Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Dorris

• Decision Date: 28 December 2017
• Docket Number: No. W2017–00617–COA–R3–CV,W2017–00617–COA–R3–CV
• Citation: 556 S.W.3d 745
• Parties: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. v. Marcus DORRIS
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

556 S.W.3d 745

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.

v.Marcus DORRIS

No. W2017–00617–COA–R3–CV

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, AT JACKSON.

November 14, 2017 Session

FILED December 28, 2017

Application for Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court May 17, 2018

Drayton D. Berkley, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Marcus Dorris.

Bradley E. Trammell and Kavita Goswamy Shelat, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.

J. Steven Stafford, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Frank G. Clement, Jr., P.J., M.S., and Arnold B. Goldin, J., joined.

J. Steven Stafford, P.J., W.S.

This case involves the appeal of an action for possession of property initially filed in general sessions court. On appeal to the circuit court, the trial court dismissed the appellant's counterclaims for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The circuit court thereafter determined that the appeal from general sessions court was not timely. We reverse the circuit court's dismissal of the general sessions appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction but affirm the dismissal of the appellant's counterclaims.

Background

This case originated with the filing of a detainer warrant by Plaintiff/Appellee Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") in Shelby County General Sessions Court ("general sessions court") against Defendant/Appellant Marcus Dorris ("Appellant"). The warrant sought only possession of the property. At the scheduled June 20, 2016 hearing, Appellant did not appear and the general sessions court awarded possession of the property in question to Wells Fargo. The following day, Appellant filed a motion to set aside the judgment and attached, as exhibits, motions to transfer to circuit court and to dismiss, as well as an answer and three counterclaims. In these filings, Appellant sought to (1) transfer the action to circuit court; (2) dismiss the eviction action; and (3) assert counterclaims for wrongful foreclosure, violation of the federal Truth in Lending Act, and fraudulent suppression of the transfer of the note.

On July 6, 2016, the general sessions court clerk's office issued a writ of possession regarding the subject property. On July 8, 2016, while the post-judgment motion was pending, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to circuit court. On August 9, 2016, the general sessions court entered its order denying the motion to set aside, stating, in relevant part, that the notice of appeal divested the general sessions court of jurisdiction and the parties should proceed with the appeal in circuit court.

The case was transferred to the Shelby County Circuit Court ("trial court") and on October 5, 2016, Wells Fargo filed a motion to dismiss Appellant's counterclaims. The motion did not address whether Appellant's counterclaims were timely raised during the detainer proceeding in general sessions court but instead addressed the substance of Appellant's arguments. On December 9, 2016, the trial court granted Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss Appellant's counterclaims.

The parties then engaged in a period of discovery. On February 13, 2017, however, Wells Fargo filed a motion to enforce the June 20, 2016 judgment of the general sessions court, arguing for the first time that Appellant's appeal was untimely where no notice of appeal had been filed in the ten days following the August 9, 2016 order denying the motion to set aside.¹ On April 7, 2017, the trial court issued an order enforcing the judgment of the general sessions court. The trial court ruled that Appellant failed to file a notice of appeal in the ten days following the general sessions court's denial of the motion to set aside, as required for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction. By this order, all of the claims raised by the parties had been adjudicated and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.²

Issues Presented

Appellant raises two issues on appeal, which are taken, and slightly restated, from his brief:

1. Whether the July 8, 2016 notice of appeal transferred subject matter jurisdiction to the trial court from the general sessions court.

2. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Appellant's counterclaims against Wells Fargo.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

I.

