Grassroots Leadership, Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 19-0092
| Court | Supreme Court of Texas |
| Writing for the Court | PER CURIAM. |
| Citation | 646 S.W.3d 815 |
| Parties | GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, et al., Respondents |
| Docket Number | 19-0092 |
| Decision Date | 17 June 2022 |
646 S.W.3d 815
GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, INC., et al., Petitioners,
v.
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, et al., Respondents
No. 19-0092
Supreme Court of Texas.
OPINION DELIVERED: June 17, 2022
Nicholas B. Bacarisse, Amy Warr, Houston, Robert W. Doggett, Austin, Jerome William Wesevich, El Paso, for Petitioner.
Judd E. Stone II, Atty. Gen. W. Kenneth Paxton Jr., Kristofer S. Monson, Austin, Bruce Bangert, Brent Webster, Houston, Jeffrey C. Mateer, Austin, Todd Lawrence Disher, Nichole Beth Bunker-Henderson, Austin, Cody Rutowski, Kyle Hawkins, Houston, for Respondent Jaime Masters, in her official capacity as DFPS Commissioner.
Jeffrey C. Mateer, Austin, Todd Lawrence Disher, Kristofer S. Monson, Austin, Ryan Lee Bangert, Atty. Gen. W. Kenneth Paxton Jr., Judd E. Stone II, Brent Webster, Houston, Joseph David Hughes, Nichole Beth Bunker-Henderson, Austin, Kyle Hawkins, Houston, Cody Rutowski, for Respondents Cecile Erwin Young, in her official capacity as HHSC Executive Commissioner, The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Texas Health and Human Services.
Jay W. Brown, Bruce R. Wilkin, Cameron Dernick, Andrew L. Edelman, for Respondent Corrections Corporation of America.
Yvette Changuin, Tamara Goodlette, for Amicus Curiae.
Charles A. Deacon, San Antonio, Mark Thomas Emery, Bertina Buran York, San Antonio, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM
In this suit, we determine whether the plaintiffs have standing to challenge a Department of Family and Protective Services licensing rule governing immigration detention centers. The court of appeals concluded that the plaintiffs—detained mothers, their children, a day-care operator, and an organization representing their interests—lacked standing to sue. Because the detained mothers and their children allege concrete personal injuries traceable to the adoption of the rule, we hold that they have standing. Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, we grant the petition for review and reverse the court of appeals’ judgment. We remand to the court of appeals for consideration of the parties’ remaining jurisdictional issues and the merits, as appropriate.
I
In 2014, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement began to detain undocumented families with children at two residential detention centers, known as the Dilley and Karnes centers. Respondents CoreCivic and GEO Group are private prison companies that operate these facilities.
In 2015, a federal court ruled that the Dilley and Karnes centers lacked an appropriate childcare license and thus the operators had violated a federal consent decree requiring that such facilities be state-licensed when housing detained minors. Flores v. Johnson , 212 F. Supp. 3d 864, 877-80 (C.D. Cal. 2015). The federal court enjoined family detention at the two facilities. Id. at 887.
The Department, also a respondent, then promulgated a rule, first on an emergency basis and then formally, establishing licensing requirements for family residential centers like the Dilley and Karnes centers.1 26 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 748.7. Before the Rule's adoption, state regulations prohibited licensed facilities from housing adults and children in the same bedroom except in narrow circumstances. 31 Tex. Reg. 1995, 1996 (2006), adopted by 31 Tex. Reg. 7455, 7456 (2006), amended by 47 Tex. Reg. 2248, 2248 (2022) (former 26 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 748.3361 ) (Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm'n); 31 Tex. Reg. 1972, 1973 (2006), adopted by 31 Tex. Reg. 7440, 7440 (2006), amended by 47 Tex. Reg. 2248, 2248 (2022) (former 26 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 748.1937 ) (Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm'n).2 To permit the Dilley and Karnes facilities to house families together, the amended Rule eliminates that limitation:
A family residential center is not required to comply with ... (2) the limitation on a child sharing a bedroom with an adult ... if the bedroom is being shared in order to allow a child to remain with the child's parent or other family member ....
26 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 748.7(c).
Petitioner Grassroots Leadership, a nonprofit advocacy group, sued the Department to challenge Rule 748.7. It later amended its petition to add several detainee mothers, individually and on behalf of their children, and a day-care operator as plaintiffs. These parties also join as petitioners here.3 The private prison operators intervened as defendants.
The plaintiffs allege that the Dilley and Karnes centers have permitted unrelated adults to share bedrooms with children in reliance on Rule 748.7(c), and that one minor was sexually assaulted while sharing her room with an unrelated adult. The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction and declaration stating that the Department lacked authority to adopt Rule 748.7 because, they alleged, it increased the safety risk to the detainees and their children. The plaintiffs also alleged that the Rule's adoption has resulted in longer detention periods at the centers.
The respondents filed pleas to the jurisdiction, contending that the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Rule. The trial court granted the jurisdictional pleas in part, dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. It denied the pleas as to the remaining
grounds and granted the plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court declared Rule 748.7 invalid because it "contravenes TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 42.002(4) and runs counter to the general objectives of the Texas Human Resources Code ...." The court enjoined the Department from granting licenses under Rule 748.7, but it ordered the Department to otherwise oversee the centers pending appeal.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that all of the plaintiffs lack standing to assert their claims. --- S.W.3d ––––, 2018 WL 6187433, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 28, 2018).4 With respect to the detained mothers’ claims, the court of appeals concluded that their alleged injuries were not...
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