Gordon Holter v. Western Reserve Telephone Co. and James Conrad, Administrator, Bureau of Workers' Compensation

• Decision Date: 21 June 2002
• Docket Number: 02CA3,02-LW-5819
• Citation: 2002 Ohio 3169
• Parties: GORDON HOLTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WESTERN RESERVE TELEPHONE COMPANY AND JAMES CONRAD, ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, Defendants-Appellees. Case
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

2002-Ohio-3169

GORDON HOLTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WESTERN RESERVE TELEPHONE COMPANY AND JAMES CONRAD ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02CA3

02-LW-5819 (4th)

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District Athens

June 21, 2002

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT John R. Workman, 1375 Dublin Road, Columbus Ohio 43215

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, WESTERN RESERVE TELEPHONE COMPANY Thomas R. Sant, 100 South Third Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215-4291

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, Betty D. Montgomery and Gerald H. Waterman, 140 East Town Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215-6001

CIVIL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT

DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

ABELE P.J.

{¶1} This is an appeal from an Athens County Common Pleas Court summary judgment in favor of James Conrad, Administrator of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, and Western Reserve Telephone Company (Western Reserve), defendants below and appellees herein.^[1] Gordon Holter, plaintiff below and appellant herein, assigns the following error for review:

{¶2} "THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WESTERN RESERVE TELEPHONE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT WERE PRESENT IN THE RECORD AND REASONABLE MINDS VIEWING THE EVIDENCE MOST FAVORABLY TO PLAINTIFF COULD FIND THAT PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES WERE SUSTAINED IN THE COURSE OF AND ARISING OUT OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WESTERN RESERVE TELEPHONE COMPANY."

{¶3} On March 27, 2000, at approximately 7:40 a.m., appellant was involved in a head-on automobile collision. At the time of the accident, appellant was driving his personal vehicle and was en route to work at Western Reserve Telephone Company, where appellant was employed as a cable slicer/outside technician.

{¶4} Appellant's normal work hours were 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Occasionally, appellant, was required to perform after hours "call-out" jobs and was permitted to use his own vehicle for those call-out jobs. At the time of appellant's accident, appellant was not working on an after hours job.

{¶5} Although appellant was driving his personal vehicle, a reel of cable that belonged to his employer and weighed approximately 500 pounds sat in the bed of appellant's pickup truck. When the accident occurred, the reel of cable struck the back of appellant's pickup truck cab and then rolled down an embankment.

{¶6} Appellant submitted the affidavit of an expert who opined: "If the impact were of sufficient magnitude, the reel of wire would strike the back of the passenger cab, causing damage to the vehicle as depicted in the attached photographs." The expert also stated that the reel of wire could have damaged the support for the driver's seat belt, which would permit the driver to travel farther forward in a front-end collision and which could lead to potential contact with the steering wheel, dashboard, and windshield, presenting an increased risk of injury.

{¶7} Eventually, appellant filed a workers' compensation claim. Appellant's claim was denied at all administrative levels.

{¶8} On November 16, 2000, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the decision that denied his claim. See R.C. 4123.512. Appellant and Western Reserve subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Western Reserve argued that appellant's injuries did not occur in the course of and did not arise out of appellant's employment. Western Reserve asserted that appellant, as a fixed-situs employee, could not recover for injuries sustained while traveling to his place of employment. Appellant, on the other hand, argued that: (1) the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that his injury arose out of the employment relationship; and (2) alternatively, the existence of a special hazard established that his injury arose out of the employment relationship.

{¶9} On December 28, 2001, the trial court granted summary judgment in Western Reserve's favor. The trial court concluded that neither the totality of the circumstances exception nor the special hazard exception applied to lift the general bar against workers' compensation recovery for employees injured while traveling to a fixed place of employment. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

{¶10} Initially, we note that when an appellate court reviews a trial court's decision regarding a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court conducts ade novoreview. See,e.g.,Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co.(1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241. Accordingly, an appellate court must independently review the record to determine if summary judgment was appropriate. A reviewing court need not defer to a trial court's decision. SeeBrown v. Scioto Bd. of Commrs.(1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153;Morehead v. Conley(1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 409, 411-12, 599 N.E.2d 786. In determining whether a trial court properly granted summary judgment, an appellate court must review the standard for granting a motion for summary judgment as set forth in Civ.R. 56, as well as the applicable law. Civ.R. 56(C) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

{¶11} "* * * * Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party's favor."

{¶12} Thus, a trial court may not grant summary judgment unless the evidence before the court demonstrates that: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. See,e.g.,Vahila v. Hall(1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429-30, 674 N.E.2d 1164.

{¶13} The dispute in the instant appeal revolves around appellant's right to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund. Appellee asserts that the "coming and going" rule operates to bar appellant's claim, while appellant argues that the "totality of the circumstances" exception or the "special hazard" exception applies and precludes application of the general rule prohibiting employees from recovering workers' compensation benefits for injuries received while traveling to a fixed place of employment.

{¶14} Every employee who is injured or contracts an occupational disease in the course of employment is entitled to receive compensation as provided for in the Ohio Revised Code. R.C. 4123.54. Courts must liberally construe the workers' compensation laws in favor of employees. See R.C. 4123.95;Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc.(2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 40, 741 N.E.2d 121. Liberal construction of the workers' compensation laws require courts to adopt "the most comprehensive meaning of the statutory terms."Id.

{¶15} "A liberal construction has been defined as giving 'generously all that the statute authorizes,' and 'adopting the most comprehensive meaning of the statutory terms in order to accomplish the aims of the Act and to advance its purpose, with all reasonable doubts resolved in favor of the applicability of the statute to the particular case. Interpretation and construction should not result in a decision so technical or narrow as to defeat the compensatory objective of the Act.' Fulton, Ohio Workers' Compensation Law (2 Ed.1998) 9, Section 1.7."Bailey, 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 40, 741 N.E.2d 121.

{¶16} Although a court must liberally construe the workers' compensation laws in favor of the injured employee, a court may not "'read into the statute something which cannot reasonably be implied from the language of the statute.'"Phillips v. Borg-Warner Corp.(1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 266, 268, 291 N.E.2d 736 (quotingSzekely v. Young(1963), 174 Ohio St. 213, 188 N.E.2d 424, paragraph two of the syllabus).

{¶17} R.C. 4123.01(C) defines what constitutes an "injury" in the workers' compensation context: "'Injury' includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." Thus, for an injury to be compensable, the employee must establish that the injury was received in the course of and arose out of the employee's employment. SeeStivison v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 498, 499, 687 N.E.2d 458. "'All elements of the formula must be met before compensation will be allowed.'"Id.(quotingFisher v. Mayfield(1990), 80 Ohio St.3d 275, 277, 551 N.E.2d 1271).

{¶18} Generally, the "coming and going" rule prohibits an employee who works at a fixed site and who is injured while traveling to or from work from receiving workers' compensation benefits.Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling, Inc.(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 117, 119, 1998-Ohio-455, 689 N.E.2d 917. The "coming and going" rule provides:

{¶19} "'[A]n employee with a fixed place of employment who is injured while traveling to or from his place of employment, is not...