Grillette v. Warden, Winn Correctional Center

• Decision Date: 22 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-30937.,02-30937.
• Citation: 372 F.3d 765
• Parties: David GRILLETTE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WARDEN, WINN CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

372 F.3d 765

David GRILLETTE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WARDEN, WINN CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 02-30937.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 22, 2004.

Peter Reichman Flowers (argued), Shreveport, LA, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Stephen Christopher Fortson (argued), Lemle, Kelleher, Barlow & Hardtner Shreveport, LA, Don M. Burkett, Many, LA, for Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before GARWOOD, JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:

David Grillette, a Louisiana state prisoner, appeals the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as time-barred. Grillette was granted a Certificate of Appealability ("COA") as to whether he is entitled to statutory tolling of the limitations period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) during the interval between the trial court's April 19, 1999, denial of his state habeas application and the filing of his supervisory writ application to the state appellate court on June 8, 2000. For the following reasons, we hold that, under the circumstances presented, Grillette's state post-conviction relief proceedings remained "pending" and thereby tolled the limitations period throughout this interval, rendering his § 2254 application timely. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Grillette was convicted by a jury in Louisiana's Eleventh Judicial District Court, DeSoto Parish, of attempted second degree murder, aggravated burglary, and armed robbery, for which he was sentenced to concurrent terms of 50, 30, and 99 years' imprisonment. Grillette's convictions and sentences became final on October 31, 1991, when they were affirmed on direct appeal by the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal. Grillette did not seek direct review in the Louisiana Supreme Court. On July 12, 1993, Grillette filed an application for state habeas relief, asserting that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Grillette argued that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by engaging in the use and manufacture of methamphetamine during the time of Grillette's trial and by failing to object to allegedly improper and unconstitutional jury instructions.¹ On April 19, 1999, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court vacated Grillette's attempted second degree murder conviction, but denied his habeas application as to his remaining convictions. On June 8, 2000, Grillette filed an application for a supervisory writ with the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal. The Louisiana Court of Appeal reached the merits of the case, but denied relief on June 23, 2000.² Grillette then timely filed an application for supervisory writs with the Louisiana Supreme Court on June 24, 2000. On May 11, 2001, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied the writs without assigning reasons.

On April 11, 2002, Grillette filed a § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief in federal district court, challenging his remaining state court convictions. The magistrate judge sua sponte recommended that Grillette's § 2254 petition be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred by the one-year limitation period imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). Because Grillette's conviction became final prior to the AEDPA's April, 24, 1996, effective date, he was entitled to a one-year grace period from that date (in the absence of statutory or equitable tolling) to file a federal habeas petition. Egerton v. Cockrell, 334 F.3d 433, 435 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 200-02 (5th Cir.1998)). The magistrate judge determined that Grillette's state application tolled the limitations period under § 2244(d)(2) until April 19, 1999, while it was pending in the trial court. From that point, Grillette had 30 days within which to timely file a supervisory writ application to the Louisiana Court of Appeal. See Louisiana Courts of Appeal Uniform Rule 4-3 (1999). The magistrate judge found, however, that Grillette had neither filed a writ application to the appellate court within that 30-day period nor obtained an extension of the return date. Citing Melancon v. Kaylo, 259 F.3d 401 (5th Cir.2001), the magistrate judge determined that tolling of the one-year limitations period therefore ceased on May 19, 1999, when the 30 days allotted by Rule 4-3 had passed. The magistrate judge further concluded that Grillette was not entitled to any further tolling under § 2244(d)(2). The magistrate judge reasoned that by the time Grillette filed his supervisory writ application with the Louisiana Court of Appeal on June 8, 2000, more than one year had elapsed since this application was rendered untimely under Rule 4-3; therefore, the AEDPA's one-year limitations period had already expired.

Grillette filed objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation of dismissal, contending that he was entitled to equitable tolling because his case presented rare and extraordinary circumstances and because he had diligently pursued post-conviction relief. Grillette also argued that he was entitled to further statutory tolling. Contrary to the magistrate judge's conclusion, Grillette averred, his writ application to the Louisiana Court of Appeal was filed timely because he "gave notice of his intent to take a [w]rit on the issues related to the two convictions left standing" and the court had granted him an extension on the return date, "set[ting it] for June 8, 2000." In support of his contentions, Grillette presented a letter dated July 11, 2002, from the trial judge, Judge Beasley, verifying that following his April 1999 written judgment, he "was aware that [Grillette, through counsel,] intended to file a Writ of Supervisory Review" to the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal. Judge Beasley further wrote that "[b]ecause he was aware" that Grillette's new defense counsel had been "diligently" trying to locate and gather the documentation necessary for a writ application, "[he] believed it appropriate to extend the return date until June 8, 2000."³ Nonetheless, on August 9, 2002, the district court denied Grillette's objections, adopted the reasons stated in the magistrate judge's recommendation, and entered a judgment dismissing Grillette's § 2254 petition. Grillette then timely filed Notice of Appeal and sought a COA from the district court, which the district court denied on September 16, 2002.

This Court granted a COA "as to whether Grillette is entitled to tolling of the limitations period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) during the interval between the trial court's denial of his application and the filing of his writ application to the appellate court," but denied COA on the issue whether the defendant was entitled to equitable tolling. For the following reasons, we vacate the district court's dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DISCUSSION

In a federal habeas corpus case, we review de novo the district court's denial of a § 2254 application on procedural grounds. Melancon v. Kaylo, 259 F.3d 401, 404 (5th Cir.2001) (citing Emerson v. Johnson, 243 F.3d 931, 932 (5th Cir.2001)). The AEDPA established a one-year statute of limitations on the filing of federal habeas applications. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Federal habeas applicants, such as Grillette, whose convictions became final prior to the AEDPA's April 24, 1996, enactment, had a one-year grace period until April 24, 1997, to file a federal habeas application. Melancon, 259 F.3d at 404 (citing Hall v. Cain, 216 F.3d 518, 520 (5th Cir.2000)). However, pursuant to § 2244(d)(2), a "properly filed" state post-conviction application tolls "any [AEDPA] limitations period," including the one-year grace period, throughout the entire time during which the application is "pending." Smith v. Ward, 209 F.3d 383, 384 (5th Cir.2000) (citing Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir.1998) (stating that "the § 2244(d)(2) tolling provision is applicable to this one-year [grace] period for filing following AEDPA's effective date")).

The Supreme Court clarified in Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002), that a state habeas "application is pending," in the context of § 2244(d)(2), "as long as the ordinary state collateral review process is `in continuance,'" or, in other words, "until the application has achieved final resolution through the State's post-conviction procedures." Saffold, 536 U.S. at 219-20, 122 S.Ct. 2134. Thus, a petitioner is entitled to, and indeed often must invoke, "one full round" of collateral review in state court before seeking federal habeas relief. Id. at 222, 122 S.Ct. 2134. While that full round of state habeas proceedings is properly in progress, AEDPA's one-year period of limitations is tolled. Id. The Supreme Court emphasized that such a construction of AEDPA and its limitations period protects "the principles of `comity, finality, and federalism,' by promoting `the exhaustion of state remedies while respecting the interest in the finality of state court judgments.'" Id. (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001)).

It is undisputed that Grillette's state post-conviction application, filed July 12, 1993, was "pending" with the trial court for almost six years, until April 19, 1999, when the trial court granted in part and denied in part the application. Accordingly, his state application clearly tolled the federal one-year limitations period, which began on April 25, 1996 (the day after the AEDPA became effective), until April 19, 1999. A state habeas application remains "pending," and thus continues to toll AEDPA's limitations period, during the interval between a state trial court's disposition of the...