Governmental Research Bureau, Inc. v. St. Louis County, 38081

• Decision Date: 01 July 1960
• Docket Number: No. 38081,38081
• Citation: 258 Minn. 350,104 N.W.2d 411
• Parties: GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH BUREAU, Inc., Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Minnesota, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 411

104 N.W.2d 411

258 Minn. 350

GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH BUREAU, Inc., Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Minnesota, et al., Respondents.

No. 38081.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 1, 1960.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The phrase used in that part of L.1933, c. 359, as amended by L.1949, c. 723, which is now M.S.A. § 273.13, subd. 7a, reading 'tax limitations Now established by statute' (italics supplied), construed in its context as part of a general statute, the broad purpose of which is to give tax relief to homestead owners without depriving taxing authorities of the right to use the total assessed valuation of the county, applies not only to tax limitations in effect at the time of the enactment of the act but to future tax limitations in effect at the time of making the levy.

2. L.1933, c. 359, as construed, does not violate Minn.Const. art. 4, § 27, which provides that 'No law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.' That act embraces only one general subject, that of classification of property for tax purposes. The use of percentages of assessed valuation of property for the purpose of taxation and the use of such percentages for the purpose of tax limitations are germane to that subject.

Nye, Montague, Sullivan & McMillan and Donald D. Harries, Duluth, for appellant.

Thomas J. Naylor, County Atty., George B. Sjoselius, Asst. County Atty., Duluth, for respondents.

MURPHY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment which upheld the 1959 St. Louis County tax levy for its road and bridge fund. We are called upon to construe that part of L. 1933, c. 359, as amended by L.1949, c. 723, which is now M.S.A. § 273.13, subd. 7a, and which provides:

'For the purpose of determining salaries of all officials based on assessed valuations and of determining Tax limitations (and net bonded debt limitations) Now established by statute or by charter, class 3b and class 3c property shall be figured at 33 1/3 per cent and 40 per cent of the full and true value thereof, respectively.' (Italics and brackets supplied; the words within brackets were repealed by L.1949, c. 723.)

Our decision must turn upon the meaning of the words 'tax limitations Now established by statute' as used in the foregoing provision. The plaintiff taxpayer contends that the word 'now' refers to tax limitations in effect at the time of the enactment in 1933. The trial court agreed with the county's contention that the word 'now' as used in the act is prospective in connotation and refers to the time of making the levy, which in this case occurred in 1959.

The issue must be viewed against its factual background. The 1959 road and bridge fund levy by St. Louis County amounted to $2,544,000. That county under M.S.A. § 163.05, subd. 3, was limited to a 12-mill rate of the taxable valuation of the county for road and bridge fund purposes. If the county is permitted to include within its total assessed valuation an amount representing 33 1/3 and 40 percent of the assessed valuation of urban and rural homestead property, respectively, the 12-mill limit will not be exceeded. If, however, such property is included in the total taxable valuation of the county on a basis of 20 to 25 percent of its appraised value, the total taxable valuation of the county will be decreased almost 14 million dollars and, as a consequence, the millage rate for road and bridge fund purposes will exceed the 12-mill limit.

The plaintiff correctly points out that when the 1933 act was passed the millage rate for road and bridge fund purposes was 10 mills. It contends that, since that rate has now changed, the higher valuations of 33 1/3 and 40 percent may no longer be used. It concludes that the current millage rate of 12 mills must be applied to the lower valuations of 20 and 25 percent, because the current 12-mill limitation was not 'now established' when the act was passed in 1933. The plaintiff asserts that the permissive percentages provided for by § 273.13, subd. 7a, expired by their own terms when the tax limitation ceased to be 10 mills, or the rate 'now established' when that authority was granted in 1933. The plaintiff does not complain of a levy at the rate of 12 mills as now authorized if applied to the taxable valuation on which taxes on homesteads are actually paid, ¹ but objects to the computation of values at the higher percentages of 33 1/3 and 40 percent on the first $4,000 in value of homesteads.

1. In support of its position that the 12-mill limit is not one 'now established' within the meaning of subd. 7a, plaintiff cites § 645.45, which provides:

'The following words and phrases, when used in any law hereafter enacted, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, shall have the meanings ascribed to them in this section:

'(19) 'Now,' in any provision of a law referring to other laws in force, or to persons in office, or to any facts or circumstances as existing, relates to the laws in force, or to the persons in office, or to the facts or circumstances existing, respectively, on the effective date of such provision.'

