Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A.

• Decision Date: 21 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. W2013–00471–SC–R11–CV.,W2013–00471–SC–R11–CV.
• Citation: 439 S.W.3d 899
• Parties: Wilma GRIFFIN v. CAMPBELL CLINIC, P.A.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

439 S.W.3d 899

Wilma GRIFFIN

v.CAMPBELL CLINIC, P.A.

No. W2013–00471–SC–R11–CV.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Jackson.

April 9, 2014 Session.

July 21, 2014.

Jerry E. Mitchell and Kevin Baskette, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Campbell Clinic, P.A.

Louis P. Chiozza, Jr., and John W. Leach, Memphis, Tennessee, and Steven R. Walker, Oakland, Tennessee, for the appellee, Wilma Griffin.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Joseph F. Whalen, Acting Solicitor General; and Warren A. Jasper, Senior Counsel, for the appellee/intervenor, the State of Tennessee.

Opinion

JANICE M. HOLDER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GARY R. WADE, C.J., and CORNELIA A. CLARK, WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.

OPINION

JANICE M. HOLDER, J.

The plaintiff filed a civil action in the general sessions court asserting a health care liability claim against the defendant. Following a trial, the general sessions court entered judgment in the defendant's favor. The next day, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and deposited $211.50 with the general sessions court clerk, which represents the amount of the standard court cost of $150 for an appeal to the circuit court required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 8–21–401(b)(1)(C)(i) plus state and local litigation taxes. The circuit court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to file a bond “with good security ... for the costs of the appeal” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27–5–103. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that payment of the standard court cost is sufficient to perfect an appeal from the general sessions court to the circuit court. After a thorough review of the statutory scheme at issue, we conclude that the plaintiff's cash bond was sufficient to perfect her appeal to the circuit court. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On February 26, 2007, Wilma Griffin filed suit against Campbell Clinic, P.A. (“Campbell Clinic”) in the General Sessions Court for Shelby County, Tennessee. In her civil warrant, Ms. Griffin alleged that Campbell Clinic provided substandard medical treatment to her on February 20, 2005, for which she sought compensatory damages up to the jurisdictional limit of $25,000.00. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 16–15–501(d)(1) (Supp.2007) (“The jurisdiction of courts of general sessions, where they have been created, shall extend to the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) in all civil cases, both law and equity....”).

Following a bench trial on May 15, 2007, the general sessions court entered judgment in favor of Campbell Clinic. Ms. Griffin filed a notice of appeal the next day and deposited $211.50 with the general sessions court clerk, an amount that includes the standard court cost for an appeal to the circuit court plus state and local litigation taxes. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 8–21–401(b)(1)(C)(i) (Supp.2007) (stating in part that “the clerk shall charge a standard court cost of one hundred fifty dollars ($150) at the institution of ... [a]ppeals to the circuit ... court from ... general sessions court”). Campbell Clinic moved for a more definite statement, and Ms. Griffin responded by filing a complaint that stated with particularity the grounds giving rise to her cause of action. The parties continued to litigate the matter for the next five years.

On August 10, 2012, the Court of Appeals released its decision in Jacob v. Partee, 389 S.W.3d 339 (Tenn.Ct.App.2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 12, 2012). In Jacob, the intermediate appellate court held that a party perfecting an appeal from the general sessions court to the circuit court must file an appeal bond in an amount sufficient to secure the yet-to-be-determined “cost of the cause on appeal.” Id. at 343 (quoting Tenn.Code Ann. § 27–5–103(b) (2000)). Although the appealing parties in Jacob timely filed their notices of appeal and paid the standard court cost imposed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 8–21–401, neither of them filed an appeal bond. Id. at 341. The Jacob court therefore dismissed the case, concluding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal from the general sessions court. Id. at 344.

Approximately one month after the Court of Appeals released its decision in Jacob, Campbell Clinic moved to dismiss Ms. Griffin's case because she had failed to file a surety bond. In reliance on Jacob, the trial court granted Campbell Clinic's motion and dismissed Ms. Griffin's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. While Ms. Griffin's appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, however, the Court of Appeals released its decision in Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012–00803–COA–R3–CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn.Ct.App. Feb. 15, 2013), in which it overruled Jacob and held that payment of a cash bond in the amount of the standard court cost satisfied the bond requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27–5–103. Id. at *19.

