Gray v. Goodson

• Decision Date: 31 January 1963
• Docket Number: Nos. 35855,35856,s. 35855
• Citation: 61 Wn.2d 319,378 P.2d 413
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Gladys GRAY, administratrix or the Estate of Eugene Robert Woods, deceased, Appellant, v. R. L. GOODSON and Frances C. Goodson, his wife, Respondents. Gladys GRAY, administratrix of the Estate of Eugeue Robert Woods, deceased, Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Respondent.

Page 319

61 Wn.2d 319

378 P.2d 413

Gladys GRAY, administratrix or the Estate of Eugene Robert

Woods, deceased, Appellant, v. R. L. GOODSON and Frances C. Goodson, his wife, Respondents.

Gladys GRAY, administratrix of the Estate of Eugeue Robert

Woods, deceased, Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Respondent.

Nos. 35855, 35856.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Jan. 31, 1963.

John Caughlan, Seattle, for appellant.

Lycette, Diamond & Sylvester, Meade Emory, Olwell & Boyle, Seattle, for respondents.

HUNTER, Judge.

This appeal is from a judgment of dismissal entered in two wrongful death actions which were consolidated in the trial court. As the factual situation, giving rise to the legal problems involved, is somewhat complicated, it is necessary to a clear disposition of this appeal that we set forth the sequence of events material to the issues.

(1) On September 28, 1956, Eugene Robert Woods died as the result of injuries received in an automobile accident in which the defendant (respondent) Frances C. Goodson was involved. (2) On October 4, 1956, Effie E. Woods, surviving spouse of the deceased, was appointed, by court order, the administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband. (3) Action was commenced by the administratrix, Mrs. Woods, for wrongful death against the defendant Goodson on January 12, 1957. (4) On March 8, 1957, on petition of Mrs. Woods, an order was entered setting aside property in lieu of homestead to herself as the surviving spouse. That order states that the estate of Eugene Robert Woods did not exceed $6,000, as disclosed by the inventory and appraisement on file, and that the petitioner was entitled to an award of all the property. The order further provides

* * * that said award is made in lieu of homestead and exemptions and that there shall be no further administration of said estate, and that the administratrix heretofore appointed shall not further administer said estate, but that she shall be discharged and exonerated and that notice to creditors be dispensed with.' (Italics ours.)

(5) Thereafter, in the Goodson action, a judgment of dismissal was entered upon a jury verdict in favor of the defendant on November 23, 1957. Notice of appeal was given by Effie Woods. (6) On February 6, 1958, Effie Woods, as administratrix of her husband's estate, commenced an action against General Motors Corporation, the trial of which was suspended pending the outcome of the appeal in the Goodson case. (7) On January 10, 1960, Effie Woods died. Arguments were heard by this court in the appeal of the judgment in the Goodson case on January 26, 1960. Neither this court nor counsel was informed at that time of Mrs. Woods' death. By our decision, reported in Woods v. Goodson, 55 Wash.2d 687, 349 P.2d 731 (1960), we reversed the judgment in favor of defendant Goodson and remanded the cause for a new trial. (8) On August 8, 1960, Gladys Gray, daughter of the deceased Effie Woods (but not the daughter of Eugene Robert Woods), was substituted, by appointment, as administratrix of the estate of Eugene Woods. (9) On September 7, 1960, counsel for the defendants, Goodson and General Motors Corporation, were first informed of the death of Effie Woods. (10) The present plaintiff, Gladys Gray, was shortly thereafter substituted as party plaintiff in both actions and both defendants were granted leave to file amended answers.

The consolidated cases came on for trial and at the close of the plaintiff's opening statement, the complaints in both actions were dismissed. The trial court's reasoning was as follows: The order of March 8, 1957, which purported to discharge Effie Woods as administratrix, was effective to end her power as her husband's personal representative. Thereafter, Effie Woods properly could not institute the wrongful death action against the defendant General Motors Corporation, since RCW 4.20.010 requires that the personal representative maintain the action. Furthermore, there no longer existed a party plaintiff in the Goodson action after the order of Woods. It is argued that only by party plaintiff must be made within one year, according to RCW 4.20.050, the substitution of Gladys Gray in September of 1960 was subject to attack. The plaintiff Gladys Gray has appealed.

