Mack v. State

• Decision Date: 17 November 2014
• Docket Number: No. S14A1168.,S14A1168.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: MACK v. The STATE.

296 Ga. 239

765 S.E.2d 896

MACK

v.The STATE.

No. S14A1168.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 17, 2014.

John Hugh Bradley, Milledgeville, for appellant.

Stephen Andrew Bradley, Asst. Dist. Atty., Fredric Daniel Bright, Dist. Atty., Daniel Brent Cochran, Asst. Dist. Atty., Monticello, for appellee.

Opinion

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

Appellant Artenimus Rayshun Mack has been charged with murder and related offenses in connection with an October 2012 shooting in Baldwin County. In the course of his prosecution, Mack moved to suppress various statements he made to police investigators following his arrest, contending, inter alia, that they were obtained in violation of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Following a hearing, at which the State adduced video recordings of Mack's statements and the testimony of investigators to whom these statements were made, the trial court denied the motion. The trial court concluded, in pertinent part, that Mack had not unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent and that he had “purposefully reinitiated” the communications with investigators in which he ultimately confessed to shooting the victim. We granted Mack's application for interlocutory appeal, and we now conclude that these findings were in error. Accordingly, we reverse.

On November 1, 2012, Mack was arrested and taken to the Baldwin County Sheriff's Office. At approximately 12:10 p.m., after an officer advised him of his Miranda¹ rights, Mack executed a written waiver form, and investigators began questioning him. During the approximately two hours that followed, Mack told investigators his version of the events leading up to and culminating in the shooting. Mack admitted being present but maintained that the shooter was an unidentified third party who, in the course of purchasing marijuana from Mack and the victim, unexpectedly produced a gun and fired at the victim.

After a one-and-a-half-hour break, the interview resumed, wherein the investigators performed a gunshot residue test on Mack. The investigators then told Mack he needed to start over with his story. Mack continued to deny that he had shot the victim, insisting that his prior account was the truth.

When the investigators began confronting Mack with inconsistencies between his account and the forensic evidence, the discussion became heated, and Mack began asking about what charges he was facing. When the lead investigator, Lieutenant Bobby Langford, told Mack that he would likely be charged with drug possession due to a large quantity of marijuana found in Mack's car, the following colloquy ensued:

MACK: OK, well, you're going to charge me with that dope, then charge me with the dope and go ahead send me to the jail.

LANGFORD: I'm going to.

MACK: OK, well, let's ride.

LANGFORD: Well, let's get—

MACK: I'm done. I have no more to say. I'm done. (Standing up) Let's ride.

At this point, the investigators told Mack to sit back down, to which he replied, “I'm done. I ain't got no more to say.” Mack sat back down, and this exchange followed:

LANGFORD: We still got some things we need to clear up. That's what I'm trying to—

MACK: I have no more to say. Y'all going to sit here and just tell me my story is a lie—

LANGFORD: That's what you're doing—

MACK: I have no more to say. You're going to charge me, man, charge me. Take me in. Let's rock. I'm ready to go.

LANGFORD: You ain't got to talk back to me.

The interview continued for approximately 30 more minutes, with Mack insisting on the truth of his account. Toward the end of the interview, Mack expressed his desire to return to the jail. Before turning Mack over to other law enforcement personnel, Langford tried several times, with different tactics, to convince Mack to tell him the truth and admit his “mistake.” Langford also informed Mack that he was leaving town the next morning and that as a result this would likely be Mack's last opportunity to tell Langford what really happened. Mack still refused to change his story, and the interview ended at approximately 5:10 p.m.

The following morning, Langford interviewed Mack at the Baldwin County Sheriff's Office again, beginning at approximately 10:10 a.m. As reflected in the video recording, the interview began with Langford explaining that he was preparing to leave town and wanted to find out whether Mack, after having “a chance to sleep on everything last night,” desired to “get anything straight this morning.”² Langford then read Mack his Miranda rights, and Mack signed another waiver form. Langford resumed his entreaties to Mack to tell him the truth and again announced that he was preparing to leave town. Mack continued to deny committing the murder. Several breaks were taken, during which Mack was permitted to smoke, telephone his wife, and return to his room to pray. After returning from his prayers, Mack altered his story slightly in a way that made it more consistent with the forensic evidence as described to him by Langford, but he still refused to admit to shooting the victim. Langford, clearly frustrated, ended the interview and escorted Mack out of the interrogation room at approximately 11:54 a.m.

