Gulledge v. Smart

• Decision Date: 29 July 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 0:87-782-16.
• Citation: 691 F. Supp. 947
• Parties: Faye GULLEDGE, as Administratrix of the Estate of David Gulledge, Jr., for the Estate and for the benefit of herself and David Gulledge, Sr., Plaintiff, v. Joe A. SMART and J. Elbert Pope, Sheriff of York County, and John Hunsucker, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

691 F. Supp. 947

Faye GULLEDGE, as Administratrix of the Estate of David Gulledge, Jr., for the Estate and for the benefit of herself and David Gulledge, Sr., Plaintiff, v. Joe A. SMART and J. Elbert Pope, Sheriff of York County, and John Hunsucker, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 0:87-782-16.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Rock Hill Division.

July 29, 1988.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ray P. McClain, Charleston, S.C., for plaintiff.

William H. Davidson, II, Columbia, S.C. for J. Elbert Pope.

Robert R. Carpenter, Rock Hill, S.C., for John Hunsucker.

Terry B. Millar, Rock Hill, S.C., for Joe A. Smart.

ORDER

HENDERSON, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff has brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deprivation of her decedent's life without due process of law, together with pendent state claims arising under the South Carolina wrongful death and survivorship statutes. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the defendants' motion.

I.

On motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts and inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the record reveals the following facts.

The plaintiff's decedent, David Gulledge, Jr., was killed on September 4, 1985, by Richard Jackson, a deputy sheriff appointed by the York County Sheriff. For several weeks before the killing, Jackson showed signs of depression at work such as acting in a withdrawn manner and, on more than one occasion, breaking down in tears. The sheriff's department as a whole was unusually tense at that time because the sheriff, defendant J. Elbert Pope, was under suspension and the deputies generally were uncertain of the security of their jobs. It was also commonly known that Jackson and his wife were having marital difficulties. On approximately August 25, 1985, Lynn Jackson told her husband that she intended to leave him.

While there is no evidence that Jackson demonstrated violent tendencies at work, Jackson was involved in one incident of domestic violence and threatened suicide. On approximately August 29, 1985, Jackson came home late at night, awakened his wife, handcuffed her and forced her outside. Once outside, he handcuffed her to himself and, with a gun in his hand, threatened to kill himself. The incident ended when their daughter called to them from the house. The next day, August 30, Lynn Jackson left the marital home with their daughter to live with her mother.

On the same day, August 30, Jackson confided to his friend and supervisor, defendant Joe Smart, that his wife was leaving him and that he had threatened suicide the night before. Jackson, however, assured Smart that the threats were a bluff to prevent his wife from leaving him and that he was fine and able to work. He turned down Smart's suggestions that he seek counselling or take time away from work. They agreed to meet that evening after Jackson finished his shift. Over the next few days, Smart monitored Jackson's work by listening to the scanner, talking to Jackson in person and by telephone and inquiring of Jackson's dispatchers and colleagues. Smart, however, did not report Jackson's suicide threat or any of his related marital difficulties to any superior officer until September 4, 1985, the day of the killing.

There is no evidence that Jackson experienced difficulties in performing his duties during this period. He arranged for his wife and daughter to return to the marital home while he went to live with his mother.

On the morning of September 4, Lynn Jackson met her husband, who was off duty, at an automobile repair shop where he left his patrol car to be serviced. During the course of the morning, the Jacksons discussed their marital problems and Lynn Jackson told her husband that she was having an extramarital affair with David Gulledge, Jr. This was the first Jackson knew of the existence of Gulledge and of the affair. The same morning, the Jacksons met with a lawyer to discuss a divorce on the ground of adultery. Jackson then requested his wife to drive her car to the Gulledge family business where he engaged in an altercation with David Gulledge, Jr., before leaving.

After he picked up his patrol car from the repair shop, Jackson met his wife at the marital home. He then forced her into the "escape-proof" backseat of the patrol car and drove off. Jackson radioed his dispatcher, asking to talk to Smart. Smart, however, was out of radio range. Jackson drove to the Gulledge family business. As his wife and Gulledge's mother watched, Jackson fatally shot Gulledge ten times with a semiautomatic rifle that was in the trunk of the patrol car. The rifle was Jackson's personal property. His service revolver lay unused on the hood of the patrol car.

At the time of the shooting, Jackson was off duty, dressed in street clothes and carrying his own personal weapon. Although he was off duty, he was driving his patrol car and, in accordance with departmental policy, was carrying his identification card, badge and service revolver while driving the patrol car. The shooting, however, was carried out away from the patrol car and there is no evidence that Jackson employed any of the "tools of his trade" once he left its vicinity. Notwithstanding Jackson's unsuccessful attempt to talk to Smart by radio, there is no evidence that Jackson actually advised anyone at the sheriff's department of his whereabouts or intentions until after the shooting had occurred.

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers, admissions and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Diebold, 369 U.S. at 655, 82 S.Ct. at 994. Rule 56(e), however, provides that a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleadings but must set forth or point to specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The defendants in this action are Joe A. Smart, a deputy sheriff with the rank of captain who was Jackson's supervisor, J. Elbert Pope, the elected sheriff of York County who was under suspension from office pending criminal charges at the time of the shooting, and John Hunsucker, who had been appointed acting sheriff at the time of the shooting. The defendants are being sued in both their individual and official capacities. The plaintiff asserts two grounds for holding the defendants liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) gross negligence, willfulness, wantonness and recklessness by the defendants in supervising and retaining a deputy who was unfit for duty and who was "on duty" whenever he was in his patrol car, including a failure to promulgate departmental policies for controlling such unfit deputies; and (2) a breach of the defendants' alleged duty to protect the public at large and the decedent in particular from violence at the hands of a deputy sheriff.

A.

The Fourth Circuit has recognized that a cause of action may arise under § 1983 as interpreted in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed. 2d 611 (1978), where a deficient program of police training and supervision allegedly results in a police officer's violation of the constitutional rights of others. Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1389-91 (4th Cir. 1987). Chief among the substantive requirements for establishing liability for police misconduct, described in Spell as "stringent indeed," 824 F.2d at 1391, is the requirement that there be "at least an `affirmative link' between policy or custom and violation; in tort principle terms, the causal connection must be `proximate,' not merely `but-for' causation-in-fact." Id. at 1387-88.

The defendants admit that the York County Sheriff had no policies or procedures for dealing with emotionally impaired officers. The plaintiff asserts that the defendants should have had a policy requiring that any deputy who showed signs of depression, as Jackson had, be compelled to seek treatment and, further, be denied access to firearms and "instruments of coercion, such as a patrol vehicle." (Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 15). The Court agrees with the defendants, however, that the essential element of causation is lacking. The defendants' failure to require that Jackson submit to treatment cannot be found to have proximately caused Gulledge's death in the absence of evidence that Jackson would have affirmatively responded to such treatment. Moreover, it is clear from the evidence that the rifle used in the shooting was Jackson's personal weapon, not a firearm issued or approved by the York County Sheriff. Therefore, any attempt to restrict Jackson's access to departmental weapons would have been fruitless. Finally, the record is devoid of evidence that Jackson's use of the patrol car played any role at all in the shooting except to transport Jackson to the scene.¹ Because Jackson could have used his personal car to the same end, the Court concludes that the failure to promulgate a policy denying access to "instruments of coercion" such as the patrol car did not proximately cause Gulledge's death.

The shooting, tragic though it was, was entirely personal in nature; there was a direct emotional involvement with the victim. The incident was unrelated to Jackson's law enforcement activities or duties and could have occurred in exactly the same fashion had Jackson no longer...