d 729, 733 (Ala.1997), quoting in turn Ex parte Beaver Valley Corp., 477 So.2d 408, 411 (Ala.1985)).

In arguing that Muilenburg's employment did not cause his accident, Goodyear relies on this court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Morgan, 830 So.2d 741 (Ala. Civ.App.2002). In Wal-Mart, the employee, a cashier, was returning to her cash register when she fell and injured her hip. The employee testified that she "just lost [her] balance" and that she...