Ellis v. Spartan Mills

• Decision Date: 20 April 1981
• Docket Number: No. 21431,21431
• Citation: 276 S.C. 216,277 S.E.2d 590
• Parties: Mary Geneva ELLIS, Appellant, v. SPARTAN MILLS and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Respondents.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 590

277 S.E.2d 590

276 S.C. 216

Mary Geneva ELLIS, Appellant, v. SPARTAN MILLS and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Respondents.

No. 21431.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

April 20, 1981.

James R. Turner and Robert S. French, Thomason & French, Spartanburg, for appellant.

Elford H. Morgan and Stanley T. Case, Butler, Means, Evins & Browne, Spartanburg, for respondents.

HARWELL, Justice:

Mary Geneva Ellis brought this Workmen's Compensation action, alleging that she sustained an accidental injury to her back while performing services related to her employment as a loom operator for Spartan Mills. The matter was initially heard by a single industrial commissioner who found that Ellis had sustained a compensable injury under Section 42-1-160, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), and who accordingly awarded her compensation for the injury. On review, the full Industrial Commission in a split decision affirmed the decision of the single commissioner. Spartan Mills and its insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court judge then reversed the commission, having concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the findings and award. Ellis has appealed to this Court; she contends that evidence sufficient to support the decision of the commission is contained in the record and that the trial judge therefore erred. We agree and reverse the trial judge.

The burden is on the claimant to prove such facts as will render the injury compensable within the provisions of the State Workmen's Compensation Law. Riley v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 253 S.C. 621, 172 S.E.2d 657 (1970); cf., Glover v. Rhett Jackson Company of Bush River Road, S.C., 267 S.E.2d 77 (1980). The Industrial Commission must find the facts in accordance with the sound discretion assigned it in these matters and the courts will not disturb conclusions reached by the Commission unless they are "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record," Section 1-23-380(g)(5) of the Code. We recently adopted this "substantial evidence" standard of review in place of our "any competent evidence" standard in deference to the clear mandate of the State Administrative Procedures Act, Sections 1-23-310 et seq. of the Code. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., S.C., 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981).

The substantial evidence rule promulgated by Lark is, however, tempered by cautionary language which is intended to constrain application of the rule only to those cases where a manifest or gross error of law has been committed by the administrative agency. As stated in Lark, substantial evidence is something less than the weight of the evidence; the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence. We stated in Law v. Richland County School District No. 1, 270 S.C. 492, 243 S.E.2d 192 (1978) that:

" 'Substantial evidence' is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action."

Although the "substantial evidence" test was not applied below, we have done so on appeal to this Court and conclude that the circuit judge erred by reversing the majority of the commission.

The record shows that Ellis appeared for work at the mill on the date of the incident, possibly suffering some discomfiture from an undiagnosed source. Nonetheless she performed her work satisfactorily during the morning and had just been assigned to a new station to start up a loom. Ellis testified that a thread had run off the...