Capelli v. Bennett

• Decision Date: 09 February 1948
• Docket Number: 40309
• Parties: Theresa Clara Capelli, Executrix of and Legatee Under the Will of the Estate of Theresa C. E. Dold, Deceased, v. Willie D. Bennett and Lula Bennett, Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

209 S.W.2d 109

357 Mo. 421

Theresa Clara Capelli, Executrix of and Legatee Under the Will of the Estate of Theresa C. E. Dold, Deceased, v. Willie D. Bennett and Lula Bennett, Appellants

No. 40309

Supreme Court of Missouri

February 9, 1948

Rehearing Denied March 8, 1948.

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Robert J Kirkwood, Judge.

Reversed and remanded (with directions).

Walter N. Davis, Frank E. Morris and Robert L Schneider for appellants.

(1) A sale of real estate made by a guardian under order of the probate court, which is followed by a report of the sale to the probate court and an approval of the report by said court, vests the equitable title to the real estate in the purchaser, although no guardian's deed is made. Henry v. McKerlie, 78 Mo. 416; Sherwood v. Baker, 105 Mo. 472, 16 S.W. 938; Oldaker v. Spiking, 210 S.W. 59. (2) Under such circumstances, suit will lie by the purchaser against the heirs, devisees and successors of the deceased to have legal title vested in him. Henry v. McKerlie, supra; Sherwood v. Baker, supra; Oldaker v. Spiking, supra. (3) A sale by a guardian under order of the probate court is a judicial sale. A judicial sale upon confirmation thereof by the court vests equitable title in the purchaser. 25 Am. Jur., p. 83, sec. 134; Hill v. Federal Land Bank, 80 P.2d 789; Tucker v. Leonard, 144 Okla. 264, 291 P. 124; Huffman v. Huffman, 99 N.E. 769; 16 R.C.L. 82, sec. 61; In the Matter of Superintendent of Banks, 207 N.Y. 11, 100 N.E. 428; Green v. Maddux, 97 Ark. 397, 134 S.W. 931; In re Burr Mfg. & Supply Co., 217 F. 16. (4) Upon confirmation of the sale of a ward's realty, the subsequent death of the ward, prior to a deed of conveyance, does not abrogate the rights of the purchaser. Lynch v. Kirby, 36 Mich. 238; Langrick v. Rowe, 212 N.Y. 240. (5) Payment of the purchase price of property sold at a judicial sale is not an absolute requisite to vest equitable title in the purchaser where no default exists on his part and he is guilty of no mala fides. Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cottrell, 85 Va. 857, 9 S.E. 132; 31 Am. Jur., p. 477, sec. 146. (6) A guardian is authorized to employ an agent to sell realty of his ward. Gordon v. Burns, 155 S.W.2d 588; 25 Am. Jur., p. 62, sec. 96.

N. Murry Edwards and Ninian M. Edwards, Jr., for respondent.

(1) Appellants having recognized respondent as their landlord and attorney to her and paid two months rent are now estopped to deny respondent's title. Renshaw v. Reynolds, 297 S.W. 374; Sharp v. Richardson, 182 S.W.2d 151; Livestock Assn. v. L. & N. Co., 138 Mo. 394; Grant v. White, 42 Mo. 285; Stewart v. Miles, 166 Mo. 174; Duke v. Compton, 49 Mo.App. 304; Starbuck v. Avery, 132 Mo.App. 542. (2) The guardian of Theresa C. E. Dold, n.c.m., never received any part of the alleged purchase price of the sale of the ward's real estate. No part of the purchase price ever went into the ward's estate. Appellants did not therefore acquire any equitable title in the ward's real estate. Bone v. Tyrrell, 113 Mo. 175; Joseph v. Belcher, 74 S.W.2d l.c. 483. (3) A guardian has no authority to bind either the person or the estate of the ward by contract. Cordes' Estate v. Coffman, 116 S.W.2d 207; Greever v. Barker, 289 S.W. 586. (4) The guardianship of Mary C. Capelli terminated ipso facto on December 29, 1945, upon the death of her ward, and the sole function of the guardian thereafter was to immediately settle her accounts and deliver the estate to the personal representatives of the ward. State ex rel. Pryor v. Anderson, 112 S.W.2d 857: State ex rel. Pryor v. Anderson, 123 S.W.2d 181.

OPINION

Clark, J.

Respondent, as executrix and legatee of Theresa Dold, deceased, brought suit before a justice of the peace to recover from defendants [appellants] rent and possession of certain described real estate in the City of St. Louis. On motion of appellants the justice of the peace certified the case to the circuit court on the ground that title to real estate is involved. Upon a trial the circuit court rendered a decree for the plaintiff and defendants appealed.

