Gress v. Petersburg Foods, LLC

• Decision Date: 24 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. 31110, 31111.,31110, 31111.
• Parties: Joyce GRESS, individually and as class representative, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees, v. PETERSBURG FOODS, LLC formerly known as Advantage Foods, LLC, a West Virginia limited liability company, Defendants Below, Appellants. and Perdue Farms, Inc., a Maryland corporation, Defendants Below and Joyce Gress, individually and as class representative, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees, v. Petersburg Foods, LLC formerly known as Advantage Foods, LLC, a West Virginia limited liability company, Defendants Below and Perdue Farms, Inc., a Maryland corporation, Defendants Below, Appellants.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

592 S.E.2d 811

215 W.Va. 32

Joyce GRESS, individually and as class representative, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees, v. PETERSBURG FOODS, LLC formerly known as Advantage Foods, LLC, a West Virginia limited liability company, Defendants Below, Appellants. and Perdue Farms, Inc., a Maryland corporation, Defendants Below and Joyce Gress, individually and as class representative, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees, v. Petersburg Foods, LLC formerly known as Advantage Foods, LLC, a West Virginia limited liability company, Defendants Below and Perdue Farms, Inc., a Maryland corporation, Defendants Below, Appellants.

No. 31110, 31111.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted September 9, 2003.

Decided November 24, 2003.

Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Starcher December 9, 2003.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice McGraw December 18, 2003.

David M. Hammer, Esq., Robert J. Schiavoni, Esq., Hammer, Ferretti & Schiavoni, Martinsburg, West Virginia, Attorneys for Joyce Gress, et al.

Stephen Godfrey Jory, Esq., Jory & Smith, Elkins, West Virginia, Attorney for Perdue Farms, Inc.

Kevin L. Carr, Esq., Eric E. Kinder, Esq., Spilman, Thomas & Battle, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for Advantage Foods, LLC.

Richard J. Antonelli, Esq., Robert W. Pritchard, Esq., Kenneth C. Kurtz, Esq., Littler Mendelson, Pittsburgh, PA, Pro hac vice for Advantage Food, LLC.

Thomas A. Bright, Esq., Glenn L. Spencer, Esq., Haynsworth, Baldwin, Johnson & Greaves, Greenville, SC, Pro hac vice for Perdue Farms, Inc.

PER CURIAM:

The appellants Petersburg Foods, LLC and Perdue Farms, Inc. appeal from the Grant County Circuit Court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of the appellee Joyce Gress on two separate issues— yield bonus pay and vacation pay.¹ We find that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment and reverse.

I.

The appellant Petersburg Foods, LLC owned and operated a chicken processing plant in Petersburg, West Virginia.² The appellee Joyce Gress worked at the Petersburg plant from March 21, 1996 through September 18, 1998 when the appellant Petersburg Foods, LLC fired Ms. Gress.³ In September 1999, Ms. Gress filed a Wage Payment and Collection Act ("WPCA") lawsuit against her former employer alleging two causes of action: (1) a claim for unpaid vacation wages, and (2) a claim for unpaid "yield bonus" pay.

Ms. Gress worked for the appellant approximately two and one-half years. Twice during her employment with the appellant, Ms. Gress took five days of paid vacation. She then worked an additional six months before being fired.

During Ms. Gress' employment at the Petersburg plant, the appellant's written vacation policy provided in its entirety:

1. After one year of service, you are eligible for one week's paid vacation. If you have a leave of absence during your first year, your seniority date will be changed by adding [the] number of days of leave.

2. When an employee has been here for five years, they will have two weeks vacation.

In addition to the appellant's written vacation policy, the appellant's vacation request form stated that "to be eligible for a vacation, you must have been employed as a regular full time employee for one year" and "[y]ou must schedule your vacation on a full week basis ([for] example = Monday through Friday equal[s] 40 hours)."

Ms. Gress sued the appellants under the WPCA, W.Va.Code, 21-5-1 through -18 [1987], alleging, in part, that she was entitled to 2.5 days of vacation pay for the additional six months that Ms. Gress worked between her last vacation and the appellant firing her.

After reviewing the appellant's vacation policy, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. Gress on March 28, 2000. The circuit court found that the vacation policy was not sufficiently clear as to be understood by employees and that Ms. Gress was entitled to 2.5 days of vacation pay for her last six months of employment.

In her second cause of action, Ms. Gress alleged that the appellant owed her a yield bonus for the hours that she worked in September 1998. During Ms. Gress's employment at the chicken processing plant, the appellant had a "yield bonus" policy. The yield bonus increased an employee's hourly rate of pay by an amount ranging from twenty-five cents to seventy-five cents per hour, depending on the past month's rate of productivity as calculated by the appellant. The bonuses were paid on the Friday following the end of each accounting month.

