Graysonia-Nashville Lumber Co. v. Carroll
Decision Date | 19 February 1912 |
Citation | 144 S.W. 519,102 Ark. 460 |
Parties | GRAYSONIA-NASHVILLE LUMBER COMPANY v. CARROLL |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Howard Circuit Court; Jefferson T. Cowling, Judge affirmed.
STATEMENT BY THE COURT.
This is an action by J. T. Carroll as administrator and J. T. Carroll in his individual capacity against the Graysonia-Nashville Lumber Company for the alleged negligent killing of his wife by one of the railroad trains of said company.
The defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Arkansas, and owns and operates a lumber plant and several railroad tracks in connection therewith near the town of Graysonia, in Clark County, Arkansas. The defendant owns and operates log trains over a certain track into and through one of its camps about two and a half miles out of said town of Graysonia. The camp and settlement was used by the defendant for the habitation of the employees and their families. There were erected along the side of said railroad track about forty houses up and down the track for a distance of about 150 yards. Mrs. Mollie Carroll and her husband, J T. Carroll, the plaintiff, occupied one of these houses; her daughter, Mrs. Jack Rawlins, occupied another. The house of Mrs. Rawlins was fifty-eight feet on a straight line from the railroad track, and on a path along from it to the tracks it was eighty-four feet. Some time in the early part of January 1911, Mrs. Carroll was at her daughter's house. About 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon she left there and started home. She was at the time an able-bodied woman about forty-five years old and in possession of all her faculties. She followed the track above referred to to the railroad, and then walked along the railroad track a distance of 112 feet to a trestle where she was overtaken by one of the defendant's trains and struck by it. She died on the next day, about 11 o'clock, from the effects of the injuries received.
James Shope, a boy between thirteen and fourteen years of age, saw the accident, and testified in regard to it substantially as follows:
James H. Gary testified:
J. T. Carroll (plaintiff) testified; The deceased and I had been married for twenty-six years, and had seven children. She was a good wife, and our relations were pleasant. She was about forty-five years of age when she was killed. The train could have been stopped within six or eight feet."
J. A. Baker testified:
W. A. McClellan, testified:
The brakeman was not present and did not testify at the trial, but the defendant introduced testimony tending to show that he had left the employ of the company before the suit was commenced, and that after a diligent search they were not able to ascertain his whereabouts.
The culvert or trestle near or on which the defendant was injured was about ten feet long and averaged two and one-half feet in height. There was one place on it between the ties about eighteen inches wide, and it was in this hole that Mrs. Carroll was found after the accident. The witnesses say she was found on her knees with her head sticking out above the trestle. There was a bruised place on each knee, and one on her hip. The skin was not broken on the hip, and did not bleed any. The skin was broken on her right eye, and bled a great deal. Two of her teeth were nearly knocked out. There were no bruises of any character on the front or back parts of her body, and her left arm was cut in two twice, and three fingers mashed on her right hand. She remained conscious for most of the time after she was injured until her death. Other facts will be referred to in the opinion.
The jury returned a verdict as follows: "We, the jury, find for the plaintiff as administrator in the sum of $ 1,000, and for the plaintiff individually in the sum of $ 2,000." From the judgment rendered the defendant has duly prosecuted an appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
D. B. Sain and W. C. Rodgers, for appellant.
1. The court should have directed a verdict for the defendant, because it entirely fails to show that any of the employees in charge of the train discovered the deceased on the track in time to have avoided the injury. 94 Ark. 529; 86 Ark. 306; 54 Ark. 431; 56 Ark. 457; 61. Ark. 549.
2. Deceased was a trespasser upon the track and grossly negligent. There was nothing to indicate that she was not a woman of mature years, in possession of all her faculties and at liberty to leave the track at any time she so willed. The train was running very slowly, and there was no reason apparent why the ordinary presumption that she would leave the track in time to save herself should not prevail. 113 Ind. 234; 47 Ark. 497, 502; 108 N.C. 616; 105 N.C. 140; 113 N.C. 558; 112 Ind. 59; 113 Ind. 196; 55 Kan. 536; 42 Neb. 905.
3. Deceased, in undertaking to use the railroad track as a footway, is presumed to have done so with full knowledge of its dangers and to have assumed the risk. 45 Kan. 503; 97 Ark. 438; 52 La.Ann. 1894; 114 La.Ann. 825.
4. The court erred in excluding testimony detailing the statement of the deceased made shortly after she was injured. It was competent as showing knowledge on her part of the proximity of the train, and as being a declaration against interest. 8 Ark. 510, 571; 9 Ark. 389; 31 Ark. 252; 37 Ark. 580; 58 Ark. 277; 59 Ark. 503; 60 Ark. 26; 74 Ark. 104; 78 Ark. 381; 54 Ark. 336; 77 Ark. 258; Id. 567; Id. 599; Id. 109; 79 Ark. 225; 84 Ark. 373; 87 Ark. 471; 90 Ark. 104. Her declaration would have been competent evidence against her, had she lived to bring suit. It was equally competent against her administrator suing in behalf of her estate.
G. C. Hardin, W. P. Feazel and Mehaffy, Reid & Mehaffy, for appellee.
1. The evidence shows that deceased was unconscious of the near approach of the train and of her peril, and that the train operative saw her in time to have given warning and stopped the train without injuring her. 91 Ark. 18; 89 Ark. 499; 2 Thompson on Negligence, § 1741; 74 Ark. 407.
2. The statement attributed to the deceased was not admissible. It was not competent or relevant because it throws no light upon the question at issue, i. e., whether or not deceased's peril was discovered in time to have avoided the injury by the exercise of ordinary care, and whether or not such care was exercised.
3. There is no error in the instruction on the measure of damages. The amount of damages for pain and suffering must necessarily be left largely to the sound judgment and discretion of the jury. 89 Ark. 541; 48 Ark. 407.
4. Instruction 5 is proper. Kirby's Digest, §§ 6288, 6290; 26 Am. Rep. 396.
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