As an initial matter, we must first determine whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider Appellant's appeal from the general sessions court. Subject matter jurisdiction concerns "a court's lawful authority to adjudicate a controversy brought before it[,]" is dependent on the nature of the action and the relief sought, and is determined by reference to the authority granted to the court by the constitution or the General Assembly. Chapman v. DaVita, Inc. , 380 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc'ns Co. , 924 S.W.2d 632, 639 (Tenn. 1996) ; Landers v. Jones , 872 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tenn. 1994) ; Kane v. Kane , 547 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tenn. 1977) ). When challenged, the party asserting that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy bears the burden of proof. Chapman , 380 S.W.3d at 712 (citing Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis , 363 S.W.3d 436, 445 (Tenn. 2012) ). The "determination of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo, without a presumption of correctness." Northland Ins. Co. v. State , 33 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Nelson v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. , 8 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 1999) ).

To the extent that this case involves the interpretation of a statute, our review is also de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Rajvongs v. Wright , 432 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tenn. 2013). "When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply its plain meaning in its normal and accepted use, without a forced interpretation that would limit or expand the statute's application." Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson , 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004) (citing Lipscomb v. Doe , 32 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Tenn. 2000) ).

II.

Appeals from the general sessions court to the circuit court are governed by statute. See Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A. , 439 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tenn. 2014). Tennessee Code Annotated section 27–5–108(a) provides: "Any party may appeal from a decision of the general sessions court to the circuit court of the county within a period of ten (10) days on complying with this chapter." See also Tenn. Code Ann. 29–18–128 ("An appeal will also lie in suits commenced before general sessions judges, under this chapter [i.e., forcible entry and detainer], within the ten (10) days allowed by § 27–5–108 [.]"). The timely filing of a notice of appeal of the general sessions court's judgment is mandatory "and if it is not complied with the [circuit] court has no jurisdiction over the case." Love v. Coll. Level Assessment Servs., Inc. , 928 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tenn. 1996). "If the appeal is not perfected within the ten-day period, the general sessions court's judgment becomes final and execution may issue." Griffin , 439 S.W.3d at 902 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 27–5–108(d) ).

This time period is altered, however, by application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 16–15–727, which provides:

(a) Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.01, regarding clerical mistakes, shall apply to all courts of general sessions. The general sessions judge shall have the authority under the same circumstances and in the same manner as is provided in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.01 to correct such mistakes.

(b) Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, regarding mistakes, inadvertence, excusable neglect, fraud and other similar reasons set out in that rule, shall apply to all courts of general sessions. A motion under the general sessions court's authority under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 shall be filed within ten (10) days of the date of judgment. Once filed, the motion shall toll the ten-day period for seeking de novo review in the circuit court until the determination of the motion is concluded. Thereafter, an appeal for de novo review in the circuit court shall be filed within ten (10) days of the general sessions court's ruling on the motion to relieve a party or the parties' legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding in the same manner as provided in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02.³

Thus, a party dissatisfied with the judgment of the general sessions court may seek to set aside that judgment by the timely filing of a motion under section 16–15–727(b). When such a motion is timely filed, the time for perfecting a de novo appeal to the circuit court is tolled until such time as the motion to set aside is adjudicated.

In this case, the timeline is not in dispute. Here, the general sessions court entered its judgment for possession on June 20, 2015. The very next day, Appellant filed his motion to set aside pursuant to section 16–15–727(b). Thus, Appellant's motion was timely filed and tolled the time for perfecting a de novo appeal to the circuit court. Had Appellant waited to file his notice of appeal until the ten days following the general sessions court's ruling on his motion to set aside, there would be no question that the circuit court obtained jurisdiction to consider Appellant's de novo appeal. Rather than wait to file his notice of appeal, however, Appellant chose to prematurely file his notice of appeal on July 8, 2016, prior to the general sessions court's ruling on the motion to set aside.⁴

Wells Fargo essentially argues that because the general sessions court had not adjudicated Appellant's motion to set aside, Appellant's July 8, 2016 notice of appeal was of no effect. Under Wells Fargo's interpretation of section 16–15–727, Appellant was therefore required to file a second notice of appeal in the ten days following the general sessions court's denial of the motion to set aside. In the absence of a notice of appeal filed within this ten-day window, Wells Fargo asserts that Appellant failed to timely perfect his appeal.

In contrast, Appellant argues that the filing of his...