Griffin v. State

• Decision Date: 25 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. SC01-457.,SC01-457.
• Parties: Michael Allen GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

866 So.2d 1

Michael Allen GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC01-457.

Supreme Court of Florida.

September 25, 2003.

Order Denying Rehearing January 29, 2004.

Michael V. Giordano of Giordano & Luchetta, Tampa, Florida, for Appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Sandra S. Jaggard, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Michael Allen Griffin appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the circuit court's denial of postconviction relief.

Griffin was convicted of first-degree murder of law enforcement officer Joseph Martin, attempted first-degree murder of law enforcement officer Juan Crespo, burglary of a hotel room, two counts of grand theft (one count involving a stolen vehicle and the other involving items stolen from the hotel room), and one count of the unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The factual circumstances of the crimes are set forth fully in this Court's opinion on direct appeal. See Griffin v. State, 639 So.2d 966 (Fla.1994)

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The jury recommended death by a vote of ten to two. The trial court found four aggravating circumstances: (1) Griffin had a prior violent felony (the attempted murder of Officer Crespo); (2) the crime was committed during the commission of a burglary; (3) the murder was committed to avoid arrest; and (4) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). In mitigation, the trial court found that Griffin was twenty years old at the time of the murder, had shown remorse, had a traumatic childhood, and had a learning disability. The trial court found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and followed the jury recommendation and sentenced Griffin to death.

On appeal, Griffin raised two issues relating to the guilt phase of his trial¹ and four issues relating to the penalty phase.² This Court affirmed both the convictions and the sentence of death. Griffin, 639 So.2d at 972. The United States Supreme Court denied Griffin's petition for certiorari. Griffin v. Florida, 514 U.S. 1005, 115 S.Ct. 1317, 131 L.Ed.2d 198 (1995).

Thereafter, Griffin filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, raising thirty-one claims of error. The circuit court held a Huff³ hearing and subsequently entered an order summarily denying most of Griffin's claims as being procedurally barred or without merit. The circuit court granted an evidentiary hearing on the following claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly present evidence of Griffin's mental condition and other background mitigating evidence and failing to properly advise Griffin about his comments to the court at the time of sentencing; and (2) the sentencing judge and the State allegedly engaged in ex parte communication concerning the preparation of the sentencing order.

A six-day evidentiary hearing was held in September and October 2000. During the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court heard testimony from several defense and state witnesses. Following the hearing, the circuit court denied relief on both claims. As to Griffin's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the presentation of mental health evidence, the circuit court concluded that the credible evidence did not support Griffin's assertion that he suffers from organic brain damage or any significant mental illness. The circuit court also found that trial counsel investigated Griffin's background, had him evaluated by a mental health professional, and made an informed tactical decision not to present mental health evidence. In regard to the lay witnesses that Griffin asserted could have testified about mitigating circumstances in his background, the circuit court concluded that the testimony of these witnesses was either cumulative to that presented at trial or counsel made a strategic decision not to present the testimony. The circuit court also noted that had this mental health and mitigating evidence been presented at trial it would have revealed conflicting and damaging information about Griffin. Thus, the court concluded, Griffin could not show that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to present the evidence.

As to Griffin's claim that counsel failed to properly advise him about his comments to the court at the time of sentencing, the circuit court found that counsel was under the impression that Griffin would be speaking about remorse, but Griffin took it upon himself to expand his comments further. Thus, counsel could not be faulted for not preventing Griffin from saying something that could later be used against him and was not ineffective in this regard. On the second claim of ex parte communication between the sentencing judge and the State in the preparation of the sentencing order, the circuit court found that the judge asked both parties to provide sentencing memoranda discussing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, that defense counsel received a copy of the State's memorandum, and that there was nothing wrong in the judge's use of the State's memorandum in the preparation of the sentencing order.

Griffin has appealed the circuit court's denial of postconviction relief to this Court, raising twenty-one issues on appeal. Griffin contends that (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of trial by failing to investigate and present available mitigating evidence; (2) the trial court failed to independently consider and weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors and counsel was ineffective in failing to object at the time of sentencing; (3) postconviction counsel was hampered in his representation of Griffin due to a large workload, a lack of funding, and the failure of various agencies to provide requested public records; (4) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt phase of trial by failing to adequately cross-examine various State witnesses, failing to advise Griffin of possible judicial bias, conceding guilt during opening argument, and failing to argue an alternative theory of defense;⁴ (5) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move for a change of venue based on pretrial publicity; (6) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the use of shackles during trial; (7) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately question prospective jurors during voir dire; (8) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to improper prosecutorial argument; (9) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move for the suppression of statements Griffin made to the police; (10) Griffin is innocent of the murder and is ineligible for the death penalty and the jury instruction on the CCP aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague; (11) Griffin was absent during critical stages of his trial; (12) the jury was erroneously instructed regarding the standard for evaluating expert testimony; (13) the jury was not properly instructed on the proof necessary to establish an aggravating circumstance or how to weigh the aggravating circumstances, the jury was allowed to consider an automatic aggravator, and the sentencing order failed to consider and weigh mitigating evidence presented at trial; (14) the jury instructions unconstitutionally diluted the jury's responsibility for its role in the sentencing process; (15) Rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, which prevents counsel from contacting jurors, is unconstitutional; (16) Florida's capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to Griffin; (17) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance on direct appeal based upon an inadequate record on appeal; (18) the cumulative effect of errors by trial counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court deprived Griffin of a fair trial; (19) the jury was erroneously instructed on the avoid arrest aggravating circumstance; (20) Griffin is insane to be executed; and (21) the trial court erred in admitting autopsy photographs of the victim during the guilt phase.

Initially, we note that Griffin attempts to incorporate all of the claims, facts, and arguments from his postconviction motion at the circuit court into his brief to this Court. However, "[m]erely making reference to arguments below without further elucidation does not suffice to preserve issues, and these claims are deemed to have been waived." Duest v. Dugger, 555 So.2d 849, 852 (Fla.1990). Thus, in those instances where Griffin does not elaborate on his claims on appeal, this Court will not look to his postconviction motion for explanation.

The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the first two claims that Griffin raises on appeal: ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to investigate and present mental health and other mitigating evidence; and that the trial court failed to independently consider and weigh the aggravating factors and counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failure to object. This second claim is based on Griffin's assertion that the trial court engaged in impermissible ex parte contact with the State in the preparation of the sentencing order.

At the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court heard testimony from defense expert clinical neuropsychologist Dr. Ernest Bordini, State expert clinical neuropsychologist Dr. Jane Ansley, Griffin's mother Marianne Griffin, Griffin's half-brother Charles Griffin, Jose Montejo, who was Griffin's "foster" father during his early childhood, Griffin's friend Steve Minnis, who considered himself Griffin's "big brother," Griffin's trial counsel Andrew Kassier, and state attorney Penny Brill, who was part of the State's prosecution...