Gordon v. Sadasivan

• Decision Date: 09 September 1985
• Docket Number: Docket No. 78434
• Citation: 144 Mich.App. 113,373 N.W.2d 258
• Parties: Stanley T. GORDON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Scipio Jones, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Govindan SADASIVAN, M.D., Chong Hoon Park, M.D., State of Michigan Mental Health Department and Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital, Defendants, and John Reynolds, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 258

373 N.W.2d 258

144 Mich.App. 113

Stanley T. GORDON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Scipio Jones, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Govindan SADASIVAN, M.D., Chong Hoon Park, M.D., State of

Michigan Mental Health Department and Northville

Regional Psychiatric Hospital, Defendants,

and

John Reynolds, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 78434.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 9, 1985.

Decided July 2, 1985.

Released for Publication Sept. 9, 1985.

Quentin J. Lukomski, P.C., Detroit (by Robert P. Young), for plaintiff.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., and George L. McCargar and Mark S. Meadows, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendant John Reynolds.

Before HOOD, P.J., and V.J. BRENNAN and MAHER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order of the trial court which granted accelerated judgment in favor of defendant John Reynolds.

This cause of action arises out of the death of plaintiff's decedent on September 28, 1981. According to plaintiff's complaint, plaintiff's decedent was involuntarily committed to Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital on June 12, 1981. Plaintiff alleges that the employees and doctors at the hospital were aware that decedent suffered from severe hypertension at the time decedent was committed but failed to treat the condition. Plaintiff claims that the defendants' failure to furnish such care and treatment caused decedent to suffer a cerebral vascular accident ultimately resulting in decedent's death.

Plaintiff filed this suit on September 22, 1983, alleging that the defendant doctors were liable for the wrongful death of decedent and claiming damages against the State of Michigan, Department of Mental Health, Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital, and John Reynolds, the hospital's superintendent, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981 and 1983 for violations of decedent's constitutional rights. On March 8, 1984, defendants State of Michigan, Department of Mental Health and Northville Hospital were dismissed from the case.

Defendant John Reynolds brought a motion for accelerated judgment pursuant to GCR 1963, 116.1(2) and (5). After a hearing on April 27, 1984, the trial court granted accelerated judgment, finding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that defendant Reynolds was protected by governmental immunity.

The purpose of an accelerated judgment motion is to test certain defenses which may make trial on the merits unnecessary. Ceplin v. Bastian-Blessing Div. of Golconda Corp., 90 Mich.App. 527, 530, 282 N.W.2d 380 (1979). It does not test the merits of a claim. San Joaquin County California v. Dewey, 105 Mich.App. 122, 131, 306 N.W.2d 418 (1981). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is an appropriate basis for accelerated judgment. Baker v. Detroit, 73 Mich.App. 67, 71, 250 N.W.2d 543 (1976).

In the case at bar, defendant John Reynolds seeks to characterize the action against himself as an action which was in actuality one against the state and over which the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction. Defendant Reynolds argues, therefore, that the circuit court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's claim.

The Legislature created the Court of Claims in 1939 and conferred upon it the following jurisdiction:

"(1) Except as provided in section 6440, the jurisdiction of the court of claims as conferred upon it by this chapter over claims and demands against the state or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or agencies, shall be exclusive. * * * The court has power and jurisdiction:

"(a) To hear and determine all claims and demands, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto, against the state and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or agencies." M.C.L. Sec. 600.6419; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.6419.

Section 6440 provides:

"No claimant may be permitted to file claim in said court against the state nor any department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof who has an adequate remedy upon his claim in the federal courts, but it is not necessary in the complaint filed to allege that claimant has no such adequate remedy, but that fact may be put in issue by the answer or motion filed by the state or the department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof." M.C.L. Sec. 600.6440; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.6440.

Defendant claims that Sec. 6440 is inapplicable to the instant action because this action is against the state and actions against the state are prohibited in federal court by the Eleventh Amendment. We disagree.

