Grumley v. Webb

• Decision Date: 31 October 1871
• Citation: 48 Mo. 562
• Parties: WILLIAM GRUMLEY, Respondent, v. WM. G. WEBB, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

48 Mo. 562

WILLIAM GRUMLEY, Respondent,

v.WM. G. WEBB, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1871.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Geo. P. Strong, for appellant.

The cause of action in this case originated prior to the date of the discharge. All the facts upon which this suit is based were well known to Grumley when he made the settlement. The receipt, when interpreted in the light of all the facts and circumstances connected with the settlement, is a full discharge of the plaintiff's claims embraced in this suit. (Altham's case, 4 Coke, 305-6; Vedder v. Vedder, 1 Denio, 259; Hoes v. Van Hosen, 1 Barb. Ch. 398; Van Brunt v. Van Brunt, 3 Edw. Ch., N. Y., 16; 1 Show. 150, 154; Bell v. Bruen, 1 How. 169; Russell v. Rogers, 10 Wend. 479; Perkins v. Forniquet, 14 How. 313; Gray v. McCune, 23 Penn. 447; McGlynn v. Billings, 16 Verm. 329.)

The two suits virtually embraced the whole matter in controversy.

Grumley had his election to take the lease, with the rents and profits, or to take the value of the buildings. He could not have both. If Webb paid for the buildings, the rents and profits would belong to him. Grumley could not be forced to take the lease, nor ought he to be allowed to evade the effect of the settlement by alleging that he did not know that he could recover the lease. He knew that Webb had it, and he knew all the circumstances under which it was obtained. With all this knowledge, he made no claim to the lease for more than four years, and brought suit for the value of the buildings. When that suit was settled and dismissed, all claim to that lease was relinquished. Grumley's delay in asserting any claim, especially after he knew the $7,000 suit was dismissed, and that Webb claimed there had been a full settlement, was a recognition of the fact of the set?lement and a waiver of any of his rights. (See McNew v. Booth, 42 Mo. 193, as to what would be a reasonable time in which to assert a claim.)

The receipt should be so interpreted as to give effect, if possible, to all its terms. It should be held to apply to all claims of the same nature as those embraced in the judgment specified. General words are only rejected, or limited to the special recital, when the testimony shows that the parties could not be presumed to have had in mind the subject to which it is sought to apply them. In all other cases they should be allowed their natural and reasonable force. (Ramsdell v. Hylton, 2 Ves. Sr. 310; Van Brunt v. Van Brunt, supra; Moore v. McGrath, Cowp. 9, 11; Knight v. Cole, supra;Bell v. Bruen, supra;Haydell v. Roussell, 1 La. Ann. 38; 6 Bac. Abr. 632.)

The settlement was a full, fair and reasonable settlement. Defendant has paid for Grumley, as the accounts show, $11,593.75 profits on his own money, for a lease that was not worth over $6,000. Such a payment ought to be held to include all matters, all demands growing out of that property, up to March 7, 1865.

The receipt is a sufficient compliance with the statute of frauds. A release of a claim or demand is a release or settlement and extinguishment of all right to the thing out of which the demand arose. (4 Com. Dig. 96, §§ 20, 22, 24-5; Hughes v. Moore, 7 Cranch, 176; Perkins v. Forniquet, 14 How. 310; Altham's case, 4 Coke, 304-6; Dearborn v. Cross, 2 Cow. 48.) The plaintiff has received a large sum of money from defendant, who had reason to believe that he was paying for a full discharge of all claims and demands; he was led to that belief by the plaintiff. Grumley repeatedly sent him (defendant) to Broadhead to settle without any limitation of authority. Broadhead did act as his agent, and did settle both suits. There was nothing to lead defendant to doubt his full authority, and plaintiff ought not now to be allowed to deny it. If Broadhead had no authority, and yet settled the second suit, and received from Webb, acting in good faith, a large sum of money in consideration of that settlement; and if Grumley, by his words or conduct, induced Webb to believe that Broadhead had authority, Grumley is estopped to deny that authority. (Merchants' National Bank v. State National Bank of Boston, 10 Wall. 604; Hern v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289; Farmers' Bank v. B. & D. Bank, 16 N. Y. 131, 133, 136; Welland Canal v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 483.) In the case of the Merchants' Bank, the court say: “Smith, by his conduct, if not by his declarations, avows his authority to buy the certificates and gold in question; and the bank, under the circumstances, had a right to believe him.” So with Col. Broadhead. He, by his conduct, avowed his authority to settle both suits, and under the circumstances Webb had a right to believe him.

