Stokes v. First Nat. Bank

• Decision Date: 15 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 1229,1229
• Citation: 298 S.C. 13,377 S.E.2d 922
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Danny W. STOKES, Claimant, Respondent, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK, Employer, and Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Appellants. . Heard

Page 922

377 S.E.2d 922

298 S.C. 13

Danny W. STOKES, Claimant, Respondent, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK, Employer, and Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Appellants.

No. 1229.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Sept. 15, 1988.

Decided Oct. 31, 1988.

Jackson L. Barwick, Jr., and S. Markey Stubbs, Belser, Baker, Barwick, Ravenel & Bender, Columbia, for appellants.

Preston F. McDaniel and John K. Koon, Columbia, for respondent.

GARDNER, Judge:

The principal question this workers' compensation case requires us to decide is whether a claimant's nervous breakdown caused by emotional stimuli or stressors alone is compensable. We hold that there Commissioner James J. Reid found as a fact that claimant suffered "a bodily injury on or before November 30, 1984, of a general psychological nature as a result of the unusual and extraordinary conditions of his employment with First National Bank of South Carolina...." He found that Stokes has a 50 percent permanent partial disability and awarded him $268.99 per week for 340 weeks. The full commission and the Court of Common Pleas affirmed Commissioner Reid's order. We also affirm.

is no valid justification in such cases for distinguishing between mental disorders resulting from physical injuries and mental disorders brought about by emotional stimuli or stressors which are incident to unusual and extraordinary conditions in employment.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

First National's exceptions to the appealed order include: (a) that respondent suffered a "mental-mental injury" (mental stimuli resulting in mental injury) which is not recognized in South Carolina Workers' Compensation law as a compensable injury, (b) that in South Carolina, a mental injury requires a physical element which was not present in this case, (c) that there was no evidence of an accident occurring prior to December 9, 1984, (d) that the commissioner erred in adopting the "heart attack test" as the sole consideration in determining the compensability of mental-mental injuries, (e) that the finding of the commission that Stokes suffered an injury on or before December 1, 1984, was based upon surmise, conjecture and speculation.

FACTS

In late 1983 management announced that the First National Bank would merge with the South Carolina National Bank. In early January 1984, First National told Stokes and its other employees that the merger would occur on December 1, 1984; this date became known among First National employees as "D" Day.

In January 1984, Stokes was Vice President in charge of item processing at the operations center for First National Bank in Columbia, South Carolina; as such he supervised more than 130 employees, including four managers. One of the managers resigned that month and was not replaced since management anticipated that when the banks merged fewer employees would be needed. Instead, Stokes assumed his duties. As a result Stokes' work hours increased in January 1984 from approximately 45 hours per week to about 60 hours per week. In July 1984, the record indicates that Stokes began to work 12 to 15 hours per day, another significant increase.

The most significant jump in work hours occurred after November 10, 1984, as "D" Day approached, when Stokes' work hours increased to between 16 and 18 hours per day seven days a week. Mrs. Barbara Miller, who worked closely with Stokes preparing for the merger, testified about the extraordinary working conditions then at First National and described Stokes' condition in mid-November 1984 thusly:

Q. Was Danny able to run his job by mid-November at the latest date of 1984?

A. No. Absolutely not.

Q. And do you have an opinion as to why that was so?

A. It was more work than was humanly achieveable by one person. There were too many people to manage, to supervise, too much to be done. And not enough support in terms of additional managers and so on working for him to take up some of that load.

Stokes' wife also testified that the "straw that broke the camel's back" was the increased work load after November 10, 1984, a date firmly fixed in her mind because of a weekend trip that the family took to Hilton Head, South Carolina.

The merger occurred on schedule on December 1, 1984. Stokes worked at SCN until December 9, 1984. Then he "just gave up" and was hospitalized until the

                first of the year for what is known in layman's language as a nervous breakdown.   When Stokes attempted to return to work, SCN informed him that he was discharged.   His salary was $42,000 per year when discharged.   At the time of the hearing of this case and after extensive hospitalization, medical treatment, psychotherapy, counseling, etc., Stokes was working with the State of South Carolina and earning $28,000 per year.   There is substantial evidence of record that because of the nervous breakdown Stokes is permanently disabled to work as an executive with the responsibilities he previously handled for First National
                

