Green v. State
Decision Date | 26 December 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 89-47,89-47 |
Citation | 784 P.2d 1360 |
Parties | Michael H. GREEN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Steven E. Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Gay Woodhouse, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Karen Byrne, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, for appellee.
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
Appellant Michael H. Green appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery, W.S. 6-2-401(c)(ii), and the imposed sentence which was enhanced by the habitual criminal statute, W.S. 6-10-201.
Green raises the following issues:
The State frames these issues as follows:
We affirm the conviction on the aggravated robbery charge but reverse and remand for resentencing under the habitual criminal sentencing statute.
In the late evening of August 11, 1987, a man armed with a knife grabbed the clerk of a convenience store in Laramie, Wyoming and demanded money. The assailant took about $300.00 in cash and 13 blank money orders. The clerk identified Green as his assailant. Prior to this robbery, the clerk had noticed a person sitting in a car behind the store wearing clothing similar to that worn by the assailant. Near where this car had been parked, the Laramie police found a discarded cigarette package which contained Green's fingerprints. On August 14, 1987, Green was arrested in Butte, Montana. A car in which Green was riding contained the stolen money orders.
The episode in Laramie was not the only event during this short period of time that resulted in criminal charges against Green. Green was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping and aggravated criminal sodomy for crimes he committed on August 11, 1987, in Saline County, Kansas. He was convicted on these charges on February 26, 1988, and was sentenced to prison for two consecutive prison terms of 15 years to life, one consecutive life sentence, and three concurrent sentences of three to ten years. Green was also found guilty of aggravated robbery for the August 12, 1987, robbery of a Rawlins, Wyoming convenience store, for which he received a sentence of 20 to 25 years in prison. See Green v. State, 776 P.2d 754 (Wyo.1989).
Pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, W.S. 7-15-101, 18 U.S.C.Appx. (1982), Green was brought to Wyoming from Kansas to stand trial on the charges arising from the Rawlins and Laramie robberies. A jury convicted Green for the Rawlins robbery on November 9, 1988. On January 24, 1989, a jury convicted Green for the Laramie robbery and in that same proceeding also found him to be habitual criminal. Because the jury found Green to have been previously convicted of four felonies, the court sentenced Green to life in prison.
Wyoming's version of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is contained in W.S. 7-15-101 through -105. W.S. 7-15-101 states in pertinent part:
"(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial at the next term of court after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance." (emphasis added)
The federal act, 18 U.S.C.Appx., requires a state participating in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers to adopt its statutes "in substantially" the same form as the federal act. Id. at § 2. Wyoming's version of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, cited above, is the same as the federal act except that the federal government's version requires the time for trial to be "within one hundred and eighty days" instead of "at the next term of court" required by the Wyoming statute, W.S. 7-15-101.
Green contends that this difference in wording is unconstitutional. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers, however, is merely a statutory set of procedural rules that do not rise to the level of constitutionally guaranteed rights. Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1978); Perry v. Carter, 514 F.Supp 19, 21 (W.D.Okla.1980). The right that Green apparently here argues as being violated due to the language difference may be his right to a speedy trial. Although we have a well-settled analysis to determine whether a defendant received a speedy trial, Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo.1989), we need not apply that analysis here. If another appropriate ground exits to resolve an issue, we need not discuss constitutional questions. K N Energy, Inc. v. City of Casper, 755 P.2d 207 (Wyo.1988). We need not discuss the speedy trial question in this case because, when only the days countable are computed, Green was brought to trial within 180 days.
The Albany county attorney's office received notice of Green's desire to face trial on this charge on May 31, 1988. Green's trial was conducted on January 23, 1989, a span of 236 days after his request. However, from June 29, 1988, until November 9, 1988, he was unavailable for trial in this case in Albany County because he was preparing for and standing trial on the Carbon County charge. The time he was detained for trial in Carbon County tolls the time used to determine the number of days between his request and trial. Commonwealth v. Petrozziello, 22 Mass.App. 71, 491 N.E.2d 627, 633, cert. denied 479 U.S. 852, 107 S.Ct. 182, 93 L.Ed.2d 117 (1986). Subtracting the 133 days during which he was held in Carbon County from the total 236 days leaves only 103 days, well within the 180-day limit that the federal act and other jurisdictions impose on interstate detainers. The trial court, thus, properly denied Green's motion to dismiss based on any delay in bringing him to trial.
Green contends that his right to silence, based on the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution, was violated during trial. The following examination by the Deputy Albany County Attorney of Lt. Donald Butler of the Butte/Silver Bow, Montana Law Enforcement Agency sparks this contention:
At this point Green's attorney moved for a mistrial.
Not every reference to a defendant's failure to respond to a question put forth by law enforcement authorities will result in reversal of a conviction. Gomez v. State, 718 P.2d 53, 55 (Wyo.1986); Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1381 (Wyo.1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 899, 102 S.Ct. 402, 70 L.Ed.2d 216 (1981). The instant case does not present a situation where the prosecutor has made an impermissible comment on Green's right to remain silent which must result in reversal. Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220 (Wyo.1984). Rather, at issue here is the answer of the witness to an innocuous question about Green identifying himself. Green was advised of his Miranda rights, which include the right to remain silent during interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966). The gathering of booking information such as a suspect's name does not, however, reach the level of interrogation that the process...
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