In this case, a majority of the panel in the Court of Appeals relied on Bernatsky and concluded that Ms. Griffin's payment of the standard court cost and litigation taxes satisfied the appeal bond requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27–5–103.¹

Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A., No. W2013–00471–COA–R3–CV, 2013 WL 3957488, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App. July 31, 2013). The intermediate appellate court therefore reversed the trial court's dismissal of Ms. Griffin's case. Id. We granted Campbell Clinic permission to appeal.

II. Analysis

Campbell Clinic maintains that Ms. Griffin's cash bond in the amount of $211.50 fails to satisfy Tennessee Code Annotated section 27–5–103, which requires an appealing party to “give bond with good security ... for the costs of the appeal.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 27–5–103(a). Instead, Campbell Clinic insists that Tennessee Code Annotated section 27–5–103 requires an appealing party to file a surety bond in an unlimited amount because the “costs” in a given case cannot be determined until the case has been concluded. Campbell Clinic therefore argues that Ms. Griffin's failure to file a surety bond deprives the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction over her appeal.

Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a court's “lawful authority to adjudicate a controversy brought before it” and is conferred on a court by statute or the constitution. Johnson v. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tenn.2013). Tennessee Code Annotated section 16–10–112 (1994) confers on the circuit court “appellate jurisdiction of all suits and actions, of whatsoever nature, unless otherwise provided, instituted before any inferior jurisdiction, whether brought by appeal, certiorari, or in any other manner prescribed by law.”

Ms. Griffin's circuit court action was “brought by appeal.” See id. Appeals from the general sessions court to the circuit court are governed by Tennessee Code Annotated sections 27–5–101 to –107 (2000), –108 (Supp.2007). Section 108(a) states that “[a]ny party may appeal from an adverse decision of the general sessions court to the circuit court of the county within a period of ten (10) days on complying with the provisions of this chapter. ” (Emphasis added.) The relevant “provision” of chapter five in this case is Tennessee Code Annotated section 27–5–103 and its requirement that an appealing party file a bond for costs of the appeal. Accordingly, filing a bond within the ten-day period is a condition precedent to the timely perfection of an appeal. See Love v. Coll. Level Assessment Servs. Inc., 928 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tenn.1996) (recognizing that an appellant's obligation to timely perfect her appeal from the general sessions court is “mandatory ... and if it is not complied with[,] the [circuit] court has no jurisdiction”); see also City of Red Boiling Springs v. Whitley, 777 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989) (“The requirement of a bond in order to perfect an appeal from an inferior court to the circuit court is not a formality. The appeal is not perfected without it.”).² If the appeal is not perfected within the ten-day period, the general sessions court's judgment becomes final and execution may issue. Tenn.Code Ann. § 27–5–108(d).

The circuit court's jurisdiction in this case depends on our interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27–5–103. When construing a statute, our sole purpose is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn.2004). In doing so, we must first attempt to discern legislative intent purely from “the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, without forced or subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the language.” Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Tenn.1997) (emphasis omitted). Therefore, when the statute at issue is clear and unambiguous, we are compelled to apply the “plain meaning in its normal and accepted use....” Eastman, 151 S.W.3d at 507.

We do not read statutes in isolation and are required to construe them “as a whole, read them in conjunction with their surrounding parts, and view them consistently with the legislative purpose.” Kradel v. Piper Indus., Inc., 60 S.W.3d 744, 750 (Tenn.2001) (quoting State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn.1995) ). Statutes relating to the same subject or sharing a common purpose must be construed in a manner that “advance[s] their common purpose or intent.” Carver v. Citizen Utils. Co., 954 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tenn.1997) (citing Lyons v. Rasar, 872 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn.1994) ). Our ultimate goal is to select “a reasonable construction [that] avoids statutory conflict and provides for harmonious operation of the laws.” Id. (citing Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tenn.1995) and Epstein v. State, 211 Tenn. 633, 366 S.W.2d 914, 918 (1963) ).

Consistent with our...