Griffith v. North Carolina Dep't Of Correction
| Decision Date | 01 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 10 CVS 150,NO. COA10-1043,10 CVS 150,COA10-1043 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | JOSEPH MICHAEL GRIFFITH, Plaintiff, v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION and ALVIN W. KELLER, JR., Defendants |
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 25 June 2010 by Judge W. Erwin Spainhour in Anson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 January 2011.
Joseph Michael Griffith, pro se, plaintiff-appellant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Peter A. Regulski, for defendants-appellees.
Joseph Michael Griffith ("plaintiff") appeals the trial court's order granting the North Carolina Department of Correction's ("NCDOC") and Alvin W. Keller, Jr.'s ("Keller") (collectively, "defendants"), motion to dismiss pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (2010) ("Rule 12(b)(6)") for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.
Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the NCDOC, claimed defendants needed legislative authorization pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 12-3.1 (1997) prior to promulgation of their policy imposing inmate medical co-payments for custodial medical services. Plaintiff's argument appears to be based on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 123.1 (1997), which provides, in pertinent part:
In the construction of a statute, unless that construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General Assembly, or repugnant to the context of the statute, the legislative grant of authority to an agency to make and promulgate rules shall not be construed as a grant of authority to the agency to establish by rule a fee or a charge for the rendering of any service or fulfilling of any duty to the public, unless the statute expressly provides for the grant of authority to establish a fee or charge for that specific service.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 12-3.1 (1997). On or about 1 August 1997, defendants enacted a policy to charge a medical co-payment fee to all inmates in the custody of the NCDOC.1
On 1 March 2010, plaintiff filed an action in Anson County Superior Court, alleging that the NCDOC violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 12-3.1 (1997) when it promulgated the inmate co-pay policy without first seeking legislative approval of the policy. On 10 May 2010, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which reliefcould be granted. Defendants claimed, inter alia, that inmate medical care was not a service rendered to the "public."
On 25 June 2010, following a hearing, the trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We disagree.
The standard of review of an order granting a 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a claim for which relief can be granted under some legal theory when the complaint is liberally construed and all the allegations included therein are taken as true. On a motion to dismiss, the complaint's material factual allegations are taken as true.
Burgin v. Owen, 181 N.C. App. 511, 512, 640 S.E.2d 427, 428 (2007) (internal citations omitted). However, "conclusions of law or unwarranted deductions of facts are not admitted." Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 427, 251 S.E.2d 843, 851 (1979) (citations omitted). The trial court properly grants a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) if any one of the following conditions is met: "(1) the complaint on its face reveals that no law supports the plaintiff's claim; (2) the complaint on its face reveals the absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or (3) the complaint discloses some fact that necessarily defeats the plaintiff's claim." Wood v. Guilford Cty., 355 N.C. 161, 166, 558 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2002) (internal citation omitted). "The standard of review on an appealof a grant of a motion to dismiss is de novo." Scheerer v. Fisher, _ N.C. App. _, _, 688 S.E.2d 472, 474 (2010).
As an initial matter, plaintiff objects to the trial court's Conclusions of Law numbers one, two, three, and four in its order granting defendants' motion to dismiss. However, where conclusions of law are not required, they are disregarded on appeal. United Virginia Bank v. Air-Lift Assocs., 7 9 N.C. App. 315, 323, 339 S.E.2d 90, 95 (1986). When a trial court grants a motion to dismiss, "it is not necessary or required for the trial court to enter conclusions of law, and that if such are entered, they are disregarded on appeal." City of Charlotte v. Little-McMahan Properties, Inc., 52 N.C. App. 464, 469, 279 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1981). The trial court's only legal conclusion when granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is when the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint are taken as true, they are insufficient "to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory, whether properly labeled or not." Locklear v. Lanuti, 176 N.C. App. 380, 383, 626 S.E.2d 711, 714 (2006) (citation and quotation omitted). Therefore, we disregard the trial court's conclusions of law in its order granting defendants' motion to dismiss, and address only whether the allegations in plaintiff's complaint are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
When this Court analyzes a statute, we look first to the cardinal principles of statutory interpretation. "When the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and judicial construction of legislative intent is not required." Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006) (citing Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990)).
The version of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 12-3.1 in effect at the time the NCDOC promulgated the policy provided, in pertinent part:
In the construction of a statute, unless that construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General Assembly, or repugnant to the context of the statute, the legislative grant of authority to an agency to make and promulgate rules shall not be construed as a grant of authority to the agency to establish by rule a fee or a charge for the rendering of any service or fulfilling of any duty to the public, unless the statute expressly provides for the grant of authority to establish a fee or charge for that specific service.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 12-3.1 (1997) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff argues that he is a member of "the public" for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 12-3.1. We disagree.
[T]here is a salient difference between persons who are members of the public community and prison inmates in that the latter, by law, are prohibited from exercising the rights and privileges they enjoyed as free members of society. Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights justified by considerations underlying the penal system.
Mithrandir v. Dep't of Corrections, 164 Mich. App. 143, 147, 416 N.W.2d 352, 354 (1987) (internal citations omitted). "Unlike a person who enters a jail,... inmates are legally compelled to be there." Brown v. Genesee County Bd. of Comm'rs, 464 Mich. 430, 439, 628 N.W.2d 471, 476 (2001).
Prisoners... are exempt from the Wage and Hour Act. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.14(a)(6) (1999). They are barred from bringing a work-related claim under the Tort Claims Act and have limited remedies if they are injured while working. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-26(a)(4) (1999); Richardson v. N.C. Dept. of Correction, 345 N.C. 128, 478 S.E.2d 501 (1996). The Workers' Compensation Act does not apply to inmates of prisons unless an accidental injury or death resulting from the prisoner's employment assignment amounts to a discharge. In such a case, the inmate would be able to recover no more than thirty dollars per week during the inmate's disability following his release from prison. The disability payments do not relate back to the date of the injury, but to the date of release. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-13 (1999). Prisoners cannot earn more than $1.00 per day. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-26(a)(4). Further, prisoners are not eligible to use the services of the Employment Security Commission even if on work release. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 96-8(6)(k)(17) (1999).
State v. Frazier, 142 N.C. App. 207, 209-10, 541 S.E.2d 800, 802 (2001). See also In re Bode, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1002, 1005, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536, 538-39 (1999) (); Jennifer L. Lange, Note, Biting the Hand that Feeds Them--State Prisons and the ADA: Responding to Amos v. Maryland Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services, 1998 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 875, 886 (1998) ( ).
Furthermore, inmates are also subject to other restrictions on their privileges, rights, and liberties that members of the "public" are not. See, e.g., State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 603-04, 565 S.E.2d 22, 32-33 (2002) (...
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