Greenlee v. State

• Decision Date: 08 April 1940
• Docket Number: 34017
• Citation: 195 So. 312,188 Miss. 387
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: GREENLEE v. STATE

195 So. 312

188 Miss. 387

GREENLEE v. STATE

No. 34017

Supreme Court of Mississippi, Division A

April 8, 1940

Suggestion Of Error Overruled May 6, 1940.

APPEAL from the circuit court of Grenada county HON. JNO. F. ALLEN Judge.

Dudley Greenlee was convicted of burglary, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

John Horan, of Water Valley, for appellant.

The circuit judge could not postpone the July Term of the Circuit Court of Grenada County and hold the term on the third Monday of September, at a time fixed by law for holding the Circuit Court in Attala County in the same circuit district held by the same judge; and all judgments and orders entered thereat are void.

Arbour v. Y. & M. V. R. R. Co., 98 Miss. 714, 54 So. 158; Williams v. State, 156 Miss. 346, 126 So. 40; 15 C J., page 881, sec. 230, and page 891, sec. 245; Walton v. State, 147 Miss. 851, 112 So. 790; Stevenson v. McLeod Lbr. Co., 120 Miss. 65, 81 So. 788.

The corpus delicti must be proved by evidence aliunde confession of the accused. And the corroborate evidence must relate to some fact or circumstance which is material to the issue of the guilt or innocence of the accused; or, as it has otherwise been expressed, the corroboration must be proof of substantial facts tending to incriminate the accused. The corpus delicti consists of two substantial fundamental facts: (1) The fact of the act or deed, that is, the result; (2) the fact of the existence of criminal agency as the cause of the death, or burning, or other deed. The first of these constituents is always required to be proved, either by direct testimony or by presumptive evidence of the strongest kind. And the second of these constituents becomes a proper subject of presumptive reasoning upon all the facts and circumstances of the case. As a matter of law confessions are entitled to very little weight. Anderson v. State, 184 Miss. 892, 186 So. 836; Richardson v. State, 80 Miss. 115, 31 So. 544; Spears v. State, 92 Miss. 613, 46 So. 166; Bolden v. State, 98. Miss. 727, 54 So. 241; Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472; Raybourn v. State, 115 Miss. 730, 76 So. 639; Butler v. State, 129 Miss. 778, 93 So. 3; Williams v. State, 129 Miss. 469, 92 So. 584; Miller v. State, 129 Miss. 774, 93 So. 2; Floyd v. State, 138 Miss. 697, 103 So. 368; Keither v. State, 18 Miss. 192; 16 C. J. 704, sec. 1437.

W. D. Conn, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General, for appellee.

As to the right of the circuit judge to pretermit a regular term of court, we think that that matter has already been settled by the court in Ivey v. State (Miss.), 119 So. 507, wherein the court held that there was no authority to pretermit court terms. In the light of this decision, we may concede that the regular term was improperly pretermitted. However, Section 731 of the Code of 1930 specifically provides for special terms of circuit court to be held whenever the business of such court requires it and provides that an order calling such special term shall be entered on the minutes of the special term. It is provided that the term shall not be held in a shorter time than twenty days from the date of the order, and the clerk of the court is directed to give such notice; but the statute then provides that a failure or irregularity in giving such notice shall not affect the validity of any judgment or proceeding given or had at such special term.

The order of the circuit judge which was entered on the minutes of the court appears to comply with the requirements of this statute, even though the judge, in his order, referred to it as "a special adjourned term". This order was made more than twenty days, required by law, preceding the first day of this special term of court. Whether the clerk actually gave the notice required by law or not appears to be immaterial in the light of the statute above referred to.

The court is thoroughly committed to the proposition that where a confession is relied on, it is only necessary to show that an offense has probably been committed and that when this proof, coupled with the confession, establishes the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt, such showing is sufficient. The corpus delicti in such case need only be shown to the extent that the mind is satisfied that a real rather than an imaginary crime has been committed.

Nichols v. State, 165 Miss. 114, 145 So. 903; Walker v. State, 127 Miss. 246, 89 So. 921; Patterson v. State, 127 Miss. 256, 90 So. 2; Garner v. State, 132 Miss. 815, 96 So. 743; Heard v. State, 59 Miss. 545.

In the case at bar, we think that the proof was sufficient in the light of the rule above referred to and that there is nothing on this score of which appellant can complain.

OPINION

Smith, C. J.

The appellant was convicted of burglary at a special term of the court below called by the judge thereof under Section 731 Code of 1930. The July, 1939, Term of Court was pretermitted by an order of the judge in vacation, reciting that the term "be and the same is hereby postponed to be held beginning the third Monday and 18th day of September, 1939, for the reasons stated above. It is further ordered that in due time the...