Even in the absence of a provision relating to the construction of the word 'now' in a statutory or constitutional provision, many courts have ruled that 'now' refers to the date when the provision itself became effective rather than to some later date. Buffington v. State, 2 Misc.2d 496, 152 N.Y.S.2d 716; Buckingham v. District Court, 60 Nev. 129, 102 P.2d 632; In re Application of Marino, 23 N.J.Misc. 159, 42 A.2d 469; Nutt v. United States, 26 Ct.Cl. 15; Beard v. Smith, 22 Ky. 430; In re McNabb. D.C.D.Or., 175 F. 511; Roe v. Davis, 106 Tex. 537, 172 S.W. 708; Rail v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 418, 120 S.W.2d 252; Barrow v. Wilcoxson, 91 Colo. 278, 14 P.2d 1095; East Jersey Water Co. v. Board of Conservation and Development, 91 N.J.L. 448, 103 A. 853; McHale v. Board of Com'rs, 180 Ind. 390, 103 N.E. 321; Easby's Petition, 124 Pa.Super. 578, 189 A. 548; State ex rel. Chittenden v. Harmon, 87 Ohio St. 364, 101 N.E. 286; State ex rel. Bumsted v. Henry, 74 N.J.L. 162, 64 A. 475, affirmed 74 N.J.L. 790, 67 A. 375; State ex rel. Pierson v. O'Connor, 54 N.J.L. 36, 22 A. 1091; State v. Bossa, 69 Conn. 335, 37 A. 977.

Other courts, however, have refused to so construe the word 'now' when it was felt that under the circumstances of the particular case such a limited construction would be inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, render it a nullity, or result in absurdity. Arkansas Utilities Co. v. City of Paragould, 200 Ark. 1051, 143 S.W.2d 11; Protest of Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 137 Okl. 186, 279 P. 319; State ex rel. Brewster v. Mayor and Com'rs of City of Lawrence, 101 Kan. 225, 165 P. 826; Moskowitz v. La Guardia, 183 Misc. 33, 48 N.Y.S.2d 174. No Minnesota cases in point have been brought to our attention, and we have found none. The briefs and arguments of counsel dwell at length upon the legislative procedures relating to the 1949 amendment to the act and the semantics of its composition. After careful consideration, however, we must conclude that the reasoning derived from this material can only lead to a speculative result. ²

The words of a statute are not to be isolated, and their meaning must be found in the context and purpose of the statute as a whole. Furthermore, as Mr. Justice Mitchell pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Ott v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 70 Minn. 50, 55, 72 N.W. 833, 834, 'canons of construction are never the masters of the courts, but merely their servants, to aid them in ascertaining the legislative intent.' See, Moskowitz v. La Guardia, supra. This rule applies both to the canons of construction enunciated by this court and to those stated in M.S.A. c. 645, as the legislature expressly recognized in § 645.08:

'In construing the statutes of this state, the following canons of interpretation are to govern, Unless their observance would involve a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature, or repugnant to the context of the statute.' (Italics supplied.)

In attempting to discover the intent of the legislature in enacting L.1933, c. 359, its history should be examined. The act was passed in a period of economic depression. Its object was to give tax relief to the homestead owner by reducing the assessed valuation of his homestead property. It was not intended, however, that such reduction should decrease the total assessed valuation of the county. The reduction was to be shifted to other property. Prior to the 1933 amendment of § 273.13, rural homestead property was valued at 33 1/3 percent of the full and true value for tax purposes, urban property was valued at 40 percent of full and true value, and each other type of property was included in one of several other 'classes' and valued at designated percentages of their full and true value. By L.1933, c. 359, two additional classes were created, class 3b and class 3c. The act provided in part:

'All unplatted real estate, except as provided by class one (1) hereof and which is used for the purposes of a homestead, shall constitute class three 'b' (3b) and shall be valued and assessed at twenty (20) per cent of the true and full value thereof. Provided, if the true and full value is in excess of the sum of $4,000.00, the amount in excess of said sum shall be valued and assessed as provided for by class three (3) hereof.

'All platted real estate, except as provided by class one (1) hereof and which is used for the purposes of a homestead, shall constitute class 3c and shall be valued and assessed at twenty-five (25) per cent of the true and full value thereof. Provided, if the true and full value is in excess of the sum of $4,000.00, the amount in excess of said sum shall be valued and assessed as provided for by class four (4) hereof.'

It is clear that the legislature recognized that the effect of the foregoing act would be to reduce the total valuation of taxable...