Guillen-Gonzalez v. JC Penney Corp., Inc.

Decision Date16 August 2010
Docket NumberCivil No. 08-2407 (FAB)
Citation731 F.Supp.2d 219
PartiesFrank GUILLEN-GONZALEZ, Plaintiff, v. JC PENNEY CORP., INC., JC Penney Puerto Rico, Inc., and/or JC Penney Company of Puerto Rico, Inc., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Manuel Duran-Rodriguez, Manuel Duran Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Kenneth C. Suria-Rivera, Marena Sofia Ramirez-Ramirez, William Estrella Law Offices, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 21.) Having considered the arguments contained in defendant's motion and plaintiff's opposition, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 12, 2008, plaintiff Frank Guillen-Gonzalez ("Guillen") filed a complaint alleging that defendant JC Penney Puerto Rico, Inc. ("JC Penney") discriminated against him because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and a Commonwealth discrimination statute known as "Law 100", P.R. Laws Ann. tit 29, § 146. Guillen also claims that JC Penney retaliated against him in violation of the retaliation clause of the ADEA and in violation of a Commonwealth retaliation statute known as "Law 115", P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 194a. Guillen alleges that JC Penney failed to promote him, but instead filled the positions he sought with younger employees whom Guillen alleges were less experienced than he. (Docket No. 1 at 3-4.) Guillen also claims that JC Penney demoted him and substituted him with "substantially younger employees." Id. at 4. Guillen also alleges JC Penney failed to promote him and demoted him because of his age, and because he filed a charge of discrimination against JC Penney. He claims he suffered from severe emotional injuries and that he lost past and future wages and benefits as a result of JC Penney's actions against him.

JC Penney argues that Guillen's claims should all be dismissed. According to JC Penney, Guillen's discrimination claims are either time-barred or fail to establish prima facie cases of disparate treatment or retaliation.

LOCAL RULE 56

Local Rule 56(c) requires a non-moving party to file with its opposition "a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts" which shall "admit, deny or qualify the facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts and unless afact is admitted, shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation as required by this rule." Local Rule 56(c) also requires that, if the nonmoving party includes any additional facts, such facts must be in a separate section, set forth in separate numbered paragraphs, and be supported by a record citation. As a general principle, parties may not include legal arguments or conclusions in their statement of facts. See MVM Inc. v. Rodriguez, 568 F.Supp.2d 158, 163 (D.P.R.2008); Juarbe-Velez v. Soto-Santiago, 558 F.Supp.2d 187, 192 (D.P.R.2008).

The First Circuit Court of Appeals has "repeatedly ... emphasized the importance of local rules similar to Local Rule 56 [of the District of Puerto Rico]." Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2007). Rules such as Local Rule 56 "are designed to function as a means of 'focusing a district court's attention on what is-and what is not-genuinely controverted.' " Id. (quoting Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir.2006)). Due to the importance of this function to the summary judgment process, "litigants ignore [those rules] at their peril." Id. Where a party does not act in compliance with Local Rule 56, "a district court is free, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to accept the moving party's facts as stated." Id. (citing Cosme-Rosado v. Serrano-Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.2004)).

Guillen has largely failed to comply with the requirements of Local Rule 56(c). Instead of supporting his denials of JC Penney's assertions with specific record citations as required by Local Rule 56, Guillen's counter-statement contains paragraphical responses to JC Penney's alleged facts that are identical, demonstrating that Guillen's counsel uses and repeats the same language, verbatim, over and over, rather than creating arguments tailored to each alleged fact Guillen wishes to qualify or deny. The repeated arguments fail to cite to anything on the record supporting the given denials or qualifications of disputed facts. Of course, this failure to cite properly to supporting materials is to be expected when the exact same denials and qualifications, citing to the exact same materials on the record, are used to refute the diversity of facts alleged by JC Penney.

As to JC Penney's assertion that Guillen's supporting materials are not admissible, the Court reminds both parties that it will not rely on facts supported by documents that are not authenticated either by supporting affidavit or by virtue of their being self-authenticating documents prepared in the normal course of business. JC Penney is not immune from this admonition; in certain instances it fails to identify properly key exhibits purporting to support its statement of uncontested facts. The Court will also not rely on Guillen's own discrimination charge as evidence. Guillen asks the Court to consider the documentation of his administrative charges of discrimination as evidence supporting those very same claims brought to this Court. Such a request is like John Doe supporting his claim of innocence by referencing his claim of innocence in another forum.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

What follows is a brief factual background composed of relevant uncontested facts meant to provide context for the Court's legal analysis. The Court may introduce further factual information or discuss submitted exhibits as necessary in the course of examining the contested claims.

