Grayson v. Gulf Oil Co., 0962

• Decision Date: 17 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 0962,0962
• Citation: 292 S.C. 528,357 S.E.2d 479
• Parties: Cheryl GRAYSON, Employee, Appellant, v. GULF OIL COMPANY, Employer, and Travelers Indemnity Company, Carrier, Respondents. . Heard
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 479

357 S.E.2d 479

292 S.C. 528

Cheryl GRAYSON, Employee, Appellant, v. GULF OIL COMPANY, Employer, and Travelers Indemnity Company Carrier, Respondents.

No. 0962.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard March 17, 1987.

Decided May 26, 1987.

Hugo M. Spitz and J. Kevin Holmes, of Steinberg, Levkoff, Spitz, Goldberg, Pearlman, Holmes & White, Charleston, for appellant.

Robert A. Patterson and Bruce E. Miller, of Barnwell, Whaley, Patterson & Helms, Charleston, for respondents.

GARDNER, Judge:

This is a worker's compensation case. The single hearing commissioner found as a matter of fact and concluded as a matter of law that the claimant (Cheryl Grayson) sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment which resulted in total disability from January 4, 1984, to the date of the order (June 4, 1985) and thereafter until maximum improvement has been reached or until further order, the employer to be given credit for the few days claimant worked in the interim. On appeal the full commission affirmed. But upon appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, the trial judge reversed the award on the grounds that there was no substantial evidence of record to support the finding of accidental injury and that the claimant intentionally returned to her job knowing that she suffered from a reaction to petrochemicals and thereby intentionally injured herself. The claimant appeals. We reverse and remand.

The scope of review of the trial judge was and is defined by Section 1-23-380(g)(5), Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended. This statute provides that courts may reverse or modify administrative decisions if the pleadings are clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the whole record. Substantial evidence "is something less than the preponderance of the weight of the evidence; it is evidence which would allow a reasonable mind to reach the conclusion the administrative agency reached." Ellis v. Spartan Mills, 276 S.C. 216, 277 S.E.2d 590 (1981).

The claimant began working for Gulf Oil Company (the employer) in 1965. The claimant testified that between 1982 and 1983 substantial quantities of gas from storage tanks were lost by evaporation. According to the claimant's testimony, approximately 300,000 gallons of gasoline were lost. At the time the employer was having problems with the loading rack vapor recovery system.

The claimant, in the fall of 1982, began manifesting symptoms of what was later diagnosed as a dysfunction of her immune system caused by chemical sensitivity to gasoline products. In late October, 1983, the claimant became violently ill and was treated for the first time by Dr. Allan D. Lieberman who, the record reveals, is a qualified medical expert in ecology. In January, 1984, on Dr. Lieberman's advice, the claimant took sick leave for about a month. After that time, on Dr. Lieberman's advice, she decided to return to work because her symptoms and blood tests had returned to normal. She returned to work on February 12, 1984, and worked about four days when she became acutely ill. On February 17, 1984, she returned to her work office to talk with her immediate superior at which time she became deathly ill and was taken to the hospital by ambulance. She was treated by various doctors before returning to her specialist, Dr. Lieberman. Dr. Lieberman describes the claimant's illness in a letter of record to claimant's attorney dated August 14, 1984, as follows:

Mrs. Grayson has multi-system disease caused by chemical sensitivity. It would be best for your purposes to use the following diagnoses:

1. Environmentally triggered vasculitis syndrome manifesting:

a) Arthralgia

b) Myalgia

c) Acneiform skin lesions of face, neck, chest

2. Allergic tension-fatigue syndrome manifesting:

a) Fatigue

b) Depression

c) Confusion

All symptoms are second degree to petrochemical sensitivity.

From a practical point of view there is almost no place that a petrochemically sensitive person can work without being exposed adversely. This is because she reacts to all products derived from coal, oil, or gas.--i.e., carpeting, synthetic fabrics, copy machines, computer paper, vinyl wall coverings, etc. People in the work place are also a hazard because they are using colognes, after shave lotion, perfumes, and tobacco.

If Mrs. Grayson could live carefully in her own oasis and rotate her foods, she might regain tolerance to the petrochemical world in 1-2 years.

In my opinion the constant exposure over 19 years to the petrochemicals in her work place dysregulated her immune system resulting in an allergic or hypersensitivity cascade to her total environment including all foods, chemicals, and her own microbiological flora. (Emphasis ours.)

Dr. Lieberman, in the testimony of this case, described his connotation of the word "cascade" as follows:

And the reason I say that is that they undergo what we would use the terminology of cascade, where suddenly they become universal reactors, and they react to almost everything. (Emphasis ours.)

The only issue of merit is whether there is substantial evidence of record to show that the claimant's problem was the result of an accident as used in these cases and as defined in Section 42-1-160, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended, of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Law.

The employer argues that claimant's disability is simply an occupational disease resulting from chronic exposure to petrochemicals over nineteen years and not the result of an accident as used in the law of workers' compensation.

Our courts have long held that the Workers' Compensation Law has to be construed liberally in favor of coverage, and doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of the injured employee. Douglas v. Spartan Mills, 245 S.C. 265, 140 S.E.2d 173 (1965).

The compensability of a particular event as an accident within the purview of the Workers' Compensation Law is a question of law to be decided by the courts. On the other hand, the commission's factual determination as to whether an accident has occurred is conclusive if supported by any competent evidence. Sturkie v. Ballenger Corporation, 268 S.C. 536, 235 S.E.2d 120 (1977).

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