The final interview began roughly ten minutes later, wherein Mack, after being Mirandized one more time, admitted to Langford that he shot the victim and gave a brief description of the events leading up to the murder. The video recording contains no colloquy about, or other indication of, who initiated this conversation. At the suppression hearing, however, Langford testified that Mack initiated the conversation: “Somebody from the detention called me or came up and said, ‘[Mack] wants to speak with you again,’ and I said, ‘bring him up.’ ” There was no testimony or other evidence adduced at the suppression hearing to dispute this account.

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court must affirm the trial court's findings on disputed facts unless clearly erroneous. McDougal v. State, 277 Ga. 493(1), 591 S.E.2d 788 (2004). Here, however, there are no disputed facts, given that Mack's interrogation sessions were captured in video recordings that are part of the appellate record and that the one material communication that was not recorded—the request prompting Mack's final interview—is not the subject of any factual dispute. See id.; Green v. State, 275 Ga. 569, 573(2), n. 11, 570 S.E.2d 207 (2002). Accordingly, our review of the trial court's application of the law to the undisputed facts is de novo. McDougal, 277 Ga. at 497, 591 S.E.2d 788.

1. In examining the operation of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that when an individual in custody “indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473–474(III), 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). At this point, that individual “has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion.” Id. at 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602. In this regard, this Court has held that

an assertion of the right to remain silent during custodial interrogation must be unambiguous and unequivocal before interrogators are required to stop their questioning.... Resolution of that question depends on whether the accused articulated a desire to cut off questioning with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 401, 404(2), 721 S.E.2d 864 (2012). An accused will be found to have “unambiguously and unequivocally” asserted his right to remain silent where he declares that he is finished talking or otherwise expresses the clear desire for police questioning to cease. See, e.g., State v. Moon, 285 Ga. 55, 57, 673 S.E.2d 255 (2009) (finding unequivocal assertion of the right to remain silent where defendant, after being questioned for some time, stated, “I ain't got no more to say. I mean, that is it.”); Green, 275 Ga. at 572–573, 570 S.E.2d 207 (finding unequivocal assertion of right to silence when defendant said in response to detective's suggestion that the interview was about to end, “That's cool.... I don't want to talk.”); Hatcher v. State, 259 Ga. 274, 277(2), 379 S.E.2d 775 (1989) (finding unequivocal assertion where defendant stated during police interview, “I don't want to talk about it no more please. No, no, no.”), overruled on other grounds by Perez v. State , 283 Ga. 196, 200, 657 S.E.2d 846 (2008). Cf. Barnes v. State, 287 Ga. 423, 425(2), 696 S.E.2d 629 (2010) (defendant's statement that “if you're not going to talk real talk, then we shouldn't talk” was not an unequivocal assertion of the right to remain silent).

Here, Mack unambiguously and unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent when he stated during the November 1 interview, “I'm done. I have no more to say. I'm done. Let's ride.”³ These statements, followed closely by similar expressions of Mack's desire to stop talking amidst the investigators' entreaties to him to tell the truth, clearly articulated Mack's desire that further questioning cease. See Moon, 285 Ga. at 57, 673 S.E.2d 255. Accordingly, any statements Mack made during the November 1 interview after invoking his right to remain silent were improperly obtained and must be suppressed. See id. (affirming suppression of statements made after defendant's invocation of right to remain silent); Green, 275 Ga. at 573, 570 S.E.2d 207 (trial court should have suppressed statements made after invocation of defendant's right to remain silent).

2. The admissibility of the statements made during the November 2 interviews is a more complicated issue, as it is clear that an accused's assertion of his right to remain silent effects neither a ...