Griffin v. City of Robards
| Decision Date | 22 April 1999 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 97-SC-1101-T,97-SC-1103-TX,s. 97-SC-1101-T |
| Citation | 990 S.W.2d 634 |
| Parties | E.B. GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. CITY OF ROBARDS and Marion Lee Eakins, Appellees, and City of Robards, Henderson County, Kentucky Marion Lee Eakins, et al., Appellants, v. E.B. Griffin, Other Resident Opponents to the Incorporation of Robards, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Carl B. Boyd, Jr., Sheffer Hoffman, Henderson, Kentucky, for E.B. Griffin.
Logan B. Askew, Scott P. Kasierski, White, White, Askew & Crenshaw, Hopkinsville, Kentucky, for City of Robards, Henderson County, Kentucky and Marion Lee Eakins.
The matter before this Court involves the legality of the incorporation of the City of Robards in Henderson County, Kentucky. On July 22, 1997, a petition was filed with the Henderson Circuit Court pursuant to KRS 81.050 et seq. to incorporate an area in southern part of the county. There is no issue that the document filed complied with all the statutory requirements. The Henderson Circuit Court set the incorporation hearing for September 9, 1997. On August 28, 1997, opponents of incorporation filed a petition in opposition to incorporation. On September 3, 1997, the opponents of incorporation filed a Motion to Dismiss or Modify the petition to incorporate. At a hearing on September 5, 1997, the trial court overruled the opponents' motion to dismiss, but reserved ruling on the modification request. The opponents sought to remove a small area containing thirteen registered voters from the area to be incorporated on the basis that it was non-contiguous.
On September 9, 1997, the hearing on the petition to incorporate was held. The court employed a bifurcated process in conducting the hearing. First, the court examined whether the procedural steps for incorporation had been properly followed. KRS 81.050. Second, the court heard arguments on whether the necessary substantive criteria for incorporation had been met. KRS 81.060.
The parties stipulated that the requirements of KRS 81.050(1) had been met; however, opponents raised the issue of whether that portion of the petition which contained the list of signatures and addresses was legitimate since the other items required for the petition were not attached when the signatures were affixed to the list. The trial court found that the procedural requirements for incorporation had been met and proceeded to review the substantive requirements of incorporation. The trial court heard testimony from three witness from both the proponents and the opponents. The trial court ordered each side to submit memoranda on this issue.
On October 8, 1997, the trial court granted opponents' motion to modify the territory to be incorporated by striking that contested portion of the territory containing the thirteen registered voters. On November 25, 1997, the Henderson Circuit Court issued an order incorporating the City of Robards, Kentucky. Opponents appealed and proponents cross-appealed the order of October 8, 1997. The proponents filed a motion for transfer to the Supreme Court which this Court granted.
KRS 81.050(1) provides as follows:
(1) Proceedings to incorporate a city shall be commenced by a petition being filed with the circuit clerk of the county in which the area to be incorporated is located. The petition shall contain:
(a) The signatures and addresses of:
1. A number of registered voters equal to two-thirds ( 2/3) of the voters of the proposed territory, or
2. A number of real property owners, the sum total of whose assessed value of real property is equal to at least two-thirds ( 2/3) of the assessed value of the real property in the proposed territory;
(b) A statement of the boundaries proposed and the number of residents;
(c) An accurate map of the proposed territory;
(d) A detailed statement of the reasons for incorporation including the services sought from the proposed city;
(e) A description of the existing facilities and services within the proposed territory; and
(f) A statement of the form of government under which the city will operate if incorporated.
As noted, it was stipulated that the proponents of incorporation filed a document which met all the requirements of KRS 81.050(1). Opponents assert that because the list of signatures and addresses compiled as per KRS 81.050(1)(a) was not attached to the items listed in KRS 81.050(1)(b)-(f) at the time of the signing, the entire petition must be stricken as invalid.
The opponents discuss the confusion which was generated by the process employed in this case. They also stated that it "would have been no significant burden" to have items (a)-(f) affixed at all times. With regard to the issue of confusion, we find no evidence of any confusion, much less any prejudice, in this case. During the public hearings the trial court gave all parties multiple opportunities to withdraw their names from the petition favoring incorporation. Opponents are unable to demonstrate that the final tally of 303 persons in favor of incorporation was not in fact the number of persons actually favoring incorporation. The fact that persons changed their minds and decided to oppose or support incorporation after having previously signed a document favoring the opposite side strongly suggests that no prejudice occurred. Everyone was given a chance by the trial court to make sure that their name was in the correct place. Opponents have offered nothing to refute the final tally's legitimacy.
Opponents' statement that it would not be a burden to affix all attachments has no relevance in this proceeding. Where is there language in our Commonwealth's Constitution or Statutes that states that as long as a procedural step is "no significant burden" an opposing party has a right to demand its performance?