It is well established that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against an unconsenting state in federal court not only when the state is the named party, but also when it is the party in fact. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Whether the Eleventh Amendment is applicable " 'is to be determined not by the mere names of the titular parties but by the essential nature and effect of the proceeding, as it appears from the entire record' ". Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, citing Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500, 41 S.Ct. 588, 590, 65 L.Ed. 1057 (1921).

In Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the Eleventh Amendment shielded state officials from actions brought against them personally for deprivations of federal rights under color of state law. Citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160, 28 S.Ct. 441, 453-454, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), the Court explained that when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the United States Constitution, he " 'comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.' * * * (Emphasis supplied.)" 416 U.S. at 237, 94 S.Ct. at 1687.

In conclusion, the Court held that while the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for recovery of damages from the public treasury, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), "damages against individual defendants are a permissible remedy in some circumstances notwithstanding the fact that they hold public office". Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, 416 U.S. at 238, 94 S.Ct. at 1687.

In reviewing the grant of accelerated judgment in the instant case, we must accept all well-pled allegations of the nonmoving party as true. Rinaldi v. Rinaldi, 122 Mich.App. 391, 396, 333 N.W.2d 61 (1983). Applying the doctrine of Scheuer v. Rhodes, we conclude that the instant plaintiff has alleged facts that demonstrate that he is seeking to impose individual and personal liability on the named defendant, Reynolds, not the state, for an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law. We hold, therefore, that the Eleventh Amendment does not foreclose plaintiff from seeking a remedy for his claim in federal court. Accordingly, the Court of Claims lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. M.C.L. Sec. 600.6440; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.6440. Further, because state courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction over Sec. 1983 claims, Dickerson v. Warden, Marquette Prison, 99 Mich.App. 630, 634, 298 N.W.2d 841 (1980), we find that the circuit court did have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim. The trial court's grant of accelerated judgment on this ground is reversed.

The trial court also held that defendant Reynolds was protected from suit by governmental immunity. While the trial court failed to specify what principles of governmental immunity he applied, defendant concedes and we agree that Michigan's governmental tort liability act, M.C.L. Sec. 691.1401 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 3.996(101) et seq., is limited to tort actions and is inapplicable to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. See Central Advertising Co. v. Novi, 91 Mich.App. 303, 314, 283 N.W.2d 730 (1979); Moore v. Detroit, 128 Mich.App. 491, 340 N.W.2d 640 (1983).

In Armstrong v. Ross Twp., 82 Mich.App. 77, 85, 266 N.W.2d 674 (1978), this Court adopted the doctrines set forth by the United State Supreme Court for determining the bounds of governmental immunity under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983:

"Immunity from suit under 42 USC 1983 turns upon the existence of an analogous immunity provision at common law coupled with a weighing of the need for immunity as against the need to compensate plaintiffs for violation of civil rights. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 US 409; 96 S Ct 984; 47 L Ed 2d 128 (1976), Wood v. Strickland, 420 US 308; 95 S Ct 992; 43 L Ed 2d 214 (1975), Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; 94 S Ct 1683; 40 L Ed 2d 90 (1974). Absolute immunity from suit has been accorded only to those officials exercising the very widest discretion and with the greatest need to be free of the possible influence of litigation. See Imbler v. Pachtman, supra (prosecuting attorneys), Pierson v. Ray, 386 US 547; 87 S Ct 1213; 18 L Ed 2d 288 (1967) (judges), Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 US 367; 71 S Ct 783; 95 L Ed 1019 (1951) (state legislators). Executive officials enjoy only a qualified immunity, dependent upon the scope of discretion, responsibilities of the office, and circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action. Reasonable grounds for action and good faith belief in the propriety of the action are the basis for immunity. Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra."

Since our decision in Armstrong v. Ross Twp., supra, the Supreme Court has abandoned the subjective elements of the qualified immunity test in favor of the following objective standard:

"We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights...