Greene, In re
| Decision Date | 24 May 1979 |
| Docket Number | 50857 and 51156,50834,Nos. 50784,s. 50784 |
| Citation | 28 Ill.Dec. 525,390 N.E.2d 884,76 Ill.2d 204 |
| Parties | , 28 Ill.Dec. 525 In re Irish D. GREENE, a Minor, Appellee. Appeal of the PEOPLE of the State of Illinois (two cases). In re Edward EICHER, a Minor, Appellee. In re Marvin B. FRAZIER, a Minor, Appellant. In re Gordon DYESS, a Minor, Appellant. In re Darnell MURFF, a Minor, Appellant. In re Michael STRICKLAND, a Minor, Appellant (the People of the State of Illinois, Appellee (four cases)). |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Chicago (Dennis E. Urban, Ronald P. Alwin, Aaron L. Meyers, Francis Sowa, Asst. Public Defenders, and James B. Haddad, Professor of Law, Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield and Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago , for the People.
This cause is a consolidated appeal from four appellate court decisions reviewing the findings of delinquency entered by the circuit court of Cook County, juvenile division, against six respondents. The issue concerns the nature and effect of the age factor in the definition of delinquent minors contained in the Juvenile Court Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 37, par. 702-2). (Although the causes arose in 1974, 1975, and 1976, the 1977 statutes will generally be cited for unamended provisions.)
Pursuant to petitions for adjudication of wardship, filed by the State and alleging the respondents had committed specified criminal offenses prior to their 17th birthdays, all six respondents were found delinquent. The findings of delinquency were entered following adjudicatory hearings after which the court determined each respondent had violated the specified criminal law beyond a reasonable doubt: Irish Greene, voluntary manslaughter (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 37, par. 702-2; Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 9-2(a)(1)); Edward Eicher and Gordon Dyess, aggravated battery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 37, par. 702-2; Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 12-4(a)); Marvin Frazier, assault, aggravated assault, and unlawful use of a weapon (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 37, par. 702-2; Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, pars. 12-1(a), 12-2(a)(1), 24-1(a)(2)); Michael Strickland, rape and robbery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 37, par. 702-2; Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, pars. 11-1, 18-1); Darnell Murff, armed robbery and unlawful restraint (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 37, par. 702-2; Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, pars. 18-2, 10-3). Green and Dyess were placed on one year's probation. Eicher, Murff, Strickland and Frazier were committed to the Illinois Department of Corrections, juvenile division.
On appeal, all six respondents challenged the adjudications of delinquency on the ground that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that respondents had committed the offenses on which the adjudications of delinquency were based, prior to their 17th birthdays. The Appellate Court, First District, Third Division, reversed the judgment against Greene (In re Greene (1978), 59 Ill.App.3d 286, 16 Ill.Dec. 444, 374 N.E.2d 1322), and the Appellate Court, First District, Fifth Division, reversed the judgment against Eicher (In re Eicher (1978), 59 Ill.App.3d 1021, 17 Ill.Dec. 551, 376 N.E.2d 697) on the ground that age is an element of delinquency which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Court, First District, First Division, remanded Frazier's cause (In re Frazier (1978), 60 Ill.App.3d 119, 17 Ill.Dec 497, 376 N.E.2d 643) for a determination of his age at the time he committed the offense on which the finding of delinquency was predicated on the ground that age, while not an element of delinquency, is an essential statutory fact without proof of which the trial court would have no statutory power to proceed under the Juvenile Court Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 37, par. 701-1 Et seq.). Dyess', Murff's, and Strickland's appeals had been consolidated in the Appellate Court, First District, Fourth Division, which affirmed the judgments against them on the ground that the age limitation merely confers authority on the trial court to proceed and that the issue of age is waived unless specifically raised (In re Dyess (1978), 62 Ill.App.3d 571, 19 Ill.Dec. 438, 378 N.E.2d 1313). This court allowed the State's petitions for leave to appeal from the appellate court judgments entered in favor of Eicher and Greene, allowed the petitions for leave to appeal filed by Frazier, Dyess, Strickland, and Murff, and consolidated the appeals.
We hold that age is not an element which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to support an adjudication of delinquency. Delinquency is not a crime codified under our criminal laws. Rather, it is the commission of an otherwise unlawful act by one under 17 that triggers the application of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 37, par. 701-1 Et seq.). Age therefore is merely the factor which authorizes the application of the juvenile system. Once the State has properly alleged in the petition for adjudication of wardship that the respondent was under 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense which forms the basis for the petition (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 37, pars. 702-1, 702-2, 704-1), the authority of the court to proceed under the Juvenile Court Act has been asserted. Unless the respondent specifically challenges the authority of the court to proceed against him as a juvenile, the respondent is deemed to have consented to the juvenile proceedings and has waived any objections to the court's authority to apply juvenile procedures and to impose juvenile sanctions upon him. The burden then lies on the State to prove the respondent's guilt of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Our conclusion is based primarily on an analysis of the Act and its purpose.
The Act establishes that its purpose is to care for and guide minors (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 37, par. 701-2(1); In re Armour (1974), 59 Ill.2d 102, 104, 319 N.E.2d 496), and it expressly mandates that it is to be construed liberally to carry out that protective function (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 37, par. 701-2(4)). Thus the terms in the Act should be read to favor the inclusion, rather than the exclusion, of minors.