The appellant's written yield bonus policy provided that "to qualify for the bonus, employees must be active on payroll at the time of the distribution." According to the appellant's representatives, to be "active on payroll" meant that an employee had to be present at work and working when the appellant distributed the yield bonus checks. If an employee were out sick or on vacation and was not present when the appellant distributed the yield bonus checks, then the appellant voided that employee's yield bonus check. According to the appellants, the yield bonus policy provided a "means of sharing profits with employees when performance and profitability warrant."

The appellant fired Ms. Gress on September 18, 1998—before the end of the September 1998 yield bonus accounting period. The appellant refused to pay Ms. Gress a yield bonus for days that she worked in September because she was not employed by the appellant on the date that the yield bonuses were distributed.

In its January 4, 2002 order, the circuit court granted Ms. Gress' motion for summary judgment on the yield bonus issue, and ordered the appellants to pay Ms. Gress the yield bonus that she earned for the days she worked in September 1998.

In February of 2002, Perdue Farms, Inc. and Petersburg Foods, LLC filed separate motions to reconsider with the circuit court. Both Petersburg Foods, LLC and Perdue Farms, Inc. requested that the circuit court review its orders granting summary judgment in favor of the appellee on the issues of vacation pay and yield bonus pay.⁴ On April 11, 2002, the circuit court denied the appellants' motions to reconsider.

Petersburg Foods, LLC and Perdue Farms, Inc. filed separate appeals to this Court. On February 13, 2003, the Court granted their appeals and consolidated the appeals for purposes of consideration and decision.

I.

The appellants argue that the circuit court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. Gress on the issues of vacation pay and yield bonus pay. We review a circuit court's entry of summary judgment under a de novo standard. "A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo." Syllabus Point 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

The Wage Payment and Collection Act, W.Va.Code, 21-5-1 through -18 [1987], controls the manner in which employees in West Virginia are paid wages. "The West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act is remedial legislation designed to protect working people and assist them in the collection of compensation wrongly withheld." Mullins v. Venable, 171 W.Va. 92, 94, 297 S.E.2d 866, 869 (1982).

Employers have an obligation to pay employees' wages in a timely manner. When an employer fires an employee, the employer "shall pay the employee's wages in full within seventy-two hours." W.Va.Code, 21-5-4(b) [1987].

The Wage Payment and Collection Act defines wages as:

...compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, commission or other basis of calculation.... [T]he term "wages" shall also include then accrued fringe benefits capable of calculation and payable directly to an employee: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall require fringe benefits to be calculated contrary to any agreement between an employer and his employees which does not contradict the provisions of this article.

W.Va.Code, 21-5-1(c).

Under the WPCA, accrued fringe benefits are wages. The WPCA defines the term "fringe benefit" as:

... any benefit provided an employee or group of employees by an employer, or which is required by law, and includes regular vacation, graduated vacation, floating vacation, holidays, sick leave, personal leave, production incentive bonuses, sickness and accident benefits and benefits relating to medical and pension coverage.

W.Va.Code, 21-5-1(1) [1987].

In Syllabus Point 5 of Meadows v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 207 W.Va. 203, 530 S.E.2d 676 (1999), this Court stated:

[p]ursuant to W.Va.Code § 21-5-1(c) (1987), whether fringe benefits have then accrued, are capable of calculation and payable directly to an employee so as to be included in the term "wages" are determined by the terms of employment and not by the provisions of W.Va.Code § 21-5-1(c). Further, the terms of employment may condition the vesting of a fringe benefit right on eligibility requirements in addition to the performance of services, and these terms may provide that unused fringe benefits will not be paid to employees upon separation from employment.

In Meadows, this Court held that under the WPCA, the terms of the applicable employment policies determine when fringe benefits accrue and whether those benefits must be paid upon termination. "The WPCA does not create a right to fringe benefits. Rather, it reserves the question of fringe benefits to the bargaining process between employers and employees." Meadows v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 207 W.Va. at 216, 530 S.E.2d at 689.

This Court has defined the word "accrued," as used in the WPCA, to mean "vested." According to the Meadows Court, "[t]he concept of vesting is concerned with expressly enumerated conditions or requirements all of which must be fulfilled or satisfied before a benefit becomes a presently enforceable right. Because the WPCA contains no such conditions or requirements, the payment of fringe benefits can only be governed by the terms of employment found in employment policies promulgated by employers and agreed to by employees. ...