The undisputed facts alleged in the pleadings and shown by the evidence are, in substance, as follows: The real estate in question was owned by Theresa Dold until her death on December 29, 1945. Some time before that she had been adjudged of unsound mind by the probate court and respondent had been appointed and qualified as her guardian. The real estate was rented to appellants on a month to month basis. In October, 1945, Reardon, as agent for respondent, entered into a written contract with appellants to sell them the real estate for $ 4,000.00, subject to adjustments for rents, taxes and insurance as of date of closing, and appellants paid Reardon $ 100.00 to bind the contract. On November 13, 1945, respondent, as guardian, obtained an order of the probate court to sell the real estate to appellants in accordance with the contract. On December 11, 1945, respondent filed a report of the sale and on December 26, 1945, the same was approved by the probate court; on December 29, 1945, Theresa Dold died leaving a will which was probated January 23, 1946. The will named respondent executrix and, as residuary legatee, devised to her the real estate now in question. The will was executed prior to the time testator was adjudged to be of unsound mind and its validity is not questioned. On January 5, 1946, appellants paid a month's rent in advance. They then knew that Theresa Dold was dead. On February 5, 1946, appellants paid another month's rent in advance and refused to pay rent thereafter. Respondent testified that when she was applying for letters testamentary she told appellants that the contract had expired and she was no longer guardian. She was not finally discharged as guardian by the probate court until May 14, 1946. Respondent never received the $ 100.00 paid to her agent, Reardon, as earnest money. In February, 1946, Reardon offered to return this money to appellants, but they refused to receive it.

Appellants' answer or counterclaim set up most of the facts above stated, alleged that they are the equitable owners of the real estate and prayed that title be decreed in them, upon their payment of the balance of the purchase price, which they tendered into court. Upon their tender being refused, appellants paid the sum of $ 3,900.00 into the registry of the circuit court.

Appellants contend that the sale by the guardian, followed by her report of sale and its approval by the probate court, vested them with the equitable title, although no deed was delivered and the entire purchase money had not then been paid. They further contend that the death of the owner, after the sale had been approved, did not destroy their vested equitable title.

Respondent contends that the equitable title did not vest in appellants because no part of the purchase money actually went into the ward's estate prior to her death, and that the death of the ward terminated the authority of the guardian. Respondent further says that, by the payment of rent after the ward's death, appellants are estopped to deny respondent's title.

Questions similar to, but not exactly like, those raised here have been before this court many times. The opinion in Henry v. McKerlie, 78 Mo. 416, reviews many prior decisions and holds that a sale of real estate by a guardian of minors, followed by report and approval, vests the equitable title in the purchaser; also, that a judgment of approval of such a sale by a probate court is just as invincible to collateral attack as a judgment of a circuit court. At page 428 the opinion makes a statement which has, in substance, been repeated by this court many times since, to wit:

"When the sale by an administrator or curator under an order of the court has been regularly approved by the court, this fact of itself passes to the purchaser an equity for the legal title, which equity, notwithstanding an irregular deed or the want of any deed, the court will enforce in his favor by denying recovery in ejectment, by the heirs, or by vesting him with the perfect title; provided, always, that he has on his part complied with the terms of the sale. Grayson v. Weddle, 63 Mo. 523; Long v. Joplin Mining & Smelting Co., 68 Mo. 422; Gilbert v. Cooksey, 69 Mo. 42."

That case has been cited and followed many times, but it differs from the instant case because there the purchase money had been fully paid and a guardian's deed executed and delivered. The objections there made were that the order approving the sale was premature and that the guardian's deed did not contain necessary recitals.

In Sherwood v. Baker, 105 Mo. 472, 16 S.W. 938, an administrator sold land of his decedent under order of the probate court, collected the purchase money, reported the sale and had it approved, but never executed a deed. Fifteen years later the purchaser sued the widow and heirs of the deceased owner and procured a decree vesting the legal title in him. This court affirmed the decree. That case and the one next mentioned are authority for the proposition that the approval of a sale of real estate by the probate court vests equitable title in a purchaser who has complied with the terms of sale, and that neither the discharge of an administrator or guardian nor the failure to deliver a deed will prevent the purchaser from obtaining a decree for the legal title. But, in those cases the full purchase price had been paid into the estate.

Oldaker v. Spiking, (Mo.) 210 S.W. 59, was an ejectment suit. Defendant's answer alleged and the proof showed that in 1866 a curator was appointed for plaintiff who was then a minor. The guardian, in 1868 procured an order for the sale of his ward's real estate, sold same and...