Grogan v. Lutheran Medical Center, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 97CA0811,97CA0811
• Citation: 950 P.2d 690
• Parties: 97 CJ C.A.R. 3439 Vicki L. GROGAN, Petitioner, v. LUTHERAN MEDICAL CENTER, INC., and The Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Respondents. . IV
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 690

950 P.2d 690

97 CJ C.A.R. 3439

Vicki L. GROGAN, Petitioner, v. LUTHERAN MEDICAL CENTER, INC., and The Industrial Claim

Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Respondents.

No. 97CA0811.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. IV.

Dec. 26, 1997. ^*

Law Office of Neil O'Toole, P.C., Neil D. O'Toole, Denver, for Petitioner.

Weinberger & Kanan, P.C., Michael W. Sutherland, Denver, for Respondent Lutheran Medical Center, Inc.

No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office.

Opinion by Judge ROY.

Petitioner, Vicki L. Grogan (claimant), seeks review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) which affirmed an order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denying her claim for temporary total disability benefits (TTD) while she received job placement services. We affirm.

The pertinent facts are undisputed. In July 1991, claimant sustained a compensable injury while working for Lutheran Medical Center (Lutheran). In July 1995, claimant was placed at maximum medical improvement (MMI) and assigned a medical impairment rating of 24% of the whole person. Lutheran then filed a final admission of liability admitting liability for benefits of approximately $62,472.90 which had previously been paid. This amount exceeded the $60,000 benefit cap set forth in § 8-42-107.5, C.R.S.1997, for injuries when a claimant's impairment rating is 25% or less of the whole person.

In late March or early April 1996, Lutheran offered claimant "job placement assistance" to be provided by a vocational rehabilitation firm. Claimant accepted the offer and attended two job interviews arranged by the vocational firm, which also provided several other services, including resume preparation.

After accepting the offer of job placement services, claimant filed a notice of hearing on the issue whether she was entitled to rehabilitation maintenance benefits during the time she received job placement services. At the hearing, claimant argued that the job placement services constituted "vocational rehabilitation" and that, therefore, she was entitled to ongoing TTD benefits pursuant to § 8-42-105(1), C.R.S.1997, as long as she received those services.

She further asserted that any such TTD benefits she received were in the nature of vocational rehabilitation maintenance benefits and thus were not subject to inclusion in the calculation of the $60,000 benefit cap.

Lutheran responded, taking the position that the offer of job placement was not vocational rehabilitation and, therefore, it was not willing to reinstate TTD benefits. It further argued that, even if the job placement constituted vocational rehabilitation, claimant was not entitled to any further TTD benefits because the § 8-42-107.5 benefit cap had already been exceeded.

In resolving these issues, the ALJ reasoned that the benefits claimant sought were necessarily TTD benefits because rehabilitation maintenance benefits are not available under the Workers' Compensation Act. Thus, regardless of whether the job placement services constituted "vocational rehabilitation," claimant was not entitled to any additional TTD benefits as any such benefit was subject to the $60,000 cap which already had been exceeded. The Panel affirmed and claimant now seeks review.

Claimant again argues that the job placement services constitute "vocational rehabilitation" for purposes of § 8-42-105(1). Then, relying primarily on Donald B. Murphy Contractors v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 916 P.2d 611 (Colo.App.1995), claimant contends that the § 8-42-107.5 cap does not apply because she would receive TTD benefits because of her acceptance of an offer of vocational rehabilitation. We need not address her first argument because we disagree with her contention that the cap does not apply.

Section 8-42-107.5, which provides for a benefit cap, states in pertinent part:

No claimant whose impairment rating is twenty-five percent or less may receive more than $60,000 from combined temporary disability payments and permanent partial disability payments....

In construing statutes, our primary task is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. To accomplish this, we turn first to the words of the pertinent statutes. Farmers Group, Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419 (Colo.1991).

Legislative words and phrases in a statute should be given their plain and ordinary meanings, Snyder Oil Co. v. Embree, 862 P.2d 259 (Colo.1993), and a forced, subtle, or strained construction should be avoided if the language is simple and the meaning is clear. Wright v. Vail Run Resort Community Ass'n, 917 P.2d 364 (Colo.App.1996).

If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to other rules of statutory construction. Snyder Oil Co. v. Embree, supra.

Here, in construing the terms of the pertinent statutes, we agree with the ALJ that the benefits claimant sought were TTD benefits subject to the § 8-42-107.5 cap.

The section in the Act which provides for benefits during vocational rehabilitation, § 8-42-105(1), C.R.S.1997, provides that TTD benefits terminate upon the occurrence of any of the events enumerated in § 8-42- 105(3), C.R.S.1997, except where vocational rehabilitation has been offered and accepted pursuant to § 8-42-111(3), C.R.S.1997. Section 8-42-105(1) further provides that, if vocational rehabilitation is started, but later terminated, neither the employer nor insurer may recover any TTD benefits paid during vocational rehabilitation. Thus, by its own terms, § 8-42-105(1) establishes that disability payments made to a...