DISCUSSION

In addressing the issues put to this Court by the above exceptions and the questions presented in First National's brief, we hold it necessary (1) to define the word "accident" as used in workers' compensation cases, (2) to review the applicable heart attack injury cases, (3) to review the development of mental injury cases in South Carolina, (4) to address the issue of whether mental-mental injuries are compensable in this state and (5) to determine if the commission erred in determining that Stokes suffered a compensable injury. It will be seen in the discussion which follows that over the years the restricted meaning of the word "accident" which was applied in earlier workers' compensation cases gave way to a much more expansive connotation of the word. And on the heels of this development, the judicial construction by the South Carolina Supreme Court of the words "arising out of employment" was enlarged to include injuries resulting from "unusual or extraordinary conditions of employment." These developments in workers' compensation law, as will be seen, were the precursors of this decision.

DEFINITION OF "ACCIDENT"

For long years the word "accident" was interpreted by the Supreme Court of South Carolina as a term which referred to a physiological injury resulting from work and caused by an external act or occurrence. Radcliffe v. Southern Aviation School, 209 S.C. 411, 40 S.E.2d 626 (1946).

The connotation of the word "accident" as presently applied by our courts in workers' compensation cases means an unlooked for or untoward event that the injured person did not expect, design or intentionally cause. Yates v. Life Insurance Co. of Georgia, 291 S.C. 301, 353 S.E.2d 297 (Ct.App.1987). It is not necessary that the accidental quality or condition be created by a wound or external violence. Hiers v. Brunson Construction Co., 221 S.C. 212, 70 S.E.2d 211 (1952). The term relates not only to the dynamics of the occurrence causing the injury but also to the injury itself. We quote from Colvin v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 227 S.C. 465, 468, 88 S.E.2d 581, 582 (1955).

The term 'injury' as used in the phrases 'personal injury or death accidentally sustained', 'injury by accident', 'injury proximately caused by accident', and similar expressions, has been construed to mean not only an injury the means or cause of which is an accident, but also an injury which is itself an accident; that is, an injury occurring unexpectedly from the operation of internal or subjective conditions, without the prior occurrence of any external event of an accidental character. (Emphasis added).

The rule is plainly laid down in Hiers v. Brunson Construction Co., supra, as the law of South Carolina that the adjective "accidental" may refer to the injury itself.

In the majority of jurisdictions, no slip, fall or other fortuitous event or accident in the cause of the injury is required; the unexpected result or industrial injury is itself considered the compensable accident. [Emphasis ours.]

221 S.C. at 231, 70 S.E.2d at 220.

The compensability of a particular event as an accident within the purview of the workers' compensation law is a question

of law to be decided by the courts, while the commission's factual determination as to whether an accident occurred is conclusive if supported by competent evidence. Grayson v. Gulf Oil Co., 292 S.C. 528, 357 S.E.2d 479 (Ct.App.1987).

HEART ATTACK INJURIES

A careful review of the mental injury cases of this state compels the conclusion that both the Supreme Court and this Court have likened mental injury cases to heart attack cases; because of this a short review of the development of "heart attack" compensation cases is essential to this decision.

In earlier heart attack cases, the rule was that the heart attack must be the result of sudden, unusual exertion, violence or strain. See Raley v. City of Camden, 222 S.C. 303, 72 S.E.2d 572 (1952). As late as 1959 our Supreme Court wrote that this state was committed to the unusual exertion or strain rule. Sims v. S.C. State Commission of Forestry, 235 S.C. 1, 109 S.E.2d 701 (1959).

In 1960 in the case of Kearse v. S.C. Wildlife Resources Department, 236 S.C. 540, 115 S.E.2d 183 (1960) our Supreme Court announced a new and, we think, enlightened rule that a heart attack is compensable if it is induced by unexpected strain or overexertion or by unusual or extraordinary conditions of employment.

For a number of years unusual and excessively long work schedules have been recognized as unusual and extraordinary working conditions.

Kearse, supra, held that a coronary occlusion or thrombosis constituted a compensable accident where the evidence showed that for several days prior to the attack the claimant, a game warden, had worked 16 to 18 hours per day, far in excess of his usual hours. Wynn v. Peoples Natural Gas Co. of S.C., 238 S.C. 1, 118 S.E.2d 812 (1961), held that a general manager and supervisor of operations of a gas company suffered a...