The plaintiff contends that the order of March 8, 1957 was ineffective to terminate all power in Effie Woods to act as the personal representative of the estate of Eugene Woods. It is argues that only by following the proper statutory procedures could Effie Woods be completely discharged as administratrix; that the order in the award in lieu of homestead proceeding was only effective to discharge her with respect to the assets under consideration; that as her power to act as a statutory agent in a wrongful death action was not effected, she remained, until her death, as the party plaintiff in the Goodson action and she properly could commence the action against General Motors Corporation. The plaintiff's argument concludes that, as her substitution as party plaintiff occurred within a year after Effie Woods' death, she, as administratrix of Eugene Woods' estate, is the proper plaintiff in both actions. It is crucial, therefore, to determine the effect of the order of March 8, 1957, which purported to discharge Effie Woods as administratrix of her deceased husband's estate.

In the recent case of State ex rel. Patchett v. Superior Court, 60 Wash.2d ----, 375 P.2d 747 (1962), of which neither the trial court nor counsel in the instant case was aware, we held that an order awarding property in lieu of homestead, which also ordered the discharge of the personal representative upon a final settlement of the estate, is ineffective to achieve that result if the proper statutory procedure (RCW Chapter 11.76) requisite to the validity of such an order is not followed. We there quoted as follows from Stell Co. v. Smith, 16 Wash.2d 388, 133 P.2d 811 (1943), wherein the estate was closed and the executrix was discharged in a set aside order:

"The executrix was discharged and the estate closed without a final settlement or order of court approving such final settlement.

* * *

* * *

"* * * That order [the set aside order], it is true, was final within its limited field of setting aside property to the widow in lieu of homestead, but it is not a valid order approving the executrix's final report and petition for distribution and discharge of the executrix and surety from further responsibility in the estate, as there was an utter disregard of the statutory procedure prerequisite to the validity of such an order. * * *" (Italics ours.)

In State ex rel. Patchett v. Superior Court, we said the Stell Co. v. Smith case only concerned the valid closing of an estate, but the reasoning applied to the procedure essential to the discharge of a personal representative at the time of closing an estate. As in State ex rel. Patchett v. Superior Court, the probate court in the instant case acted outside its jurisdiction in failing to comply with the statutory procedure for discharging a personal representative at the time of the final settlement of an estate. RCW Chapter 11.76. The order was void as to the discharge of the administratrix, Effie Woods. It was final only with respect to the property awarded. Therefore, she continued to be the party plaintiff in the Goodson action and she properly commenced the action against General Motors Corporation. The order substituting the plaintiff Gladys Gray was proper, having been made within one year after the death of Effie Woods.

The defendants contend, however, that the death of Effie Woods resulted in abatement of the actions since she was the only person alive at the death of Eugene Woods who qualified as a beneficiary of the actions under RCW 4.20.020. It is argued that the benefit of the wrongful death action does not survive to the estate of a beneficiary who dies subsequent to the death of the injured deceased. If this proposition is correct, the judgments of the trial court must be affirmed even though they were based upon an erroneous theory.

The question is one of first impression in this state. Since the right of action for wrongful death was created by statute, the basic issue involved is whether the legislature intended that the benefit of the action pass to the estate of a deceased beneficiary. In resolving this issue, we are mindful that the statute, being remedial in nature, is to be liberally construed. Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wash.2d 419, 275 P.2d 723 (1954); Cook v. Rafferty, 200 Wash. 234, 93 P.2d 376 (1939).

In discerning the intention of the legislature with regard to this matter we deem it important to reflect upon the nature of the statutory wrongful death action and the purpose for which it was enacted.

According to the common law, no civil action could be maintained by a surviving spouse, child or other close relative of the deceased person against one who wrongfully caused the death. This rule is thought to be derived from the maxim of tort law actio personalis moritur cum persona (a personal action dies with the person). Logically, however, the maxim provides no support for the above rule; the rule at common law that a tort action for personal injury could not survive to the estate of the injured deceased person is not a logical reason for denial of an action to a living person who suffers pecuniarily from the wrongful death. See Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act § 15 (2d ed.1913). Some early authorities advanced public policy reasons for denying a common law action for wrongful death, but, these have not withstood critical analysis. Tiffany, supra, § 16.

It was with the spirit of rejecting the bases of the common law rule and its harsh effects that the wrongful death statutes were enacted, beginning with Lord Campbell's Act in England in 1846. Such statutes, in some form or another, have been enacted in all states and...