KRS 446.080 has several provisions dealing with the manner in which the judiciary is to construe statutes. First, all laws are to be "liberally construed with a view to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the legislature." KRS 446.080(1). Second, "[a]ll words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of language." KRS 446.080(4). There is no language in KRS 81.050 that expressly requires that items (b)-(f) all be in existence when the signatures are affixed to item (a). Rather the statute requires that items (a)-(f) be submitted together when the document is filed with the circuit clerk. There is no discussion of how the process of obtaining signatures is to be performed.
In their initial briefs both opponents and proponents of incorporation employ the term "petition" with a certain lack of precision. The "petition" is the document which proponents of incorporation must file with the court. KRS 81.050(1). It contains the items listed in KRS 81.050(1)(a)-(f). The list of signatures and addresses of the persons supporting incorporating is but one of the six items included in the petition. KRS 81.050(1)(a).
Whether we believe that having items (a)-(f) affixed together throughout the entire process of gathering signatures is a good idea is not the appropriate test to be applied. Our job is to interpret the statutes, not amend or enhance them. Since there is no discussion of how the signatures are to be acquired, we cannot engraft one on top of the existing statute. We see no statutory requirement that items (b)-(f) be supplied to individuals when they affix their signatures to item (a). We note that trial court first considered whether the requirements of KRS 81.050 had been met by proponents. The trial court also took pains to make sure that all those who had signed favoring incorporation did in fact support it. Opponents have offered no evidence that any one of the three hundred and three persons did not support incorporation.
In their reply brief, opponents engage in an extensive and potentially exhaustive discussion of the meaning of the word petition. Such a discussion is superfluous since the word is absolutely and precisely defined by KRS 81.050(1). This Court is not permitted to redefine the meaning of a word in a statute when the General Assembly has already expressly defined the word. Hoy v. Kentucky Indus. Revitalization Auth., Ky., 907 S.W.2d 766, 769 (1995) ().
In a matter such as the incorporation of a municipal area, strict adherence to the express terms of the statute is necessary. Donald v. City of Glenview, Ky.App., 723 S.W.2d 861, 863 (1986). In this case proponents have followed the explicit dictates of KRS 81.050(1) to the letter. Accordingly, since we see no explicit requirement governing how the signatures for KRS 81.050(1)(a) are to be obtained, we believe it is inappropriate for us to create additional requirements the General Assembly did not draft.
The second argument against incorporation is that the City of Robards does not meet the criteria outlined in KRS 81.060(1)(a)-(e). The Kentucky General Assembly established the following requirements for the incorporation of a new city:
a. At least three hundred (300) persons reside in the territory sought to be incorporated;
b. Incorporation constitutes a reasonable way of providing the public services sought by the voters or property owners of the territory, and there is no other reasonable way of providing the services;
c. The territory is contiguous;
d. The territory is able to provide necessary city services to its residents within a reasonable period after its incorporation; and
e. The interest of other areas and adjacent local governments is not unreasonably prejudiced by the incorporation.
KRS 81.060(1)(a)-(c). In assessing whether the requirements of KRS 81.060(1)(a)-(e) have been met, the circuit court is given the following criteria:
a. Whether the character of the territory is urban or rural b. The...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
IN RE DE-ANNEXATION OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY
...except where such intervening territory is a strip less than four rods in width. 46. See in this connection Griffin v. City of Robards, 990 S.W.2d 634, 640 (Ky.1999)(if a municipal value or purpose occurs in the corridor, contiguity may be warranted, but if only a barren corridor exists, th......
-
Fort Morgan Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Gulf Shores, 1101440.
...386, 237 Ill.Dec. 529, 709 N.E.2d 998, 1000 (1999); Ridings v. City of Owensboro, 383 S.W.2d 510, 511–12 (Ky.1964); Griffin v. City of Robards, 990 S.W.2d 634, 640 (Ky.1999); Owosso Twp. v. City of Owosso, 385 Mich. 587, 189 N.W.2d 421, 422 (1971); State ex rel. Danielson v. Village of Moun......
-
City of Leb. v. Goodin ex rel. Good (In re in Revocable Trust)
...of annexations in order to prove the “natural or regular” standard rests upon an uncertain foundation. Conspicuously absent from Ridings and Griffin, the cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in instituting this new standard, are the terms “natural” or “regular.” 27 In fact, our researc......
-
City of Lebanon v. Goodin
...39 (Ky. 1957); Kelley v. Dailey, 366 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. 1963); Ridings v. City ofOwensboro, 383 S.W.2d 510 (Ky. 1964); Griffin v. City of Robards, 990 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1999); Rector v. City of Bowling Green, 594 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. App. 1979). One such statutory mandate is set forth in KRS 81A.410,......