Grant v. White

• Decision Date: 31 March 1868
• Citation: 42 Mo. 285
• Parties: Ulyses S. GRANT and Julia B. Grant, Respondents v. Joseph W. WHITE, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

42 Mo. 285

Ulyses S. GRANT and Julia B. Grant, Respondents

v.Joseph W. WHITE, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri

March Term, 1868.

1. Landlord and Tenant--Lease--Tenancy from Year to Year--Tenancy at Will

Where a tenant holds over by consent, either express or implied, after the determination of a lease for years, it is held to be evidence of a new contract, without any definite period for its termination, and in either case is construed to be a tenancy from year to year. But where a tenant whose lease is expired is permitted to continue in possession, pending a treaty for a further lease, or where there is no express or implied consent, he is not a tenant from year year, but so strictly at will that he may be turned out of possession without notice.

2. Landlord and Tenant--Lease--Consent to continue in possession, how may be shown.

Whether a possessin is continued under an express or implied consent is a questin of fact. Circumstances may be sufficient to authorize a jury to infer an acquiescence on the part of the landlord in the tenant holding over. If the holding over by a tenant, after the expiration of his term of lease, is willful, it cannot be with consent either express or implied.

3. Married Women--Seaprate Real Estate--Agents--Contract made by--Liability of Third persons to Principal for.

Although land belongs to a femme convert in her sole individual right, it is undeniably true that her husband is seized with her in the possession, and she must be held to be acting as his agent. But a man may delegate an agency to his wife, as well to any other person; or he may ratify her acts as agent, although done without previous authorization. And an agent may make a contract in his own name, whether he describes himself as an agent or not, and his principal will be entitled to sue thereon in all cases, unless from the attendant circumstances it is clearly manifested that an exclusive credit was given to the agent and it was intended by both parties that no resort should in any event be had by or against the principal upon it.

4. Landlord and Tenant--Lease--Occupation under--EStoppel

Where a party voluntarily entered into a contract for the lease of real estate, went into possession under it, and peaceably occupied the premises according to its terms, on the plainest principles of justice he is estopped from disputing its validity.

5. Landlord and Tenant--Lease--Possession--Constructions of Statute.

The premises of sectin 27, chap. 187, Gen. Stat. 1865, cannot be invoked between the parties to an action for unlawful detainer, where defendant was lesses and held his possession under plaintiffs as lessors.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Green & Reese, for appellant.

I. The plaintiffs must prove a lawful possession of the real estate within three years before suit, and not merely constructive but actual possession. And it is not pretended that plaintiffs ever were in possession of the premises. (Gen. Stat. 1865, p. 732, § 27.)

II. The writing offered in evidence, signed by Julius B. Grant and Joseph W. White, did not give possession to plaintiffs. (1 Tucker, 119, and CHitty's note.) It was executed by a femme covert, not as agent for her husband, and not for her separate property, as known to the law, and is not obligatory upon respondents or appellant. It must be mutual, or not binding on either. The consideration and inducement for signing the paper was quiet enjoyment of the premises by White, and the surrender of his notes; which consideration has not been fulfilled, nor any tender or offer made to fulfill the same.

III. Even if the writing be construed as a valid lease between plaintiffs and defendant, still it terminated on the first of March, 1865; and, without any objection on the part of plaintiffs, defendant continued to hold the premises until after the middle of May following, planted his crops and prepared for the ensuing year, all of which created a tenancy from year to year, which could only be terminated at the end of the year, on three months' previous notice. (4 Kent's Com. 111; 4 Wend. 327; 3 Hill, 547; 16 Mo. 162; 31 Mo. 13; 26 Mo. 216, 256, 581; 13 Wend. 479; 1 Cruise, chap. 9, p. 251.)

Lackland & Martin, for respondents.

1. Instruction No. 1 was properly refused. Defendant knew at the time of the execution of the lease that the lessor was a femme covert. He, contracting with her as such, signed the lease, and the law will not permit him to say that the same is not binding on him. The tract of land in question is the property of Mrs. Grant, conveyed to her by her father. It is her separate property, and in respect to it she is regarded as a femme sole. (Coats v. Robinson, 10 Mo. 757.)

II. Instruction No. 3 was properly refused, because there was no evidence to show that there was either an express or implied consent to hold over. The lease expired on the first day of March, A.D. 1865, and it was the duty of the defendant to surrender the premises at the expiration of the lease. The doctrine of actual possession for three years contained in this instruction does not apply to the present case. White held these premises under a lease, paid rent under said lease, and when his time expired he became an unlawful detainer. His “uninterrupted possession” was by and with the consent of plaintiffs. The law of this case was fairly and clearly laid down by the court in the instructions given for both defendant and plaintiffs, and the refusal of the instructions complained of by the defendant could not alter the verdict of the jury.WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinin of the court.

Plaintiffs brought their action before a justice of the peace, under the provisions of the statute for an unlawful detainer, and on a trial the jury found a verdict for the defendant. On an appeal to the Circuit Court, the judgment of the justice was reversed and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs. The record shows that ' defendant purchased the land in controversy, about seven years previous to the trial, and took possession of the same, and has continued in possession ever since. He gave a mortgage on the land to secure the deferred payments, which mortgage was foreclosed and the land sold and finally deeded to Julia B. Grant, one of the plaintiffs. After the land was conveyed to Mrs. Grant, by an instrument in writing she leased the same to defendant for a period of two years. The lease bears date on the 13th day of July, 1863; is signed by both the parties; and provides that defendant shall have the premises from the first day of March, 1863, till the first day of March, 1865, at which time he agreed to give up the possession, unless further arrangements should be made between the parties in writing. The defendant paid part of the rent, but refused to pay the remainder. No arrangement was ever made for a continuation of the lease. Defendant did not give up the possession at the expiration of the lease, but continued in the occupation of the premises till the succeeding May, when the agent of the plaintiffs demanded the same from him, and, upon his refusal to comply, instituted proceedings to recover possession.

For the plaintiffs, the court instructed the jury that if they believed from the evidence that the defendant, White, executed, with Julia B. Grant, the instrument of writing given in evidence, he...