Govan v. State

• Decision Date: 17 January 1995
• Docket Number: No. 363,1993,363
• Citation: 655 A.2d 307
• Parties: Arthur GOVAN, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Submitted:
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 307

655 A.2d 307

Arthur GOVAN, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

No. 363, 1993.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: Jan. 17, 1995.

Decided: Jan. 30, 1995.

Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County, Cr.A. Nos. IN92-10-1586R1 through 1596R1.

Superior Court, New Castle County

AFFIRMED.

Before VEASEY, C.J., WALSH and BERGER, JJ.

ORDER

WALSH, Justice.

This 30th day of January, 1995, upon consideration of the briefs and arguments of the parties, it appears that:

(1) Arthur Govan ("Govan") appeals from his convictions in the Superior Court for the intentional murder of Craig Williams ("Williams") and the felony murder of Gwendolyn Weeks. For these convictions, Govan received a sentence of life imprisonment. Govan asserts two claims of error: (1) that the trial court erred in not suppressing the statement Govan made to police on October 23, 1992; and (2) that an improper prosecutorial comment at trial constituted plain error. We find that the Superior Court's conclusion that Govan made a voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights is supported by the record and free of any error of law. We also find that the prosecutor's remarks in her closing argument, although arguably improper, did not "so infect[ ] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 168, 191 (1986). Accordingly, we affirm Govan's convictions for intentional murder and felony murder.

(2) The facts giving rise to this appeal are straightforward and uncontroverted. Gwendolyn and Dwayne Weeks ("Weeks") were married for nearly nine years when Gwendolyn Weeks ("Mrs. Weeks") decided to leave her husband and move into her own apartment. At the time of the murders, Mrs. Weeks had not yet filed a divorce petition. To discourage her husband from visiting her, Mrs. Weeks moved onto the upper floor of an apartment complex that had a security gate.

At approximately 8:35 p.m. on April 10, 1992, Mrs. Weeks placed a 911 call to police that graphically and contemporaneously relayed the circumstances of the killings. The transcript of this phone call reflects that Mrs. Weeks called police when she heard her estranged husband outside of her apartment door. The dispatcher was on the phone when Mrs. Weeks, after a long pause, screamed: "He's in here. He has a gun. Ahhhhhh a gun." The dispatcher responded: "What's the matter, ma'am. Marty? Marty get them there 10-18 with a gun. Shot's fired. Ma'am. Leslie, shots fired at 964. I've got an open line."

Mrs. Weeks received two gunshots to the head and Williams, in addition to three gunshot wounds to the head, suffered numerous wounds to his arms and upper torso. The State contended that Weeks sought to murder his wife to prevent her from receiving anything from him in a future divorce proceeding. Williams apparently was thought by Weeks to be romantically linked to Mrs. Weeks. Weeks offered Govan several hundred dollars to kill Weeks' wife so that Weeks could pass a lie detector test. The two men originally planned to murder Mrs. Weeks as she left her place of employment. Unable to locate her, Weeks and Govan proceeded to Mrs. Weeks' apartment. Because of the security gate surrounding the apartment, Weeks and Govan parked nearby and walked into the apartment complex. Weeks and Govan made their way inside the apartment building and knocked on Mrs. Weeks' door. When Mrs. Weeks did not reply, Weeks broke down the door. Upon locating Mrs. Weeks and Williams huddled in a bedroom, Weeks and Govan opened fire.

The day after the murders, police interviewed Govan after reading him the Miranda warnings. At that time, Govan admitted to his presence at the scene, but claimed that Weeks was the only shooter. On April 13, 1992, two days later, Govan again admitted to his presence at the scene, and again claimed that he fired no shots.

The police subsequently obtained information indicating that two guns were used to murder Mrs. Weeks and Williams. At 6:30 a.m. on October 23, 1992, police from Ridley Township, Pennsylvania, arrested Govan at his home, read him his Miranda warnings, and transported him to the Delaware County District Attorney's Criminal Investigation Division ("CID") in Media, Pennsylvania. Before their interrogation, the police again read Govan his Miranda rights. Govan purportedly waived his rights under Miranda by signing a waiver of rights form.

At approximately 7:17 a.m. Sergeant Peifer of CID and Detective Outten of the New Castle County Police Department questioned Govan about the murders. During the course of this questioning, Govan confessed to shooting Williams, but the police were not using a recording device. Govan repeated his confession at approximately 8:08 a.m. which the police recorded and transcribed.

Before trial, Govan moved to suppress his October 23, 1992 statement on the grounds that he did not give the statement voluntarily. After a suppression hearing, the trial court denied Govan's motion and the statement was admitted at trial. During closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that the jury should find Govan guilty "[b]ecause, ladies and gentlemen, he committed those murders, and Gwen Weeks and [Craig] Williams are entitled to justice." The jury found Govan guilty of intentional murder and felony murder. The Superior Court sentenced Govan to life imprisonment ¹ and this appeal followed.

(3) Govan first agues that the trial court erred by not suppressing his October 23, 1992 statement to police. The State counters that Govan waived his Miranda rights. The Superior Court's factual conclusions as to a defendant's waiver of his Miranda warnings are entitled to substantial deference. Accordingly, we reverse these findings only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Marine v. State, Del.Supr., 624 A.2d 1181, 1188 (1993). We find no such abuse of discretion in the case at bar.

(4) Before police may question a suspect who is in custody, the authorities " 'must warn the accused prior to such questioning of his right to remain silent and of his right to have counsel, retained or appointed, present during interrogation.' " Marine v. State, Del.Supr., 607 A.2d 1185, 1195, cert. dismissed, 113 S.Ct. 28 (1992) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717 (1979)). This statement is popularly known as the Miranda warning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Nevertheless, an accused can waive the rights afforded by Miranda, provided the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572 (1987).

(5) At trial, the State has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a valid waiver occurred. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). "Only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal [sic] both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (emphasis added). Govan's first contention of error raises both inquiries.

(6) To determine whether Govan's waiver of his Miranda rights was "an uncoerced choice," the trial court must conclude that, under a totality of the circumstances, the waiver "was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception." Id. Govan argued at trial that the police threatened him by banging on the table and pointing their fingers at him. Govan also claimed that the investigating officers deceived him by making an implicit promise that, if Govan were to "tell it like it is," he could be out of jail in time to see his son grow up. The State's witnesses, however, directly contradicted Govan's testimony.

(7) Weighing the evidence, the trial judge concluded that the police officers did not bang on the table, point their finger at the defendant, or make any promises regarding his son. Alternatively, the court found that, even if the police had acted as Govan claimed, the actions did not amount to coercion by the police. These findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence and are not clearly erroneous. Consequently, they are binding on this Court. Albury v. State, Del.Supr., 551 A.2d 53, 60 (1988).

(8) To determine whether Govan's waiver of his Miranda rights was made with "the requisite level of comprehension," the trial court must conclude again, under a totality of the circumstances, that "the waiver [was] made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Moran, 475 U.S. at 421. The record reveals a conflict in the testimony as to whether Govan understood the rights afforded to him by Miranda. Under questioning from his attorney, Govan testified that he did not understand the import...