Griffin v. State

• Decision Date: 26 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. S06A0608.,S06A0608.
• Citation: 280 Ga. 683,631 S.E.2d 671
• Parties: GRIFFIN v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

280 Ga. 683

631 S.E.2d 671

GRIFFIN v. The STATE.

No. S06A0608.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 26, 2006.

Caleb Burch Banks, Statesboro, for Appellant.

Richard Ashley Mallard, Dist. Atty., Keith A. McIntyre, Asst. Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Laura D'Ann Dyes, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee.

MELTON, Justice.

Following a jury trial, Deanthony Griffin appeals his convictions for murder, felony murder, armed robbery, burglary, possession of a firearm during the commission of an armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a burglary.¹ Griffin contends that the trial court made several errors regarding the admissibility of certain evidence and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

In the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows that, on October 25, 2002, David Brian Cribbs, Sr. was found shot to death in his truck parked in the driveway of his home in Savannah, Georgia. His two adult children, David Brian Cribbs, Jr. ("Junior") and Ashley Brooks Cribbs, were also shot to death, and their bodies were found behind a detached garage. All three victims had been shot in the head. The prior day, Griffin borrowed his sister's car to visit Junior, who owed him money. Griffin admitted going to the Cribbs' home twice on the day of the murders, but stated that the Cribbs were not home during either visit. Neighbors heard gunshots around the home at approximately 7:30 p.m., near the last time that the Cribbs children were heard from, and again at 10:00 p.m that evening, when Cribbs, Sr. returned home for the day. A number of items stolen from the Cribbs' home at the time of the murders, including a floor safe, computer equipment, and clothing were subsequently found in a dumpster next to a storage locker Griffin shared with his girlfriend, and the items were contained in plastic bags which had Griffin's fingerprints on them. The plastic bags came from a roll of trash bags found in the trunk of the car which Griffin borrowed from his sister on the day of the murders. This evidence was amply sufficient to authorize the jury to find Griffin guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Tarver v. State, 278 Ga. 358, 361(5), 602 S.E.2d 627 (2004) (evidence sufficient to find existence of aggravating circumstances under OCGA § 17-10-30(b)).

1. Griffin contends that the trial court erred by admitting a certain hearsay statement made by Ashley Cribbs before her death to her close friend, Rachel Bolton. During trial, Bolton testified that, on one occasion, she and Ashley Cribbs returned to the Cribbs' home and found Griffin waiting there. At the time, Ashley told Bolton: "What is he doing here? He's not supposed to know where we live." The trial court admitted this statement pursuant to the necessity exception to the hearsay rule.

Hearsay may be admitted under the necessity exception if it meets the two prerequisites of necessity and trustworthiness. Ward v. State, 271 Ga. 648(2), 520 S.E.2d 205 (1999). The component of necessity is satisfied when the declarant is unavailable, the statement is relevant to a material fact, and the statement is more probative of that fact than other evidence which may be offered. Id. In turn, a statement is appropriately trustworthy if, under the totality of the circumstances, it is "coupled with circumstances which attribute verity to it." Id. Whether a statement is trustworthy is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Myers v. State, 275 Ga. 709(2), 572 S.E.2d 606 (2002). In this case, Ashley Cribbs was unavailable because she had been murdered, and, as the trial court found, the statement was relevant to show Griffin's motive, intent, and bent of mind. In addition, the statement was trustworthy because Ashley Cribbs was in the act of confiding to her close personal friend. See Ward, supra, 271 Ga. at 650(2), 520 S.E.2d 205 (uncontradicted statements made to one in whom the deceased declarant placed great confidence and to whom the declarant turned for help deemed admissible under the necessity exception). Therefore, the statement was properly admitted under the necessity exception.

Griffin also contends that the admission of the statement violated his right to confront the absent declarant pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Crawford, however, is not applicable to the statement in question, as it was not a "testimonial" statement to which that case applies. See e.g., Brawner v. State, 278 Ga. 316(2), 602 S.E.2d 612 (2004) (statements made during police interrogation subject to Crawford).

2. Griffin argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements made by him during a custodial interview conducted approximately four days after he had indicated that he no longer wished to speak to one of the detectives who was questioning him. The record shows that, after the Cribbs' murders in Savannah, Griffin allowed police to search an apartment where he lived in Hilton Head, South Carolina. Cocaine was discovered in the apartment, and Griffin was arrested in South Carolina on a drug offense. While held in South Carolina, Griffin was interviewed on October 28, 2002 regarding the Savannah murders by Investigator Rick Dailey. It is undisputed that Griffin was properly given his Miranda rights, which he waived. As the interview progressed, however, Griffin became angry with Investigator Dailey and specifically told him that he did not wish to talk with him anymore, thereby invoking his right to remain silent. Investigator Dailey honored Griffin's wishes and immediately left the room.

Griffin was interviewed a second time on November 1, 2002 by a GBI agent and Investigator Dailey. Griffin did not initiate this communication. Griffin was read his Miranda rights prior to questioning, and he signed a waiver of rights form. Investigator Dailey and the GBI agent then proceeded to question Griffin about the Savannah murders, the same subject matter that Investigator Dailey had previously discussed with Griffin.

Relying on Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), Griffin contends that the second round of questioning was inappropriate. Edwards, however, addresses the propriety of continued questioning after a defendant has invoked his right to counsel, and, as Griffin invoked only his right to remain silent in this case, Edwards is not applicable here. See Fields v. State, 266 Ga. 241(1), 466 S.E.2d 202 (1996) (second interrogation regarding same crime was proper after ten months had elapsed). When a defendant has invoked his right to remain silent, as Griffin did, the propriety of subsequent custodial questioning is governed by Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). In Mosley, subsequent custodial interrogation was admissible where the initial invocation of the right to remain silent was "scrupulously honored," a significant period of time had passed, Miranda warnings were repeated, and the second interrogation concerned a different crime. Id. at 106, 96 S.Ct. 321. A second interrogation regarding the same crime may also be constitutional under Mosley, however, where the initial invocation of the right to remain silent was scrupulously honored. Fields, supra.²

Under the facts of this case, the Mosley factors are satisfied. First, Investigator Dailey scrupulously honored Griffin's original invocation of his right to remain silent by immediately stopping his interview and physically exiting the interview room. Second, in the four days between interviews, Griffin...