All that is required by the statute of frauds is some memorandum in writing signed by the party to be charged or affected. The release or receipt is such a memorandum. Webb does not claim under Grumley but under O'Fallon. He has a title good against all the world except Grumley, who has a claim or demand to it; but Webb is in possession, and Grumley is desirous to assert this claim or demand. Now, when he releases that, he releases everything that he has--every right. How, then, can this court enforce a claim or demand which he has discharged?

When Webb settled for this claim and demand, he settled everything that Grumley could enforce, and secured “repose and quiet” from the only party who could disturb the title he holds from O'Fallon.

The language of the receipt is not only broad enough to cover this claim, but its language implies that there is a claim embraced in it against Webb alone, as well as a joint claim against Bigham & Webb. The judgment was a joint one. This claim is against Webb alone, and the receipt refers to such a claim.N. Myers, with Geo. W. Cline, for respondent.

I. Although Webb procured the lease in controversy in his own name, yet the equitable title is in Grumley. (44 Mo. 444.)

II. The plaintiff, Grumley, has never in any way parted with his equitable interest in this new lease:

1st. Because he could part with it in the way of a voluntary transfer by a writing alone, in conformity to the requirements of the statute of frauds (Wagn. Stat. 655, § 2).

( a) Grumley's estate in the new lease is created “by operation of law:” it is sought to divest him of it, not in the same way, but by voluntary conveyance, in the way of bargain and sale. In all cases of voluntary conveyance of an ““interest” in land, whether legal or equitable, parol testimony is inadmissible.

( b) This is not the case of rebutting, but of divesting an equity. It is not attempted to show that the equitable estate never did vest; but that after it had been vested a year and a half, the owner thereof voluntarily sold and parted with it. The defendant does not attempt to show by the receipt of March 7, 1865, that the equitable estate never vested in Grumley; but that, having vested more than a year previous, he, in the way of bargain and sale, parted with it.

A written memorandum in full conformity to the provisions and requirements of the statute of frauds is necessary. An equitable interest is as much within the statute of frauds as a legal interest. (Hughes v. Moore, 7 Cranch, 466; Millard v. Hathaway, 27 Cal. 119; Gratz v. Gratz, 4 Rawle, 434; Kelly et al. v. Stanberry, 13 Ohio, 426; Goucher v. Martin, 9 Watts, 107; Cravener v. Bowser, 4 Penn. St. 261; Simms v. Killian, 12 Ired. 252; Richards v. Richards, 9 Gray, 313; Bowser v. Cravener, 56 Penn. 132.)

2d. The defendant has no writing sufficient under the statute of frauds:

( a) Because there must be a designation of the land sold in the receipt, or in some writing to which the receipt refers. In the case at bar there is not the remotest or faintest reference to any interest in any land. The writing must show the whole contract, without reference to parol proof. (Shied v. Stamps, 2 Sneed, 172; Pipkin v. Jones, 1 Hum. 325; Simmonds v. Catlin, 2 Caines, 61-66; Johnson v. Catlin, 2 Johns. 258; Bankman v. Kuykendall, 6 Blackf. 21; Bailey et al. v. Ogdens, 3 Johns. 419; Ellis v. Deadman's Heirs, 4 Bibb, 467.)

( b) Because the only writing the defendant has is a receipt for the judgment alone. The receipt itself includes nothing else. The sweeping clause “in full of all claims and demands” is to be restrained and limited by the previous special recital of the judgment. A general release is to be taken most strongly against the releasor; but where there is a special recital, and then general words follow, the general words are to be restrained and qualified by the special recital. (See opinion in Grumley v. Webb, 44 Mo. 444, and authorities cited.)

( c) This receipt, then, is not a memorandum conveying any title to any land. It is a mere receipt for the judgment of $11,522.54. It is sought to introduce verbal evidence, not to explain but to extend this receipt; to show by parol, not what it does cover, but what it does not cover. The case therefore shows an undivested equity in the plaintiff.

3d. Even if the statute of frauds were in no way applicable to this case, yet the evidence in the case shows clearly that Grumley did not receive the $6,500 for anything but the judgment of $11,522.54, the matter specially mentioned in the receipt; that it was not intended to include his right to the ten-year lease in controversy.

( a) Upon this branch of the case we submit there is no longer any question properly debatable in this court. Our review of the evidence shows that it is substantially the same as it was on the first trial. There is the same irreconcilable conflict. If, therefore, the case presents substantially the same aspect as it did when here before, it is no longer fairly open for debate. Perhaps it is admissible to ask the court to consider a new case, but it is certainly rather late to ask the court to reconsider an old one.

( b) But granting, for the argument, that the question is still open for debate here, we contend that (as justly remarked by the court in its original...