Gouveia v. Napili-Kai, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 16 August 1982
• Docket Number: NAPILI-KA,No. 6963,LTD,6963
• Citation: 65 Haw. 189,649 P.2d 1119
• Parties: , 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3524, 97 Lab.Cas. P 10,005 Robert P. GOUVEIA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v., a Hawaii corporation, dba Napili Kai Beach Club, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 1119

649 P.2d 1119

65 Haw. 189, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3524,

97 Lab.Cas. P 10,005

Robert P. GOUVEIA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NAPILI-KAI, LTD., a Hawaii corporation, dba Napili Kai Beach

Club, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 6963.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Aug. 16, 1982.

Syllabus by the Court

1. When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield.

2. When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, the states as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.

3. The National Labor Relations Act, however, leaves much to the states. Where, for example, the challenged conduct, although occurring in a labor relations context, has been marked by violence and imminent threats to the public order, the United States Supreme Court has allowed the states to grant compensation for the consequences, as defined by the traditional law of torts.

4. The Supreme Court has not found a congressional intent to withdraw state power to regulate an activity that is a merely peripheral concern of the National Labor Relations Act.

5. The Supreme Court has permitted state regulation where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, it could not infer that Congress has deprived the states of power to act.

6. The Supreme Court has permitted concurrent state-court jurisdiction over a tort occurring in a context of discrimination in employment, as proscribed by the National Labor Relations Act, where the discrimination does not itself form the underlying "outrageous" conduct upon which the state-court tort action is based.

Robert S. Katz, Honolulu (Barry W. Marr, Honolulu, with him on opening brief; Barry W. Marr and Howard A. Matsuura, Honolulu, with him on reply brief; Torkildson, Katz, Jossem & Loden, Honolulu, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

James Krueger, Wailuku (Stephen Goldsmith, Wailuku, with him on the brief; James Krueger, A Law Corp., Wailuku, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., LUM and NAKAMURA, JJ., and OGATA and MENOR, Retired Justices, Assigned Temporarily.

NAKAMURA, Justice.

The question posed by this interlocutory appeal is whether the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit can entertain a suit for damages resulting from the allegedly unlawful termination of Plaintiff-appellee Robert P. Gouveia's employment by Napili-Kai, Ltd., an employer subject to the National Labor Relations Act. Since Gouveia's complaint avers the discharge stemmed from an attempt to engage in collective bargaining with the employer and federal law and procedures govern the employer's obligations in this regard, we conclude the circuit court erred in denying Napili-Kai's motion to dismiss the action.

I.

The complaint contains the following allegations: Gouveia was hired by Napili-Kai to work in its personnel and accounting departments at a pay rate of $4.85 per hour on March 3, 1975; the employer represented at the time of hire that the foregoing wages were at the "union scale or above"; a year later when Gouveia was given a six percent wage increase, Napili-Kai again represented that the wages were at the "union scale"; when Gouveia learned in December of 1976 that he was not being so compensated, he "attempted to engage in collective bargaining with defendant;" Napili-Kai terminated his employment on December 20, 1976 "as a direct and proximate result of plaintiff attempting to negotiate an hourly wage rate consistent with union scale, together with other employee benefits."

On February 11, 1977, prior to the filing of the complaint, Gouveia brought an unfair labor practice charge against Napili-Kai before the National Labor Relations Board (the NLRB), claiming that his discharge was in violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and 158(a)(3). The charge alleged that Napili-Kai "discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment" ¹ of Robert P. Gouveia on December 20, 1976 and thereafter "in order to discourage membership in a labor organization." On May 16, 1977, Gouveia and Napili-Kai executed a settlement agreement under the aegis of the NLRB, whereby Napili-Kai agreed to make Gouveia "whole" by the payment of $2,000 without admitting it had violated the federal law. ² Subsequently, the NLRB informed both parties that the employer had complied with all requirements of the Board-sponsored settlement and closed the case.

Gouveia initiated his state action against Napili-Kai approximately three months after the NLRB notified the parties of the termination of the unfair labor practice proceeding. Napili-Kai responded with a motion to dismiss the suit, averring the claim was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel and the doctrine of federal preemption. The circuit court denied the motion, but allowed the defendant to seek immediate review of the interlocutory order in this court.

II.

A.

We are again called upon to decide whether State law has been deprived of effect by the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution, which provides that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S.Const. art. VI, cl. 2. But "there is no unerring test to determine just when ... (state law) is without effect by reason of preemption." In re Tax Appeal of Aloha Airlines, Inc., 65 Haw. ---, ---, 647 P.2d 263, 265 (1982). The Supreme Court teaches us the touchstone here is congressional intent and there are several ways in which this may be gathered. Id. at ---, 647 P.2d at 272. As it recently reiterated in Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981), a purpose to displace state law "may be evidenced in several ways":

"The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (40 S.Ct. 36, 37, 64 L.Ed. 1142); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (62 S.Ct. 491, 86 L.Ed. 754). Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581). Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U.S. 439 (35 S.Ct. 304, 59 L.Ed. 661); Charleston & W. C. R. Co. v. Varnville Co., 237 U.S. 597 (35 S.Ct. 740, 59 L.Ed. 1102); New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (37 S.Ct. 546, 61 L.Ed. 1045); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., (272 U.S. 605, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432). Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (65 S.Ct. 1373, 89 L.Ed. 1782)."

Id. at 746-47, 101 S.Ct. at 2129, quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947). And,

(o)f course, a state statute is void to the extent it conflicts with a federal statute-if, for example, "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217-1218, 10 L.Ed.2d 248) (1963), or where the law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, supra (312 U.S.), at 67 (61 S.Ct. at 404).

Maryland v. Louisiana, supra, 451 U.S. at 747, 101 S.Ct. at 2129.

In the area of concern, Labor Law, the Court has augmented these general principles with decisional rules of particular application. A landmark case, Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228 (1953), involved picketing which a state court enjoined on grounds that it violated state statutory provisions similar to the unfair labor practice provisions of the federal labor relations statute. The issue before the Court was "whether the State, through its courts, may adjudge the same controversy and extend its own form of relief." Id. at 489, 74 S.Ct. at 165. In denying the state tribunal's power to enjoin the conduct, the Court inter alia held:

Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies.

Id. at 490, 74 S.Ct. at 165.

Though a number of significant labor preemption decisions followed on Garner's heels, the most noteworthy was San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). For these oft-quoted passages therefrom express what are still acknowledged to be the controlling rules in the relevant area:

When it is...