JC Penney is the owner and operator of all JC Penney stores in Puerto Rico, including the store located a Plaza Las Americas ("Plaza") where Guillen was still employed at the time the pleadings beforethe Court were filed. (Docket No. 21-27 at 1.)

Guillen was born on March 14, 1961. (Docket No. 21-1 at 2.) JC Penney hired Guillen as a Customer Service Associate at its Plaza store on February 21, 1988. (Docket Nos. 21-5; 21-25 at 9; 21-27 at 1-2.) It appears from a document summarizing Guillen's status within the company that his rate of payment was changed on April 9, 2000, as a result of a promotion to a Basic Logic Associate 1 and that he received numerous pay rate changes throughout his tenure as a result of "merit." 2 (See Docket No. 21-4 at 3.)

On October 24, 2004, JC Penney reclassified Guillen's job position from a BLA to a Pricing Associate. (Docket No. 21-3 at 2.) JC Penney eliminated the BLA position altogether in October of 2004, such that all persons holding the BLA position were affected. (Docket Nos. 21-25 at 14; 21-26 at 16.) On October 24, 2004, JC Penney eliminated the BLA position and reclassified Guillen from a BLA to a Pricing Associate as the result of its implementation of a new "Demand Chain Management System" (hereinafter "system").3 (Docket Nos. 21-27 at 2; 21-26 at 16.) According to Guillen, there were six persons holding the BLA position at the time of his reclassification. (Docket No. 21-25 at 26.) The BLA position was eliminated, and replaced by a new position called Inventory Maintenance Associate ("IMA"). (Docket No. 21-26 at 16.)

As stated by Guillen in his testimony, JC Penney gave the persons holding BLA positions two choices: either be reclassified to a different position other than the BLA position, or receive a severance package following termination with the company. (Docket No. 21-25 at 24.) Guillen also stated in his testimony that the order of seniority with the company would determine the positions offered to former BLA employees. Id. at 24-25. Two of the six BLAs had more seniority than Guillen: employees Maria Medina and Elizabeth Valles. ( Id. at 25.) Both were reclassified from BLA to IMA positions. (Docket Nos. 21-13; 21-15.) According to Guillen, ElizabethValles was over the age of forty when she was reclassified, and Maria Medina was "more or less" older than him at that time. (Docket No. 21-25 at 21.) Another BLA, Blanca Vega, who was hired before Guillen, and was older than Guillen, would have also been reclassified as an IMA but, due to her illness with cancer, she did not return to work at JC Penney. (Docket Nos. 21-12; 21-26 at 20-22.) Carmen Diaz, another BLA who was younger than Guillen, was reclassified to a much lower position than an IMA after the system was implemented. (Docket No. 21-26 at 22.)

JC Penney offered Guillen the following options for reclassification following the elimination of the BLA position Guillen held: a department supervisor position at either the Hatillo or Caguas stores; a position with less responsibility at the Plaza store; or the severance package upon termination. (Docket No. 21-27 at 2.) JC Penney claims no other IMA positions were available ( Id.); Guillen claims he was told there would be three IMA positions (Docket No. 21-25 at 22), and that he was not offered a position in Caguas, only in Hatillo. (Docket No. 32-2 at 1.) According to JC Penney, Guillen declined the department supervisor position at Hatillo or Caguas because of the rotating schedule requiring evening work and some weekends, as well as opening and closing the store. (Docket No. 21-27 at 2.) Guillen testified that he declined the position in Hatillo because it was "too far" from his home, not because of the work schedule it required. (Docket No. 32-2 at 1.) Regardless, Guillen continued working at the Plaza location as a Pricing Associate, which was a position with less responsibility and pay than that of the BLA position he held previously. (Docket Nos. 21-26 at 26; 21-27 at 2.) Guillen claims that the Plaza store manager, Daniel Ciccotelli, promised...

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