The specification of age in the delinquency provision of the Juvenile Court Act sets forth a class of minors whose cases are to be governed by the provisions of the Act. The petition for adjudication of wardship must allege, and the trial court at the adjudicatory hearing must determine, that the respondent is a delinquent (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 37, pars. 702-1, 704-1, 704-6). Section 2-2 of the Act defines a delinquent as "any minor who prior to his 17th birthday has violated or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred any federal or state law or municipal ordinance" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 37, par. 702-2). That definition sets forth "jurisdictional facts" necessary for the institution of delinquency proceedings under the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 37, par. 702-1), and the council commentary to an amendment to section 2-2 provides that "(t)he age differentiation between boys and girls with respect to the Jurisdiction of the juvenile court in delinquency proceedings is abolished, and the Jurisdictional limit for both sexes is established at under 17 years of age" (emphasis added) (Ill.Ann.Stat., ch. 37, par. 702-2, Council Commentary, at 59 (Smith-Hurd Supp.1978)).
Thus the definition refers to age not as an element of delinquency but as a quasi-jurisdictional factor, the presence of which confers authority on the court to proceed under the Juvenile Court Act. It delineates the group encompassed by the category of delinquency as do other age designations for other classifications under the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 37, pars. 701-13 (minors), 702-3 (minors otherwise in need of supervision), 702-4 (neglected minors), 702-5 (dependent minors)).
It is manifest, however, that the age factor in the definition of delinquency is not, technically, a jurisdictional requirement since the juvenile court is simply a division of the circuit court (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 37, par. 701-8; People v. Jiles (1969), 43 Ill.2d 145, 147, 251 N.E.2d 529) which, under article VI, section 9, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, has jurisdiction of all justiciable matters except in two specified instances in which the supreme court has original and exclusive jurisdiction. Thus establishment of age, unlike the subject matter jurisdiction of a court (see People v. Reed (1965), 33 Ill.2d 535, 538-39, 213 N.E.2d 278; People v. Link (1937), 365 Ill. 266, 290, 6 N.E.2d 201; People v. Gregory (1974), 59 Ill.2d 111, 112, 319 N.E.2d 483), is a matter which can be waived. The State's failure to establish age is analogous to prosecuting a defendant in the wrong county or to proceeding before a court that is improperly organized, objections to which can be waived (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 1-6(a) (place of trial); People v. Ondrey (1976), 65 Ill.2d 360, 363-64, 2 Ill.Dec. 717, 357 N.E.2d 1160 (place of trial); People v. Dunn (1972), 52 Ill.2d 400, 402, 288 N.E.2d 463 (place of trial); Cleary v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1954), 4 Ill.2d 57, 59, 122 N.E.2d 227 (organization); People v. Link (1937), 365 Ill. 266, 290, 6 N.E.2d 201 (organization)).
The situation of a respondent who remains silent about his age while proceeding to defend himself against an adjudication of delinquency under the Juvenile Court Act finds further analogy in cases which hold that a juvenile who wilfully misrepresents his age to an adult criminal court waives the statutory procedures which inure to juveniles accused of criminal offenses (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 37, par. 702-7; People v. Henderson (...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
E.G., In Interest of
... ... (In Interest of Sneed (1977), 48 Ill.App.3d 364, 6 Ill.Dec. 508, 363 N.E.2d 37, aff'd. (1978), 72 Ill.2d 326, 21 Ill.Dec. 194, 381 N.E.2d 272.) Moreover, the Act is generally construed liberally to favor inclusion, rather than exclusion of a minor. In re Greene (1979), 76 Ill.2d 204, 28 Ill.Dec. 525, 390 N.E.2d 884 ... Initially, I disagree with the majority's statement, upon which its entire analysis rests, that the trial court found the minor to be mature enough to make her own medical decisions. The record shows that the court made ... ...
-
W.C., In re
... ... (See In re J.P.J. (1985), 109 Ill.2d 129, 136-37, 92 Ill.Dec. 802, 485 N.E.2d 848 (finding waiver for failure to raise issue in circuit court); In re Greene (1979), 76 Ill.2d 204, 28 Ill.Dec. 525, 390 N.E.2d 884 (issue not raised at circuit court level is considered waived); In re Tingle (1977), 52 Ill.App.3d 251, 257, 9 Ill.Dec. 853, 367 N.E.2d 287 (same).) Waiver principles are generally applied in minor delinquency proceedings as well as in adult ... ...
-
City of Urbana v. ANDREW NB
... ... P.H., 145 Ill.2d at 222, 164 Ill.Dec. 137, 582 N.E.2d 700 ; DeJesus, 127 Ill.2d at 498, 130 Ill.Dec. 471, 537 N.E.2d 800 ; In re Greene, 76 Ill.2d 204, 213, 28 Ill.Dec. 525, 390 N.E.2d 884 (1979) ... From the unified structure of the circuit court follows uniformity in the use of the court's contempt power. A judge sitting in the juvenile division of the circuit court holds a person in contempt of court based ... ...
-
People v. P.H.
...of a single unified circuit court. (People v. DeJesus (1989), 127 Ill.2d 486, 498, 130 Ill.Dec. 471, 537 N.E.2d 800; In re Greene (1979), 76 Ill.2d 204, 213, 28 Ill.Dec. 525, 390 N.E.2d 884; People v. Jiles (1969), 43 Ill.2d 145, 147, 251 N.E.2d 529; see Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, Page 706 [164 Ill......